It looks like Bin Laden didn't read my last post about Islam being the solution so I will repeat the question to him.
First of all what form of Islam are you inviting America to endorse? If it's Sunni Islam then do you reccomend the Hanafi, Shafi'i or Salafi doctrine? And if it's Shi Islam, which hierarchy would you recommend? The Iranianone of Khamenai, the Iraqi with its four great Ayatollahs, or the Lebanese represented by Hussein Fadhlallah? Or maybe sheik Bin Laden is going to graciously leave America to choose its new faith freely!?
Second, Bin Laden didn't specify how this endorsement of Islam would be enforced; should it be by an executive order from the Bush administration, a legislation from the Democratic Congress, or would it be up to the American people to answer Bin Laden's call, voluntarily?
The sheik had better leave people to choose their faith as they please but of course this isn't part of the ideology of dark intolerance that sees an enemy in anyone who doesn't endorse his exact same path.
This extremist path declared democracy an enemy and here although Bin Laden was referring to the Iraqi experiment he certainly doesn't limit this animosity to this case alone. I don't think he likes other democracies and that's why arguing that it was America that provoked al-Qaeda to interfere in Iraq, or that al-Qaeda didn't exist in Iraq under Saddam, is a stupid thing to say.
The man clearly says that he despices democracy as well as those who believe in it whether in Iraq or elsewhere. Now if he has the right to invite others to Islam then it should be equally our right to invite others to democracy. Except only if we admit that democracy is a sinful path and that Bin Laden is right, then America and the world should retreat from Iraq, abandon the mission to support the fledgling democracy over there and sit back and wait for other democracies to have their turn on Bin Laden's death menu.
America didn't bring al-Qaeda to Iraq, it's democracy in Iraq that made the extremists panic—their greatest fear is that if the once capital of the Islamic empire fell in the lap of democracy, what would "protect" other parts of the "land of Islam" from "falling" too!?
The conflict is not about Bin Laden and America; it's an ideological conflict in which there are people and regimes across the world that support one side or another, meaning that the conflict was inevitable even if America hadn't taken part. Otherwise the region would have been living in peace and prosperity now!
In fact, and I think many people agree with me, the American-led intervention was defensive rather than offensive when Bin Laden's ideology jumped to strike the towers in New York. At that point it became evident that such an ideology, in the presence of regimes that support it, could threaten any spot on the map with no exception from Bali to Madrid—and although the victims of this ideology have been mostly from the middle east, this could well change in the future if the extremist manage to take over the region.
We shouldn’t think that such crazy messages could come only from a Salafi extremist like Bin Laden; because it actually reminds me of a similar call from Khomeini to the leaders in Moscow to convert to Islam shortly before the collapse of the Soviet Union. The late Ayatollah also said that Islam was the solution, so the point we should realize here is that this way of thinking is not an aspect of one particular sect as much as its part of the totalitarian ideology of Islamists that is deeply rooted in the minds of those, from one sect or another, who want to revive the Caliph rule.
Like we said in the previous post, regimes that follow this ideology, be it the Sunni Taliban or the Shia Mullahs, have failed to offer a civilized model of life so they chose instead to beautify and sell the idea of death under the old slogan of "Our dead are in heaven and your dead are in hell".
It's even more interesting in a way that this call for converting to Islam is a big fantasy since Bin Laden and the like know very well than America or other countries in the west would never impose a certain faith on their people. This message marks a deep trouble in the way extremists think; they live in illusions with complete disregard for facts, which is a very dangerous phenomenon when it's at this magnitude. And it leaves no room to doubt that they would do anything to drag the region, and the world, to an uncalculated confrontation.
It is evident from the naivety of the message that logic is completely missing in their ideology which means that dialogue with those people would be equally nonsense.
New points of view about the future of Iraq and the Middle East.
Saturday, September 08, 2007
Wednesday, September 05, 2007
Islam, The Solution...!?
Yesterday Maliki went to visit Sistani to discuss the latest security and political developments with him.
It's the kind of a move that reflects the government's persistence to let clerics make the political decisions for the country. As if they haven't done enough harm so far!
Instead of reaching out to his partners in the political process from other groups he goes in the exact opposite direction and I really don't know what he thought such visit could do to improve his position, especially at a time when he's in desperate need to mend the rift in his cabinet.
When I think of this meeting I see that it can't do anything good for Iraq. It probably can serve one particular segment of the people but most likely it's an attempt to fix the damage caused by the Shia-Shia conflict following the recent incidents in Karbala which further isolated the "coalition of four" from the rest of Shia parties.
It remains difficult for Sistani to deal with that too because he doesn't only not represent all Iraqis; he doesn't represent all the Shia either. This man had isolated himself in a small room in the back alleys of Najaf and he communicates with the world only through his agents and representatives so he can't be expected to offer much help to anyone. And it's wrong to think that the man can solve any problem with a single fatwa—we had seen many examples where fatwas and statements by dozens of clerics of both sects that called for calm and rejecting violence got ignored and couldn't change a thing in the situation on the ground.
The problem with Maliki who's the leader of the Islamic Dawa Party is that he's just like all other Islamists who insist that Islam is the solution and that clerics are the ones who can deliver that solution.
But reality proved that political Islam is in fact the problem, not the solution. And this is true not only in Iraq but in many other countries in the region that are full of political Islamist movements. They build their rhetoric on what they like to call the golden age of Islam and promise that a new golden age could come if people returned to the roots of Islam…but what happened when Islamists ruled? Definitely not a golden age of any sort.
The first problem with their theory is that they can't say which version of Islam represents the solution. With all the sectarian differences we can see, saying that Islam is the solution is an empty slogan that requires a lot of clarification.
But the truth is, every rival party believes that their faith is the only true faith and when this dispute infected the political scene in the most violent way Islam became the most prominent problem. And that's how we ended up in the middle of a Sunni-Shia conflict as well as Sunni-Sunni and Shia-Shia conflicts.
The recent incidents in Karbala are striking evidence on how mixing politics with religion made brothers slaughter one another in a bloody war for power. Even the holy shrines were not spared in the fighting.
It's ironic that when a Muslim kills another Muslim or destroys the sites revered by his own people no one speaks of it here as a major problem but if a non-Muslim does that the uproar would be legendary!
In spite of all that Islamists still insist on their slogan and after all what happened Ahmedinejad wants Shia Iran and Sunni Saudi Arabia to "fill the vacuum" when America leaves Iraq…I can only imagine the way in which the vacuum would be filled and levels of violence that would accompany that!
The people remain the most important item in the equation as they are the ones who have the actual power to decide the long-term strategic choices with their votes.
In Iraq the experience with the rule of Islamists has certainly reduced the numbers of people who support the idea of Islamic rule and a there's a growing number of people who now began to question the idea about Islam being the solution.
So, there will be a great long battle between the two ideas; between Islamic rule and the separation between religion and the state--the current problem is that the people are divided into two, almost equal, groups in this respect. This means none of the two can prevail at this stage but at the same time the performance of the government made mostly of Islamists will no doubt lead to a steady decrease in its popularity.
Islamists have failed to offer a chance for a better life whether when they were in the opposition or when they got to rule the country. I think that's why they try to sell the idea of death instead of life; they failed to offer a better life so they picked up the slogan of death and "martyrdom" to promise a better life, but in an imaginary heaven; not in real life.
This strategy, in some time that cannot be specified right now, will mark the beginning of actual death but it will the death of political Islamist movements and maybe Iraq, the country where people have the right to make a choice, will become a grave for political Islam.
It will take more than one round of elections to declare them dead but I see that time is not on the Islamists' side.
The war is going to be long because it's a war of ideas—the conflict is not going to be a localized one and will have different forms because I believe the whole world is concerned and will take part in one way or another.
Identifying and supporting the true moderates would be a fair weapon to use in this war and I think American and the rest of the free world will keep trying to support positive reforms towards a better life to defeat the ideology of death.
It's the kind of a move that reflects the government's persistence to let clerics make the political decisions for the country. As if they haven't done enough harm so far!
Instead of reaching out to his partners in the political process from other groups he goes in the exact opposite direction and I really don't know what he thought such visit could do to improve his position, especially at a time when he's in desperate need to mend the rift in his cabinet.
When I think of this meeting I see that it can't do anything good for Iraq. It probably can serve one particular segment of the people but most likely it's an attempt to fix the damage caused by the Shia-Shia conflict following the recent incidents in Karbala which further isolated the "coalition of four" from the rest of Shia parties.
It remains difficult for Sistani to deal with that too because he doesn't only not represent all Iraqis; he doesn't represent all the Shia either. This man had isolated himself in a small room in the back alleys of Najaf and he communicates with the world only through his agents and representatives so he can't be expected to offer much help to anyone. And it's wrong to think that the man can solve any problem with a single fatwa—we had seen many examples where fatwas and statements by dozens of clerics of both sects that called for calm and rejecting violence got ignored and couldn't change a thing in the situation on the ground.
The problem with Maliki who's the leader of the Islamic Dawa Party is that he's just like all other Islamists who insist that Islam is the solution and that clerics are the ones who can deliver that solution.
But reality proved that political Islam is in fact the problem, not the solution. And this is true not only in Iraq but in many other countries in the region that are full of political Islamist movements. They build their rhetoric on what they like to call the golden age of Islam and promise that a new golden age could come if people returned to the roots of Islam…but what happened when Islamists ruled? Definitely not a golden age of any sort.
The first problem with their theory is that they can't say which version of Islam represents the solution. With all the sectarian differences we can see, saying that Islam is the solution is an empty slogan that requires a lot of clarification.
But the truth is, every rival party believes that their faith is the only true faith and when this dispute infected the political scene in the most violent way Islam became the most prominent problem. And that's how we ended up in the middle of a Sunni-Shia conflict as well as Sunni-Sunni and Shia-Shia conflicts.
The recent incidents in Karbala are striking evidence on how mixing politics with religion made brothers slaughter one another in a bloody war for power. Even the holy shrines were not spared in the fighting.
It's ironic that when a Muslim kills another Muslim or destroys the sites revered by his own people no one speaks of it here as a major problem but if a non-Muslim does that the uproar would be legendary!
In spite of all that Islamists still insist on their slogan and after all what happened Ahmedinejad wants Shia Iran and Sunni Saudi Arabia to "fill the vacuum" when America leaves Iraq…I can only imagine the way in which the vacuum would be filled and levels of violence that would accompany that!
The people remain the most important item in the equation as they are the ones who have the actual power to decide the long-term strategic choices with their votes.
In Iraq the experience with the rule of Islamists has certainly reduced the numbers of people who support the idea of Islamic rule and a there's a growing number of people who now began to question the idea about Islam being the solution.
So, there will be a great long battle between the two ideas; between Islamic rule and the separation between religion and the state--the current problem is that the people are divided into two, almost equal, groups in this respect. This means none of the two can prevail at this stage but at the same time the performance of the government made mostly of Islamists will no doubt lead to a steady decrease in its popularity.
Islamists have failed to offer a chance for a better life whether when they were in the opposition or when they got to rule the country. I think that's why they try to sell the idea of death instead of life; they failed to offer a better life so they picked up the slogan of death and "martyrdom" to promise a better life, but in an imaginary heaven; not in real life.
This strategy, in some time that cannot be specified right now, will mark the beginning of actual death but it will the death of political Islamist movements and maybe Iraq, the country where people have the right to make a choice, will become a grave for political Islam.
It will take more than one round of elections to declare them dead but I see that time is not on the Islamists' side.
The war is going to be long because it's a war of ideas—the conflict is not going to be a localized one and will have different forms because I believe the whole world is concerned and will take part in one way or another.
Identifying and supporting the true moderates would be a fair weapon to use in this war and I think American and the rest of the free world will keep trying to support positive reforms towards a better life to defeat the ideology of death.
Whereabouts
Today I have an announcement to make...
Just two days ago I arrived in New York City and for the coming two years I will be studying international affairs at Columbia University, hopefully by the end of that I will get the master's degree I want!
So far I'm still in the process of settling in and figuring out what I need to do in order to actually start my studies.
However posting on this blog will continue and a new post will be coming tomorrow if not tonight.
And by the way, in case some of Ali's old readers are wondering where he is and like to contact him, he's going to college at Stony Brooks in Long Island.
Just two days ago I arrived in New York City and for the coming two years I will be studying international affairs at Columbia University, hopefully by the end of that I will get the master's degree I want!
So far I'm still in the process of settling in and figuring out what I need to do in order to actually start my studies.
However posting on this blog will continue and a new post will be coming tomorrow if not tonight.
And by the way, in case some of Ali's old readers are wondering where he is and like to contact him, he's going to college at Stony Brooks in Long Island.
Tuesday, August 28, 2007
Crossing Anbar
We've been getting some reports about the improvement in security in Anbar in the last few months but little was said about the highway that runs across the province.
The several hundred kilometer western section of the international highway is technically Iraq's second "port" in a way as it connects Iraq with Syria and Jordan and was for years the only window to the world when all airports and the southern ports in Basra were closed to traffic in the 1990s.
For most of the time between 2004 and 2007 taking this road was considered suicidal behavior as the chance someone would be robbed or killed was too high.
But with the tribal awakening in Anbar that cleared large parts of the province from al-Qaeda the highway is expected to be safer, but how much safer?
My family returned yesterday from a vacation in Syria and they have used this road twice in six weeks. I had tried hard to convince them not to do that and take a flight instead but now after hearing their story I'm convinced that my fear was not justified; the road is safe…
This is good not only for Iraq's economy and traveling but also for the American troops who can use this road as an alternative supply route in case the British troops withdraw and leave the strategic southern highway between Kuwait and Baghdad unguarded.
Back to the story; there are two travel plans for passenger SUV's and buses from Damascus to Baghdad; one includes leaving Damascus between 10 pm and midnight, reaching the Syrian border control before dawn, entering the Iraqi border control at 8 am and arriving in Baghdad around sunset. A total of approximately 20 hours with 6 to 7 hours lost in waiting and passport control.
The second plan includes leaving Damascus at noon and here convoys carrying the passengers continue to move all the way until a short distance northwest of Ramadi. At this point the time would be between midnight and 2 am and since that's within curfew hours in Baghdad, the drivers park their vehicles and everyone gets to sleep 3 or 4 hours and wait for the sun to rise and then the journey would continue.
Now the first plan sounds predictable, safe and well planned given the distance and necessary stops. But look at the second one carefully and try to picture the scene; dozens of passenger SUV's (GMC trucks mostly) and buses parking in he middle of nowhere in a zone that was until recently the heart of al-Qaeda's Islamic state! Obviously the drivers and families feel safe enough that they know they won't be robbed and slaughtered by cold-blooded terrorists. Even more interesting, this parking and resting zone was not designated nor protected by the Iraqi or American forces but simply an arrangement the drivers managed on their own perhaps with cooperation from the local tribes.
I still laugh every time I think of this incredible change and I honestly wouldn't have believed it if the story teller wasn't my father.
This sign of positive progress brings to my mind a sad irony. Back in 2004 when taking the Anbar highway was out of question for me, the Sunni dentist, I made the trip back and fourth between Baghdad and Basra countless times without any fear.
Now, I'm ready to try the trip through the west, but going south through the militia infested land is something I'd never dare do at this stage.
Aside from security my father told me one more thing that shook the common idea about the numbers of Iraqi refugees fleeing to Syria. Apparently the direction of movement is influenced by the season to a certain degree.
When my family's turn to pass through the passports control on the Iraqi side came, the vehicles that were still behind them on the Syrian side outnumbered the ones coming from the Iraqi side.
And that's not the only indication to the seasonal aspect of Iraqis' migration.
Six weeks ago when my family hired a driver to take them to Damascus the fare was $110 for each passenger since finding a car to take you out of Baghdad was difficult while the return trip from Damascus would cost only $25 per passenger because drivers were ready to accept any amount of money rather than to return to Baghdad empty handed.
Guess what, the opposite is now true!
It's supply and demand 101, this change in cost reflects a change in demand on the two ends of the route suggesting that a good percentage of Iraqis who flooded Syria in the beginning of the summer season were just trying to escape the summer heat and enjoy a simple vacation, like my family did.
It doesn't mean a refugees issue doesn't exist, but it does mean that Iraqis could sometimes be just normal tourists...
The several hundred kilometer western section of the international highway is technically Iraq's second "port" in a way as it connects Iraq with Syria and Jordan and was for years the only window to the world when all airports and the southern ports in Basra were closed to traffic in the 1990s.
For most of the time between 2004 and 2007 taking this road was considered suicidal behavior as the chance someone would be robbed or killed was too high.
But with the tribal awakening in Anbar that cleared large parts of the province from al-Qaeda the highway is expected to be safer, but how much safer?
My family returned yesterday from a vacation in Syria and they have used this road twice in six weeks. I had tried hard to convince them not to do that and take a flight instead but now after hearing their story I'm convinced that my fear was not justified; the road is safe…
This is good not only for Iraq's economy and traveling but also for the American troops who can use this road as an alternative supply route in case the British troops withdraw and leave the strategic southern highway between Kuwait and Baghdad unguarded.
Back to the story; there are two travel plans for passenger SUV's and buses from Damascus to Baghdad; one includes leaving Damascus between 10 pm and midnight, reaching the Syrian border control before dawn, entering the Iraqi border control at 8 am and arriving in Baghdad around sunset. A total of approximately 20 hours with 6 to 7 hours lost in waiting and passport control.
The second plan includes leaving Damascus at noon and here convoys carrying the passengers continue to move all the way until a short distance northwest of Ramadi. At this point the time would be between midnight and 2 am and since that's within curfew hours in Baghdad, the drivers park their vehicles and everyone gets to sleep 3 or 4 hours and wait for the sun to rise and then the journey would continue.
Now the first plan sounds predictable, safe and well planned given the distance and necessary stops. But look at the second one carefully and try to picture the scene; dozens of passenger SUV's (GMC trucks mostly) and buses parking in he middle of nowhere in a zone that was until recently the heart of al-Qaeda's Islamic state! Obviously the drivers and families feel safe enough that they know they won't be robbed and slaughtered by cold-blooded terrorists. Even more interesting, this parking and resting zone was not designated nor protected by the Iraqi or American forces but simply an arrangement the drivers managed on their own perhaps with cooperation from the local tribes.
I still laugh every time I think of this incredible change and I honestly wouldn't have believed it if the story teller wasn't my father.
This sign of positive progress brings to my mind a sad irony. Back in 2004 when taking the Anbar highway was out of question for me, the Sunni dentist, I made the trip back and fourth between Baghdad and Basra countless times without any fear.
Now, I'm ready to try the trip through the west, but going south through the militia infested land is something I'd never dare do at this stage.
Aside from security my father told me one more thing that shook the common idea about the numbers of Iraqi refugees fleeing to Syria. Apparently the direction of movement is influenced by the season to a certain degree.
When my family's turn to pass through the passports control on the Iraqi side came, the vehicles that were still behind them on the Syrian side outnumbered the ones coming from the Iraqi side.
And that's not the only indication to the seasonal aspect of Iraqis' migration.
Six weeks ago when my family hired a driver to take them to Damascus the fare was $110 for each passenger since finding a car to take you out of Baghdad was difficult while the return trip from Damascus would cost only $25 per passenger because drivers were ready to accept any amount of money rather than to return to Baghdad empty handed.
Guess what, the opposite is now true!
It's supply and demand 101, this change in cost reflects a change in demand on the two ends of the route suggesting that a good percentage of Iraqis who flooded Syria in the beginning of the summer season were just trying to escape the summer heat and enjoy a simple vacation, like my family did.
It doesn't mean a refugees issue doesn't exist, but it does mean that Iraqis could sometimes be just normal tourists...
Wednesday, August 22, 2007
They never miss an opportunity to miss an opportunity.
This was said about the Palestinians, I believe, though it seems to apply just as well to our political class but with a difference. There are some opportunities our leaders never seem to miss: the ones that make things worse.
In the last few weeks, the major political parties in Iraq have kept taking turns at damaging the political process and ultimately their own government. First, the ministers of both the Accord Front and Allawi’s bloc withdrew from the cabinet almost simultaneously, just as the unjustified summer recess was starting.
Last week, the Kurds and Shias added their share of the damage by announcing their new coalition of four parties. The move is wrong in both timing and principle; on the one hand, the date for Gen. Petraeus’ progress report in September is getting near. On the other, it’s a step in the exact opposite direction to what is needed in terms of the surge — the life rope America has thrown to save the country and allow the government in Baghdad to win the confidence of its people.
In fact I don’t know what those people were thinking when they formed this coalition; instead of trying to mend the rift and glue back the fractured unity government they come and officially reduce the government to a Shia-Kurdish alliance and further sideline reluctant Sunnis and seculars.
And saying -as they did- that the door is still open for other blocs to join the new coalition is totally worthless in this case: by then, the Islamic Party of Vice President Hashimi (which the Kurds and Shia said they would welcome) felt shunned because they didn’t wait for them and rushed to announce their “front of the moderates”. And that without even inviting the arguably only true moderate secular group represented by the Iraqi list.
It’s even stranger to see someone like Talabani, who’s considered to be a sharp and thoughtful politician, wondering “why no one welcomed the new coalition.” What makes him and the other leaders of the four involved parties think that anyone would applaud this step? Are they really that naïve to think they did something good for Iraq, or even for their own parties?
Apparently they thought renewing the vows of their old alliance would strengthen their grip on the executive and legislative authorities and allow them to impose their narrow partisan visions regarding Kirkuk and the southern provinces. But I believe they are shooting themselves in the foot. They made the ruling coalition less representative than ever, and made another change more likely and more appealing than it already was.
Every time we think they are beginning to wise up one of them comes and does something stupid. While regular Iraqis want nothing but a decent life, the fat rich suits care only about competing for more power. And even in this they disappoint. All of them.
So, what’s the solution?
Changing Maliki and his cabinet without holding new elections can cut the time needed to bring a change, but with the downside that the new Prime Minister will still have to pick his cabinet members from the same pool of candidates. Unless he’s an extraordinarily tough man his choices would be restricted with sectarian and ethnic quotas. While these quotas may prevent a “tyranny of the majority,” they also lead to one deadlock after another.
But even early elections might not bring a breakthrough. There’s no assurance that new elections will result in significant change in the political map, mostly because a) existing major parties aren’t likely to tolerate fair competition, and b) the current election system elects slates instead of direct election of individual candidates.
To be honest the situation is a dilemma—we can’t tolerate more incompetence and frustration, and at the same we are not sure what early elections are going to bring. But it’s a risk we Iraqis need to take if we want to end this awkward scene.
In the last few weeks, the major political parties in Iraq have kept taking turns at damaging the political process and ultimately their own government. First, the ministers of both the Accord Front and Allawi’s bloc withdrew from the cabinet almost simultaneously, just as the unjustified summer recess was starting.
Last week, the Kurds and Shias added their share of the damage by announcing their new coalition of four parties. The move is wrong in both timing and principle; on the one hand, the date for Gen. Petraeus’ progress report in September is getting near. On the other, it’s a step in the exact opposite direction to what is needed in terms of the surge — the life rope America has thrown to save the country and allow the government in Baghdad to win the confidence of its people.
In fact I don’t know what those people were thinking when they formed this coalition; instead of trying to mend the rift and glue back the fractured unity government they come and officially reduce the government to a Shia-Kurdish alliance and further sideline reluctant Sunnis and seculars.
And saying -as they did- that the door is still open for other blocs to join the new coalition is totally worthless in this case: by then, the Islamic Party of Vice President Hashimi (which the Kurds and Shia said they would welcome) felt shunned because they didn’t wait for them and rushed to announce their “front of the moderates”. And that without even inviting the arguably only true moderate secular group represented by the Iraqi list.
It’s even stranger to see someone like Talabani, who’s considered to be a sharp and thoughtful politician, wondering “why no one welcomed the new coalition.” What makes him and the other leaders of the four involved parties think that anyone would applaud this step? Are they really that naïve to think they did something good for Iraq, or even for their own parties?
Apparently they thought renewing the vows of their old alliance would strengthen their grip on the executive and legislative authorities and allow them to impose their narrow partisan visions regarding Kirkuk and the southern provinces. But I believe they are shooting themselves in the foot. They made the ruling coalition less representative than ever, and made another change more likely and more appealing than it already was.
Every time we think they are beginning to wise up one of them comes and does something stupid. While regular Iraqis want nothing but a decent life, the fat rich suits care only about competing for more power. And even in this they disappoint. All of them.
So, what’s the solution?
Changing Maliki and his cabinet without holding new elections can cut the time needed to bring a change, but with the downside that the new Prime Minister will still have to pick his cabinet members from the same pool of candidates. Unless he’s an extraordinarily tough man his choices would be restricted with sectarian and ethnic quotas. While these quotas may prevent a “tyranny of the majority,” they also lead to one deadlock after another.
But even early elections might not bring a breakthrough. There’s no assurance that new elections will result in significant change in the political map, mostly because a) existing major parties aren’t likely to tolerate fair competition, and b) the current election system elects slates instead of direct election of individual candidates.
To be honest the situation is a dilemma—we can’t tolerate more incompetence and frustration, and at the same we are not sure what early elections are going to bring. But it’s a risk we Iraqis need to take if we want to end this awkward scene.
Monday, August 20, 2007
Friday, August 10, 2007
Talking to Iraq's Neighbors
I think it's a good time to make a preliminary assessment of the results of reaching out and talking to Iraq's neighbors in reducing violence in the country.
So, was it a bad suggestion to talk to them?
Not completely bad, and not completely good either, pretty much like any suggestion when the situation in question is as complex as Iraq's.
The results with Iran have been so poor so far, in fact the Iranian involvement in violence has increased as statistics tell us—the American commanders here said that attacks on coalition forces by Shia militias linked to Iran represented 75 percent of total attacks in July.
Although it's still unclear whether this rise was a result of more attacks by militias or of fewer attacks by other insurgents the overall outcome is that for some reason dialogue either failed to encourage a change in Iran's policy toward Iraq or even worse giving opposite results.
On the other hand we have Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Jordan. Although Arabia was recently criticized by ambassador Khallilzad for not doing enough there are reasons to think that the three countries have to some extent contributed to the change in attitude among Sunni Arab tribes in Anbar; an effect that is slowly spreading to other regions around Baghdad, i.e. the Baghdad belts.
It is true that seeds for the awakening movement in Anbar were planted prior to the Iraq Study Group recommendations-perhaps some of you remember sheik Jad'aan and his fighters from last year-but it would be rather naïve to think that the movement gained all the sudden momentum we saw from a local initiative by some good sheiks.
In my opinion the Arab countries I mentioned have redirected much of the support they had been giving al-Qaeda and its allied tribes to the awakening sheiks and their fighters. And why wouldn't Arab countries do this!?
First Arab countries fear that Iran would control much of Iraq and they have come to realize that the only way to prevent this from happening is by allowing Iraq to become a stable state with which they can build good relations. Second their relations with America are already much better than Iran's which is seen as a common threat to them and to Iraq's stability. Add this to recent pledges with military aid in the billions and-I assume-guarantees that democracy in Iraq is not going to be a threat to their interests and we have a good package of incentives and disincentives.
This must have convinced them that they will lose if they keep putting their money on the insurgency as a way to stop the Iranian expansion.
This doesn't mean Saudi Arabia is doing all they can. After all it's the ideology they teach in their schools and mosques that keeps breeding terrorism and until they do something about that Saudi Arabia will always be responsible for creating new generations of terrorists who could strike in Iraq and elsewhere.
Then there's Syria which I'm going to leave aside right now since apparently there has been no change in its attitude in either direction. And we still haven't heard enough about meetings between American and Syrian officials, that's if there were any. Speaking of that I think the public in Iraq and America deserve to know more about what happened during previous meetings with Iran and Arab countries—I don't know about the media in America but I know our media here is not telling us any reliable information in this respect.
The question is what can be done in order to make talking to Iran at least as fruitful as talking to the Arab countries?
I don’t have an answer for this one and it looks to me that making progress on both fronts through diplomatic means is very difficult. This is because on one hand we have a group of Arab regimes whose core concern is the preservation of their regimes and whenever possible to slow down political and social reforms in their countries for as long as possible or at least make reforms a less dramatic process. These are things that America can, more or less, reassure them about since the idea of spreading democracy in the region is an America project in the first place.
But on the other hand there is a revolutionary regime whose ambitions go beyond preserving the regime to dominating the Middle East to which the road passes through Baghdad and Basra.
Today Rafsanjani complained that America was not sending "good signals" and I wonder what sort of good signals could satisfy the Mullahs; removing sanctions, allowing them to act as they please in Iraq, or maybe letting them continue their nuclear project?
My conclusion is that a diplomatic solution with Iran in the foreseeable future is very unlikely, unless the Iranians change their regime from within.
Therefore the only way I see to neutralizing Iran's interference would be to keep building the Iraqi state until it's strong enough to deal with this interference and meanwhile military operations should continue to eliminate Iran's surrogates and secure the border. This will ultimately weaken the power of their political wing as well.
Maybe this doesn’t look like a very good plan but it's better than a direct military confrontation with Iran and let's not forget that the change in power-balance on the ground could change the outcome of future negotiations, on the long run.
So, was it a bad suggestion to talk to them?
Not completely bad, and not completely good either, pretty much like any suggestion when the situation in question is as complex as Iraq's.
The results with Iran have been so poor so far, in fact the Iranian involvement in violence has increased as statistics tell us—the American commanders here said that attacks on coalition forces by Shia militias linked to Iran represented 75 percent of total attacks in July.
Although it's still unclear whether this rise was a result of more attacks by militias or of fewer attacks by other insurgents the overall outcome is that for some reason dialogue either failed to encourage a change in Iran's policy toward Iraq or even worse giving opposite results.
On the other hand we have Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Jordan. Although Arabia was recently criticized by ambassador Khallilzad for not doing enough there are reasons to think that the three countries have to some extent contributed to the change in attitude among Sunni Arab tribes in Anbar; an effect that is slowly spreading to other regions around Baghdad, i.e. the Baghdad belts.
It is true that seeds for the awakening movement in Anbar were planted prior to the Iraq Study Group recommendations-perhaps some of you remember sheik Jad'aan and his fighters from last year-but it would be rather naïve to think that the movement gained all the sudden momentum we saw from a local initiative by some good sheiks.
In my opinion the Arab countries I mentioned have redirected much of the support they had been giving al-Qaeda and its allied tribes to the awakening sheiks and their fighters. And why wouldn't Arab countries do this!?
First Arab countries fear that Iran would control much of Iraq and they have come to realize that the only way to prevent this from happening is by allowing Iraq to become a stable state with which they can build good relations. Second their relations with America are already much better than Iran's which is seen as a common threat to them and to Iraq's stability. Add this to recent pledges with military aid in the billions and-I assume-guarantees that democracy in Iraq is not going to be a threat to their interests and we have a good package of incentives and disincentives.
This must have convinced them that they will lose if they keep putting their money on the insurgency as a way to stop the Iranian expansion.
This doesn't mean Saudi Arabia is doing all they can. After all it's the ideology they teach in their schools and mosques that keeps breeding terrorism and until they do something about that Saudi Arabia will always be responsible for creating new generations of terrorists who could strike in Iraq and elsewhere.
Then there's Syria which I'm going to leave aside right now since apparently there has been no change in its attitude in either direction. And we still haven't heard enough about meetings between American and Syrian officials, that's if there were any. Speaking of that I think the public in Iraq and America deserve to know more about what happened during previous meetings with Iran and Arab countries—I don't know about the media in America but I know our media here is not telling us any reliable information in this respect.
The question is what can be done in order to make talking to Iran at least as fruitful as talking to the Arab countries?
I don’t have an answer for this one and it looks to me that making progress on both fronts through diplomatic means is very difficult. This is because on one hand we have a group of Arab regimes whose core concern is the preservation of their regimes and whenever possible to slow down political and social reforms in their countries for as long as possible or at least make reforms a less dramatic process. These are things that America can, more or less, reassure them about since the idea of spreading democracy in the region is an America project in the first place.
But on the other hand there is a revolutionary regime whose ambitions go beyond preserving the regime to dominating the Middle East to which the road passes through Baghdad and Basra.
Today Rafsanjani complained that America was not sending "good signals" and I wonder what sort of good signals could satisfy the Mullahs; removing sanctions, allowing them to act as they please in Iraq, or maybe letting them continue their nuclear project?
My conclusion is that a diplomatic solution with Iran in the foreseeable future is very unlikely, unless the Iranians change their regime from within.
Therefore the only way I see to neutralizing Iran's interference would be to keep building the Iraqi state until it's strong enough to deal with this interference and meanwhile military operations should continue to eliminate Iran's surrogates and secure the border. This will ultimately weaken the power of their political wing as well.
Maybe this doesn’t look like a very good plan but it's better than a direct military confrontation with Iran and let's not forget that the change in power-balance on the ground could change the outcome of future negotiations, on the long run.
Saturday, August 04, 2007
The Untimely Recess
The withdrawal of the Accord Front from Maliki's cabinet and the persistence of the parliament on taking a month long recess is a major embarrassment for Baghdad and Washington alike and for anyone who was looking forward to seeing some political progress in Iraq before the September milestone.
When it comes to the recess, two main factions can be identified as the cause of the deadlock:
First there is the Accord Front. This bloc apparently trying through the withdrawal from the cabinet and preventing the passage of legislations by insisting on taking the recess to show that the government and particularly Maliki have failed.
Their moving in this direction suggests that they are betting that by proving their point they will have a chance to oust Maliki and form a new government by joining forces with other opposition groups namely Allawi's bloc, the Dialogue Front since these two blocs supported the Accord's decision and Allawi's is even planning to follow the Accord's steps out of the cabinet. The Fadheela Party and some independent UIA members could be potential partners as well.
Second we have the pro-withdrawal anti-American factions in the parliament; mainly represented the Sadr bloc in addition to some radical elements from the UIA and a few from the two Sunni blocs who are not getting along well with the moderate wing in the bloc. These simply want to halt the legislative process at this point hoping that this would put more pressure on Washington to withdraw from Iraq.
I don't have the vote record of the session in which the recess was approved but from the number (150 votes in favor of the recess) I think Allawi's bloc, or at least its members who were present that day have voted similarly perhaps for the same reason the Accord did.
I suppose Petraeus will not have a difficulty in showing progress military-wise but the question is, could that be enough to make up for the damage done by these political setbacks?
There's no question that achieving a dramatic military victory in 30 days is very unlikely when we're fighting terrorists and militias. On the other hand reversing the political damage dealt by the two developments in 30 days seems to need something close to a miracle.
These developments show that a majority in our parliament care only about themselves and their blocs' interests much more than they do about the country's in such difficult time and their attitude tells that the blocs don't want to work together and don’t want to reconcile their differences.
Like we always said, we don't need reconciliation among the people, we need reconciliation among the components of the political class and if they don't want to do this then I think the best solution to ensure a fresh political start would be to change the political class through early elections once the security situation allows for. And to do this Iraq will need the "surge" to continue for several months beyond September.
One thing makes me worried these days and I'm afraid that someone is planning a different bad solution. The rift between the minister of defense and the senior commanders including chief of staff of the army which led to a group resignation is an ominous sign that indicates a deep dispute between the two leaderships and this dispute seems to be over a political issue given their history in the military institution.
It would be too early to speculate that someone is planning a coup-or preparing to crush one-at this point but the mere thought of it remains a little bit scary.
When it comes to the recess, two main factions can be identified as the cause of the deadlock:
First there is the Accord Front. This bloc apparently trying through the withdrawal from the cabinet and preventing the passage of legislations by insisting on taking the recess to show that the government and particularly Maliki have failed.
Their moving in this direction suggests that they are betting that by proving their point they will have a chance to oust Maliki and form a new government by joining forces with other opposition groups namely Allawi's bloc, the Dialogue Front since these two blocs supported the Accord's decision and Allawi's is even planning to follow the Accord's steps out of the cabinet. The Fadheela Party and some independent UIA members could be potential partners as well.
Second we have the pro-withdrawal anti-American factions in the parliament; mainly represented the Sadr bloc in addition to some radical elements from the UIA and a few from the two Sunni blocs who are not getting along well with the moderate wing in the bloc. These simply want to halt the legislative process at this point hoping that this would put more pressure on Washington to withdraw from Iraq.
I don't have the vote record of the session in which the recess was approved but from the number (150 votes in favor of the recess) I think Allawi's bloc, or at least its members who were present that day have voted similarly perhaps for the same reason the Accord did.
I suppose Petraeus will not have a difficulty in showing progress military-wise but the question is, could that be enough to make up for the damage done by these political setbacks?
There's no question that achieving a dramatic military victory in 30 days is very unlikely when we're fighting terrorists and militias. On the other hand reversing the political damage dealt by the two developments in 30 days seems to need something close to a miracle.
These developments show that a majority in our parliament care only about themselves and their blocs' interests much more than they do about the country's in such difficult time and their attitude tells that the blocs don't want to work together and don’t want to reconcile their differences.
Like we always said, we don't need reconciliation among the people, we need reconciliation among the components of the political class and if they don't want to do this then I think the best solution to ensure a fresh political start would be to change the political class through early elections once the security situation allows for. And to do this Iraq will need the "surge" to continue for several months beyond September.
One thing makes me worried these days and I'm afraid that someone is planning a different bad solution. The rift between the minister of defense and the senior commanders including chief of staff of the army which led to a group resignation is an ominous sign that indicates a deep dispute between the two leaderships and this dispute seems to be over a political issue given their history in the military institution.
It would be too early to speculate that someone is planning a coup-or preparing to crush one-at this point but the mere thought of it remains a little bit scary.
Sunday, July 29, 2007
Mesopotamia: The Champions of Asia
I wouldn't be exaggerating if I said hat today has been as exciting as one of those election days in Baghdad. Our national soccer team is playing for the Asian cup for the first time in its history. By comparison this is as if the American team is playing for the cup of Copa America against the team of Brazil or Argentina! But of course here in Iraq we care way more about soccer than Americans do. No offense meant of course!
The government had already announced shorter work hours in all government offices, including the parliament, for today so that people can go home early enough to watch the match.
2:00 pm…
I went out in the early afternoon to bring some food and gasoline for the generator as I had only a few liters left in the generator's tank and I didn't want to take chances.
I found that small crowds have gathered around gas vendors, obviously the demand is higher today and no one seems willing to miss part of the match because of a stupid gallon of gas. As a result gas price rocketed to more than 4 dollars a gallon; that's a 30 % increase from just two days ago.
Curfew was imposed at 4 in the afternoon and will last until tomorrow morning but in fact the streets were going to be empty even without a curfew.
Everyone seemed in a hurry buying what they need to before they all go home to sit in front of the TV sets.
I returned home, filled all three generators with gasoline just in case one of them fails us, which is something that happens quite often. I also put several cans of beer in the fridge and brought some Pringles chips. The ultimate snack when watching soccer, or pretty much everything!
The good surprise came at 4:30 when the state electricity came after two days of
absence; I assume it's a small "gift" from the government and the electricity department.
4:35, the match begins!
The first half (45 minutes plus 3 minutes of added time) showed clear Iraqi supremacy but it also showed the level of tension between the two teams. There was a lot of rough playing and as a result 5 yellow cards were shared by Iraqi and Saudi players. Actually it's well known that Arab teams become more aggressive when playing against another Arab team reflecting the kind of "brotherhood" among Arabs!
So, the first half ended without scoring any goals and the result remains 0-0.
5:25…
I used the half time break to write these few notes and now I must put the laptop aside and go back to pop another can of beer and watch the second half.
Many Iraqis said they will be celebrating their team regardless of the result, so tonight there will be joy no matter what.
6:30…
No, the joy is not for "no matter what"….Our team has just won the Asian cup for the first time in our soccer history. The win came through a magnificent goal by the head of our heroic forward Younis Mahmoud at the 71st minute of the match..
Our team ruled the game by all standards; in defense, midfield and attack our players proven that they are the best…they are now the masters of Asian soccer!
Today is definitely the happiest day for Iraqis in years. Tears of joy mixed with prayers for hope on the faces of millions of Iraqis…Words truly fail me and I can't describe the feeling so please pardon me if the post doesn't sound coherent; I hear the cheering and music outside although the bullets of celebration keep falling on the ground and roofs here and there. But no one seems to worry about that, the moment is so great that fear has no place in the hearts of the millions of fans, neither from bullets nor from crazy suicide bombers who tried to kill our joy last week.
Our players, tonight our heroes, learned that only with team work they had a chance to win.
May our politicians learn from the players and from the fans who are painting a glorious image of unity and national pride, and let the terrorists know that nothing can kill the spirit of the sons of the immortal Tigris and Euphrates.
The fear is gone, the curfew is ignored, tonight Iraq knows only joy...
The government had already announced shorter work hours in all government offices, including the parliament, for today so that people can go home early enough to watch the match.
2:00 pm…
I went out in the early afternoon to bring some food and gasoline for the generator as I had only a few liters left in the generator's tank and I didn't want to take chances.
I found that small crowds have gathered around gas vendors, obviously the demand is higher today and no one seems willing to miss part of the match because of a stupid gallon of gas. As a result gas price rocketed to more than 4 dollars a gallon; that's a 30 % increase from just two days ago.
Curfew was imposed at 4 in the afternoon and will last until tomorrow morning but in fact the streets were going to be empty even without a curfew.
Everyone seemed in a hurry buying what they need to before they all go home to sit in front of the TV sets.
I returned home, filled all three generators with gasoline just in case one of them fails us, which is something that happens quite often. I also put several cans of beer in the fridge and brought some Pringles chips. The ultimate snack when watching soccer, or pretty much everything!
The good surprise came at 4:30 when the state electricity came after two days of
absence; I assume it's a small "gift" from the government and the electricity department.
4:35, the match begins!
The first half (45 minutes plus 3 minutes of added time) showed clear Iraqi supremacy but it also showed the level of tension between the two teams. There was a lot of rough playing and as a result 5 yellow cards were shared by Iraqi and Saudi players. Actually it's well known that Arab teams become more aggressive when playing against another Arab team reflecting the kind of "brotherhood" among Arabs!
So, the first half ended without scoring any goals and the result remains 0-0.
5:25…
I used the half time break to write these few notes and now I must put the laptop aside and go back to pop another can of beer and watch the second half.
Many Iraqis said they will be celebrating their team regardless of the result, so tonight there will be joy no matter what.
6:30…
No, the joy is not for "no matter what"….Our team has just won the Asian cup for the first time in our soccer history. The win came through a magnificent goal by the head of our heroic forward Younis Mahmoud at the 71st minute of the match..
Our team ruled the game by all standards; in defense, midfield and attack our players proven that they are the best…they are now the masters of Asian soccer!
Today is definitely the happiest day for Iraqis in years. Tears of joy mixed with prayers for hope on the faces of millions of Iraqis…Words truly fail me and I can't describe the feeling so please pardon me if the post doesn't sound coherent; I hear the cheering and music outside although the bullets of celebration keep falling on the ground and roofs here and there. But no one seems to worry about that, the moment is so great that fear has no place in the hearts of the millions of fans, neither from bullets nor from crazy suicide bombers who tried to kill our joy last week.
Our players, tonight our heroes, learned that only with team work they had a chance to win.
May our politicians learn from the players and from the fans who are painting a glorious image of unity and national pride, and let the terrorists know that nothing can kill the spirit of the sons of the immortal Tigris and Euphrates.
The fear is gone, the curfew is ignored, tonight Iraq knows only joy...
Monday, July 23, 2007
A Flight to Nowhere
Catching any flight from Baghdad International Airport is an extraordinary experience in and of itself, but when the destination of your flight is Amman, Jordan, it reaches a whole different level.
I made this particular trip several times in the last three years, but my last journey was by far the worst.
I was used to the mild discrimination the Jordanians have been practicing against Iraqis at the airport in Amman in recent years. Passengers on a flight coming from any airport in Iraq do not exit from an ordinary gate like other passengers. Instead we are taken by bus from the plane parked hundreds of meters from the terminal under the watch of guards armed with automatic guns. Then we pass through extra security X-ray, metal detection, and a body search - before they get to the passports counters, even though all of us had passed through the strictest airport security system on earth before getting on board.
But that’s OK and we got used to it.
But recently our Jordanian brothers came up with a truly outrageous practice of discrimination against Iraqis. All disembarking Iraqi passengers now are taken to special passport counters in a hall separated from the rest of airport facilities regardless of the origin of their flights or the airlines they came aboard. Attached to this hall is what Iraqis call “the prison”.
In case you haven’t heard, Iraqi refugees stopped going to Jordan long time ago now because they know they would be turned away.
So the Iraqis I’m talking about are not refugees. Every one of them had a good reason for visiting Jordan; businessmen, official delegations, people who have family members who are residents in Jordan (residency in Jordan requires keeping $100,000 permanently in a bank in Jordan) and others who simply come to that airport in transit — to fly to another destination that is not among the limited destinations of the Iraqi airlines.
There are also people like myself who had to go there to apply for, or receive, a visa to the US, since ironically, the US embassy in Baghdad processes only two types of visas!
Last year, I received an admission offer from a prestigious American university to a master’s degree program in international affairs. It was a project I invested much time, hope and resources in for over a year. The story is long and I won’t bore you with the details.
Long story short, the American embassy in Amman recently notified me that my visa was ready to be stamped. I bought a ticket and got on a plane on my way to Amman confident that the documents I had would grant me access to Jordan for the week I needed…I was wrong.
I was ushered into the separate hall along with other Iraqi passengers, while foreigners on our plane were taken somewhere else. I was surprised by this new arrangement. “This isn’t looking good,” I thought, but I followed the procedure, handed my passport to the officer and sat down to wait as told.
Three hours later, I had been interrogated three times, shown every paper I had a couple times and got yelled at twice.
Finally I was taken to the other hall - “the prison”. At that point, I didn’t know what it was, and thought it was just another waiting stop. But the Iraqi guys who arrived before me briefed me on the situation. “Put your hand luggage over there in that room and quickly find yourself a blanket before they are all taken. You’re staying here for a long time brother!” one of the Iraqis said.
I was shocked by what I saw inside; a small passage with two rooms on the side and a third at the end; many Iraqis were chatting or lying on the floor with their bags littering the rooms. There were also some noisy children running around and sometimes crying. One room was designated as “women’s” room, another was for the men, the third was pretty much for children.
An hour passed before I could absorb what happened to me; locked up in a crowded room and just been denied the rare opportunity I had been working on for a year, for no other crime than being Iraqi.
There were about forty or fifty of us there at any point and the number went up and down as new arriving flights brought in more unfortunate Iraqis, or departing flights took some of us back home.
It wasn’t the typical scene of impoverished and suffering refugees, but in it’s own way it was painful to watch educated and professional people, doctors, businessmen and even diplomats with their red passports being treated this way; sleeping on the floor and asking for permission from a guard to go to the restroom.
No documents, letters, recommendations or pleads worked, even a phone call from the Iraqi ambassador couldn’t save the dignity of an Iraqi diplomat from being relinquished to “the prison”.
The most painful scene was of families of four being torn apart; half of the family would be allowed to enter Jordan while the other half would be rejected and ordered to go back. Many preferred to go home together over being separated like this.
One scene like this nearly turned to a tragedy when an old lady suddenly collapsed on the floor from a case of heart attack from all the stress she suffered that day. If not for the good Iraqi doctor among us, she would have died waiting for the medics to arrive.
The night was the longest ever. All of our stories were not enough to kill the time. and sleeping was not an option with all the noise and insufficient number of blankets. Many of the guys ran out of cigarettes early in the evening but luckily I had a full carton in my relatively large laptop bag! One elderly man somehow managed to get some hot water, a large kettle and some plastic cups. So we made tea and gathered at 4 am for a long tea and smokes party, waiting for the sun to rise and for the plane to come and take us home…
On the next day in the early afternoon, I boarded the plane that was returning to Baghdad with about a dozen other Iraqis. The kind stewardess was apparently familiar with cases like ours and noticed how tired we were so she immediately welcomed us with bottles of cold water and some kind words to comfort us, “There’s a few of you this time, yesterday we returned 75 passengers!” she added.
The guy sitting to my left said “There will be a day when they [Jordanians] will beg us to let them enter Iraq”.
No, the guy sitting to my right objected. “They were mean to us and they hurt us, but if we do the same we’ll have sunk to their level. Let’s instead hope that one day our country will become a better place.”
Amen…
I made this particular trip several times in the last three years, but my last journey was by far the worst.
I was used to the mild discrimination the Jordanians have been practicing against Iraqis at the airport in Amman in recent years. Passengers on a flight coming from any airport in Iraq do not exit from an ordinary gate like other passengers. Instead we are taken by bus from the plane parked hundreds of meters from the terminal under the watch of guards armed with automatic guns. Then we pass through extra security X-ray, metal detection, and a body search - before they get to the passports counters, even though all of us had passed through the strictest airport security system on earth before getting on board.
But that’s OK and we got used to it.
But recently our Jordanian brothers came up with a truly outrageous practice of discrimination against Iraqis. All disembarking Iraqi passengers now are taken to special passport counters in a hall separated from the rest of airport facilities regardless of the origin of their flights or the airlines they came aboard. Attached to this hall is what Iraqis call “the prison”.
In case you haven’t heard, Iraqi refugees stopped going to Jordan long time ago now because they know they would be turned away.
So the Iraqis I’m talking about are not refugees. Every one of them had a good reason for visiting Jordan; businessmen, official delegations, people who have family members who are residents in Jordan (residency in Jordan requires keeping $100,000 permanently in a bank in Jordan) and others who simply come to that airport in transit — to fly to another destination that is not among the limited destinations of the Iraqi airlines.
There are also people like myself who had to go there to apply for, or receive, a visa to the US, since ironically, the US embassy in Baghdad processes only two types of visas!
Last year, I received an admission offer from a prestigious American university to a master’s degree program in international affairs. It was a project I invested much time, hope and resources in for over a year. The story is long and I won’t bore you with the details.
Long story short, the American embassy in Amman recently notified me that my visa was ready to be stamped. I bought a ticket and got on a plane on my way to Amman confident that the documents I had would grant me access to Jordan for the week I needed…I was wrong.
I was ushered into the separate hall along with other Iraqi passengers, while foreigners on our plane were taken somewhere else. I was surprised by this new arrangement. “This isn’t looking good,” I thought, but I followed the procedure, handed my passport to the officer and sat down to wait as told.
Three hours later, I had been interrogated three times, shown every paper I had a couple times and got yelled at twice.
Finally I was taken to the other hall - “the prison”. At that point, I didn’t know what it was, and thought it was just another waiting stop. But the Iraqi guys who arrived before me briefed me on the situation. “Put your hand luggage over there in that room and quickly find yourself a blanket before they are all taken. You’re staying here for a long time brother!” one of the Iraqis said.
I was shocked by what I saw inside; a small passage with two rooms on the side and a third at the end; many Iraqis were chatting or lying on the floor with their bags littering the rooms. There were also some noisy children running around and sometimes crying. One room was designated as “women’s” room, another was for the men, the third was pretty much for children.
An hour passed before I could absorb what happened to me; locked up in a crowded room and just been denied the rare opportunity I had been working on for a year, for no other crime than being Iraqi.
There were about forty or fifty of us there at any point and the number went up and down as new arriving flights brought in more unfortunate Iraqis, or departing flights took some of us back home.
It wasn’t the typical scene of impoverished and suffering refugees, but in it’s own way it was painful to watch educated and professional people, doctors, businessmen and even diplomats with their red passports being treated this way; sleeping on the floor and asking for permission from a guard to go to the restroom.
No documents, letters, recommendations or pleads worked, even a phone call from the Iraqi ambassador couldn’t save the dignity of an Iraqi diplomat from being relinquished to “the prison”.
The most painful scene was of families of four being torn apart; half of the family would be allowed to enter Jordan while the other half would be rejected and ordered to go back. Many preferred to go home together over being separated like this.
One scene like this nearly turned to a tragedy when an old lady suddenly collapsed on the floor from a case of heart attack from all the stress she suffered that day. If not for the good Iraqi doctor among us, she would have died waiting for the medics to arrive.
The night was the longest ever. All of our stories were not enough to kill the time. and sleeping was not an option with all the noise and insufficient number of blankets. Many of the guys ran out of cigarettes early in the evening but luckily I had a full carton in my relatively large laptop bag! One elderly man somehow managed to get some hot water, a large kettle and some plastic cups. So we made tea and gathered at 4 am for a long tea and smokes party, waiting for the sun to rise and for the plane to come and take us home…
On the next day in the early afternoon, I boarded the plane that was returning to Baghdad with about a dozen other Iraqis. The kind stewardess was apparently familiar with cases like ours and noticed how tired we were so she immediately welcomed us with bottles of cold water and some kind words to comfort us, “There’s a few of you this time, yesterday we returned 75 passengers!” she added.
The guy sitting to my left said “There will be a day when they [Jordanians] will beg us to let them enter Iraq”.
No, the guy sitting to my right objected. “They were mean to us and they hurt us, but if we do the same we’ll have sunk to their level. Let’s instead hope that one day our country will become a better place.”
Amen…
Saturday, July 21, 2007
Home Alone
I know I haven't been a loyal blogger to the readers recently and I apologize for that but I said before this is partly because of the summer season in Baghdad and all that comes with it.
The other reason is that my family is taking a long vacation outside the country, mostly to run away from the hottest part of the season; Aab al-lahaab (August of flames). Some in our parliament want to take a month-long vacation too but I'm inclined to think it's responsibility, not the flames of August they are trying to run away from…we'll see.
This leaves me basically with lots of cooking, shopping and cleaning to do since my brother Ali isn't that good at any of this kind of work.
While I'm going to particularly miss my two little nephews their absence also means I can enjoy weeks of quiet, you know, I love the idea that if I choose to not make a sound then there will be silence! I am glad I can enjoy this privilege for some time and I hope the silence will help me focus more on writing.
On the other hand being in charge of everything at home makes me pay attention to some details that I don't notice otherwise. The funnies and oddest so far was the phone bill I received a few days ago. It's the first bill we receive in more than three years which should be the case since our land line, along with a few dozen others in the neighborhood were cut when a cable was damaged in fall 2004. The funny thing is that the bill demands fees for the first six months of 2005 when we technically didn't have a land line!
I haven't decided whether or not I'm going to pay this bill but what could they do if I don't!?
The other thing I noticed, which was quite a surprise is that this little "daughter" as we say of one of our date palms is already carrying what soon is going to be sweet yellow fruit. Isn't that cute?
The main even that's been keeping me excited an entertained is the participation of our national soccer team in the Asian Cup. The results are excellent so far including this afternoon's match in which the team won 2-0 over Vietnam. This means for a change lots of the gunfire we hear in Baghdad are celebratory these days. Two hours after the match ended I still hear some gunfire but I can't tell whether or not it's still of the celebratory type.
These lines were not meant to be a serious post but I will end it with a quick update on some of the important parameters for assessing living conditions in Baghdad; the part where I live to be accurate.
Gasoline shortage is much less severe these days. It takes typically less than an hour to fill the car at the station and black-market price is down to only 3/2 the official price (60 cents/liter instead of 1.2 dollars last month). This can change in either direction at any minute though.
In electricity the supply has technically doubled. Don't get excited because by "doubled" I mean in increased from 2 hours/day to 4 hours/day. It's still better than nothing especially that we were expecting supply to decrease as the heat rises.
Like I said above I'm doing at least one shopping errand every day and this means I get to move around between groceries, butcher shops and bakeries more than I usually do and here too I noticed a new trend. The number of small businesses and shops did not decrease in and around our neighborhood as I used to think. In fact they just relocated from the main streets to the inner streets and alleys making it safer for both shoppers and store owners alike to do what they have to.
If I could do a short tour with a camera you would see that many of the stores the once busy commercial main street are now closed but at the same time many stores are budding from homes or simply appear in no time as new stalls are erected. It's one example of how the people have adjusted to the changing situation in some parts of the city.
One last thing, I will be on the air with a couple radio interviews next week. I will provide the when and where once they are decided.
The other reason is that my family is taking a long vacation outside the country, mostly to run away from the hottest part of the season; Aab al-lahaab (August of flames). Some in our parliament want to take a month-long vacation too but I'm inclined to think it's responsibility, not the flames of August they are trying to run away from…we'll see.
This leaves me basically with lots of cooking, shopping and cleaning to do since my brother Ali isn't that good at any of this kind of work.
While I'm going to particularly miss my two little nephews their absence also means I can enjoy weeks of quiet, you know, I love the idea that if I choose to not make a sound then there will be silence! I am glad I can enjoy this privilege for some time and I hope the silence will help me focus more on writing.
On the other hand being in charge of everything at home makes me pay attention to some details that I don't notice otherwise. The funnies and oddest so far was the phone bill I received a few days ago. It's the first bill we receive in more than three years which should be the case since our land line, along with a few dozen others in the neighborhood were cut when a cable was damaged in fall 2004. The funny thing is that the bill demands fees for the first six months of 2005 when we technically didn't have a land line!
I haven't decided whether or not I'm going to pay this bill but what could they do if I don't!?
The other thing I noticed, which was quite a surprise is that this little "daughter" as we say of one of our date palms is already carrying what soon is going to be sweet yellow fruit. Isn't that cute?
The main even that's been keeping me excited an entertained is the participation of our national soccer team in the Asian Cup. The results are excellent so far including this afternoon's match in which the team won 2-0 over Vietnam. This means for a change lots of the gunfire we hear in Baghdad are celebratory these days. Two hours after the match ended I still hear some gunfire but I can't tell whether or not it's still of the celebratory type.
These lines were not meant to be a serious post but I will end it with a quick update on some of the important parameters for assessing living conditions in Baghdad; the part where I live to be accurate.
Gasoline shortage is much less severe these days. It takes typically less than an hour to fill the car at the station and black-market price is down to only 3/2 the official price (60 cents/liter instead of 1.2 dollars last month). This can change in either direction at any minute though.
In electricity the supply has technically doubled. Don't get excited because by "doubled" I mean in increased from 2 hours/day to 4 hours/day. It's still better than nothing especially that we were expecting supply to decrease as the heat rises.
Like I said above I'm doing at least one shopping errand every day and this means I get to move around between groceries, butcher shops and bakeries more than I usually do and here too I noticed a new trend. The number of small businesses and shops did not decrease in and around our neighborhood as I used to think. In fact they just relocated from the main streets to the inner streets and alleys making it safer for both shoppers and store owners alike to do what they have to.
If I could do a short tour with a camera you would see that many of the stores the once busy commercial main street are now closed but at the same time many stores are budding from homes or simply appear in no time as new stalls are erected. It's one example of how the people have adjusted to the changing situation in some parts of the city.
One last thing, I will be on the air with a couple radio interviews next week. I will provide the when and where once they are decided.
Monday, July 09, 2007
Summer logistics, and more on summer politics
The weather in Baghdad is painfully hot. And the constant struggle with daily life logistics is depleting by energy reserves.
I tried so many times to hold a pen or touch the keyboard but I couldn't finish even one coherent paragraph although there's no lack of ideas or events…it's frustrating but, I'm trying to force myself to accept it because there are still two more months to go before the annual visit of hell to Baghdad ends.
These months have been the worst in electricity supplies ever. We're getting an average of one hour per day of electricity from the grid. The last time we had such hour was three days ago! And I assume some of you are familiar now with what it takes to maintain those small generators we use at home.
And it just gets worse; my internet connection has been down for 10 days now and the backup connection is having some mysterious problem with all google-based services including of course blogspot and gmail which are indispensable to me.
I'll borrow a few lines from an Iraqi journalist I forgot his name to put it shortly. This is what he said describing life in Baghdad summer "people in normal places wake up in the morning feeling they had enough rest to start a new day. Here we wake up feeling as tired as people do when they return home from work"
But I digress….
Let's move to some serious topics but first of all I want to suggest a moment of silence to honor the souls of the innocent victims of Yesterday's terrorist attack in Emirli and other attacks elsewhere in Iraq…thank you.
On the political front there are some interesting developments. You probably heard about the message Maliki sent yesterday to the Sadr movement demanding they clarify their position from the violent elements among their followers. It wasn't as tough a message as we were hoping but it's still an interesting step that broke the fear barrier that Maliki put between himself and Sadr.
In fact it seems that this statement is part of government plan to weaken Sadr's position through public frank statements.
On Saturday there was a demonstration in Nasiriyah against militias. The governor called for the demonstrations and the tribes answered the call and took to the streets demanding rule of law and limiting the use of arms to the forces of the government only.
Not long before that there was a similar and larger demonstration in Babil demanding the same thing. The attitude in Babil is remarkably good in this respect. Sadr's militiamen and aides are often targeted by local police. In my opinion the local government in this province is one of the most realistic ones we have. They were the only local government that refused plans for security handover and explained straightforward that the local ISF was not ready yet to handle security in the province. Unlike others who rushed like fools to assume security responsibility while they know they don't have enough tools to do so. That's if not they did that on purpose, I can't tell.
Before I forget I think it's also worth mentioning that Al-Sabah-for the first time in over a year-mentioned the Mahdi army by the name in its report on clashes in Diwaniyah, Samawa and Basra in the south.
These are all signs of change in attitude but they can't be considered a true change unless magnitude and frequency increase significantly in the little time Iraq has to show that tangible progress is being made.
In earlier posts we talked about the attempt by the four main Kurdish and Shia parties to establish some sort of "moderate front".
These days another initiative to improve power sharing is emerging, apparently an idea endorsed by Talabani since he's been speaking enthusiastically about it more than he did about the moderate front idea.
The idea is basically about forming a coalition of individual leaders at the level of presidency and premiership. Talabani called it the "3+1" formula to distinguish it from the "2+2" formula for parliamentary rearrangement.
The concept is simply to give the two vice presidents, president and PM more or less equal voice power when dealing with critical decisions. The constitutional foundations for such arrangement are ambiguous but maybe that's not a big problem at this point, after all the constitution itself is going to be subject for several amendments.
The "3+1" idea is somewhat attractive; these four men are arguably among the most moderate (relatively) leaders in their respective parties and so if they can actually make this deal for sharing executive authority then perhaps they will be able to make a difference.
In my opinion it could be easier to make Abdul Mahdi and Hashimi for example agree on something that if we had Hakim and Duleimi. And at this point there could be a good chance for that the former couple to become more influential in their parties than the latter as Hakim fell sick and Duleimi is about to be ousted from leading the Accord Front.
And yes, I heard about the CBS report and I doubt its accuracy for more than one reason. But I didn't follow any news today so I'm not aware whether there have been updates; anyway the 15th of July is only a week from now.
That's all for now…
I tried so many times to hold a pen or touch the keyboard but I couldn't finish even one coherent paragraph although there's no lack of ideas or events…it's frustrating but, I'm trying to force myself to accept it because there are still two more months to go before the annual visit of hell to Baghdad ends.
These months have been the worst in electricity supplies ever. We're getting an average of one hour per day of electricity from the grid. The last time we had such hour was three days ago! And I assume some of you are familiar now with what it takes to maintain those small generators we use at home.
And it just gets worse; my internet connection has been down for 10 days now and the backup connection is having some mysterious problem with all google-based services including of course blogspot and gmail which are indispensable to me.
I'll borrow a few lines from an Iraqi journalist I forgot his name to put it shortly. This is what he said describing life in Baghdad summer "people in normal places wake up in the morning feeling they had enough rest to start a new day. Here we wake up feeling as tired as people do when they return home from work"
But I digress….
Let's move to some serious topics but first of all I want to suggest a moment of silence to honor the souls of the innocent victims of Yesterday's terrorist attack in Emirli and other attacks elsewhere in Iraq…thank you.
On the political front there are some interesting developments. You probably heard about the message Maliki sent yesterday to the Sadr movement demanding they clarify their position from the violent elements among their followers. It wasn't as tough a message as we were hoping but it's still an interesting step that broke the fear barrier that Maliki put between himself and Sadr.
In fact it seems that this statement is part of government plan to weaken Sadr's position through public frank statements.
On Saturday there was a demonstration in Nasiriyah against militias. The governor called for the demonstrations and the tribes answered the call and took to the streets demanding rule of law and limiting the use of arms to the forces of the government only.
Not long before that there was a similar and larger demonstration in Babil demanding the same thing. The attitude in Babil is remarkably good in this respect. Sadr's militiamen and aides are often targeted by local police. In my opinion the local government in this province is one of the most realistic ones we have. They were the only local government that refused plans for security handover and explained straightforward that the local ISF was not ready yet to handle security in the province. Unlike others who rushed like fools to assume security responsibility while they know they don't have enough tools to do so. That's if not they did that on purpose, I can't tell.
Before I forget I think it's also worth mentioning that Al-Sabah-for the first time in over a year-mentioned the Mahdi army by the name in its report on clashes in Diwaniyah, Samawa and Basra in the south.
These are all signs of change in attitude but they can't be considered a true change unless magnitude and frequency increase significantly in the little time Iraq has to show that tangible progress is being made.
In earlier posts we talked about the attempt by the four main Kurdish and Shia parties to establish some sort of "moderate front".
These days another initiative to improve power sharing is emerging, apparently an idea endorsed by Talabani since he's been speaking enthusiastically about it more than he did about the moderate front idea.
The idea is basically about forming a coalition of individual leaders at the level of presidency and premiership. Talabani called it the "3+1" formula to distinguish it from the "2+2" formula for parliamentary rearrangement.
The concept is simply to give the two vice presidents, president and PM more or less equal voice power when dealing with critical decisions. The constitutional foundations for such arrangement are ambiguous but maybe that's not a big problem at this point, after all the constitution itself is going to be subject for several amendments.
The "3+1" idea is somewhat attractive; these four men are arguably among the most moderate (relatively) leaders in their respective parties and so if they can actually make this deal for sharing executive authority then perhaps they will be able to make a difference.
In my opinion it could be easier to make Abdul Mahdi and Hashimi for example agree on something that if we had Hakim and Duleimi. And at this point there could be a good chance for that the former couple to become more influential in their parties than the latter as Hakim fell sick and Duleimi is about to be ousted from leading the Accord Front.
And yes, I heard about the CBS report and I doubt its accuracy for more than one reason. But I didn't follow any news today so I'm not aware whether there have been updates; anyway the 15th of July is only a week from now.
That's all for now…
Monday, July 02, 2007
More Baghdad Summer Politics
News about the creation of a so-called ‘moderate powers front’ is making the headlines in Baghdad’s papers again. This time headed by the ruling parties, not the opposition, al-Sabah reported last Wednesday:
And as usual the Dawa and SIIC can’t move forward on anything without the blessing of Ayatollah Sistani, so the SIIC sent Abdul Mahdi to Najaf to brief Sistani on the plan:
Abdul Mahdi said during a press conference after meeting his eminence in Najaf that, “We support the elected government,” [to answer questions about replacing Maliki before they are asked] and added, “We have informed Sayyid Sistani of the new coalition that would soon be announced, and we reassured [him] during the meeting that there was no intent to undermine the current government.”
I think that the new-old Kurdish-Shia coalition needs to have something more than God’s blessings via Sistani. Seeking the approval of senior clerics, and similar shows of support, have become obsolete, boring, and likely as ineffective as they have been in the past.
The formation of this coalition seems to be a precursor to Maliki’s plan to radically reshuffle his cabinet. Perhaps by dropping all of the “extra weight” and replacing the current cabinet with a slimmer one of just 20 posts:
The position of the Accord Front, particularly the Islamic Party, continues to oscillate between the two options. Al-Sabah wrote on Wednesday:
On the other hand, the Iraqi List continues to move forward with its own plans to form the political mass we mentioned in earlier posts. Al-Mashriq wrote on Wednesday:
In a later, relevant development, Talabani announced a power-sharing agreement between the presidency (Talabani, Abdul Mahdi, and Hashimi) and the premiership (Maliki, Saleh, and Zawbai). Al-Sabah reported on Thursday:
It looks like the two political poles—the ruling coalition and Allawi’s group—are competing for the votes of the Fadheela and the Islamic Party, but in slightly different ways. While Allawi needs the votes so badly that he’d even invite the Sadrists (as he himself said yesterday in an interview on al-Arabiyah); the ruling coalition is more interested in winning the Islamic Party to its side to gain a Sunni element in its lines. An overt attempt to give an ethno-sectarian coalition the national cover it needs.
In fact I’d even say that the Kurdish-Shia coalition since its inception has been ignoring logic and geography. Both of them have direct borders with the Sunni populated region, and almost no direct contact between their communities. The Kurds for instance allied themselves with the Shia, while it’s the Sunni who are in direct contact with them, standing between them and Kirkuk. Normally solving the problem would require dialogue and understanding with the influential party on the ground. Not with the party sitting hundreds of miles away.
The other side of this deliberate ignorance of logic is represented by the dream to build an ethnic Kurdish state in a region where neighboring countries have problems with significant Kurdish communities. Thinking about creating an ethnic state in the age of globalization reminds me of the Arab dream to create a racist mono-state in the last century. And the same is true of the Shia when they think of creating a state after the Iranian model when that very model is getting more isolated from the rest of the world with every move it makes. Here too there’s a geographic factor when they, the Shia, ignore the presence of hard-line Sunni states in the neighborhood.
So back to a short note on Allawi who made a rare public appearance yesterday. As usual his answers were elusive most of the time, but after some persistence from the host he finally voiced his frank opposition to Maliki, and said the latter was Prime Minister of the UIA, not of Iraq.
In general, the prospects of the two ventures are in critical equilibrium; Allawi’s has the appeal of non-sectarian secularism while its major weakness is the lack of a significant Kurdish component, which will no doubt reduce its chances to become the widely-representative ruling coalition unless it succeeds in snatching one of the major Kurdish parties and adding it to its ranks.
On the other hand the Shia-Kurdish core of the other camp has the weakness of still not having a Sunni component. The advantage it might enjoy from controlling key posts in the government which allow it access to resources and publicity, is counterbalanced by the heavy burden of a record of poor performance in running the state.
Finally, and although I don’t want to take sides in this, I have to note that the Kurdish-Shia attempt only seeks to secure a lasting parliamentary majority in order to pass legislation that fulfills their narrow ambitions. After all, the alliance between secular Sunni Kurds and conservative Shia Arabs highlights only the opportunist nature of the two sides.
Allawi’s ambitions on the other hand are more clear to some extent. He’s secular, but he’s also known to have some of the common qualities of authoritarian leaders.
However, time has shown that he too would play the game only if he is sure he can win. And the fear of the Kurds and Shia parties indicates that Allawi is taking the game seriously this time.
When this level of activity takes place while the cabinet has 13 void seats and the parliament has about 80 void seats we can expect that a big change is in the offing. Which front will lead this change is still up in the air.
The two Kurdish parties (PUK and KDP), the Dawa Party, and the SIIC agreed yesterday (Tuesday) to form a national political front that will be officially announced next week.
And as usual the Dawa and SIIC can’t move forward on anything without the blessing of Ayatollah Sistani, so the SIIC sent Abdul Mahdi to Najaf to brief Sistani on the plan:
Vice president Aadil Abdul Mahdi briefed Ayatollah Sistani about the national front that was reached among the four major parties as well as the efforts to broaden the participation [in this front].
Abdul Mahdi said during a press conference after meeting his eminence in Najaf that, “We support the elected government,” [to answer questions about replacing Maliki before they are asked] and added, “We have informed Sayyid Sistani of the new coalition that would soon be announced, and we reassured [him] during the meeting that there was no intent to undermine the current government.”
I think that the new-old Kurdish-Shia coalition needs to have something more than God’s blessings via Sistani. Seeking the approval of senior clerics, and similar shows of support, have become obsolete, boring, and likely as ineffective as they have been in the past.
The formation of this coalition seems to be a precursor to Maliki’s plan to radically reshuffle his cabinet. Perhaps by dropping all of the “extra weight” and replacing the current cabinet with a slimmer one of just 20 posts:
Haider Ibadi, a member of parliament close to PM Maliki said the latter is seeking a radical cabinet reshuffle, Ibadi added that there’s been a suggestion to reduce the number of ministries down to 20, and [to move] away from political quotas.
The position of the Accord Front, particularly the Islamic Party, continues to oscillate between the two options. Al-Sabah wrote on Wednesday:
Members of parliament from the Islamic Party Alla Makki said the party was currently considering the option of participating in the national front announced by major political parties.
On the other hand, the Iraqi List continues to move forward with its own plans to form the political mass we mentioned in earlier posts. Al-Mashriq wrote on Wednesday:
Sattar Bayir, member of parliament from Allawi’s party said, ‘The negotiations have gone decently so far to form the suggested Iraqi front. The movement is to form an Iraqi front from all national parties, organizations, associations and figures.’ And he added that there are ongoing negotiations with various parties including the Accord Front, the Dialogue Front and the Fadheela Party…
In a later, relevant development, Talabani announced a power-sharing agreement between the presidency (Talabani, Abdul Mahdi, and Hashimi) and the premiership (Maliki, Saleh, and Zawbai). Al-Sabah reported on Thursday:
Talabani added: There has also been an agreement between the presidency and the premiership to establish group-leadership according to the constitution which states the fact that the executive authority consists of these two leaderships, and by doing that the complaint of sidelining the representatives of Sunni Arabs in decision-making can be dealt with.
It looks like the two political poles—the ruling coalition and Allawi’s group—are competing for the votes of the Fadheela and the Islamic Party, but in slightly different ways. While Allawi needs the votes so badly that he’d even invite the Sadrists (as he himself said yesterday in an interview on al-Arabiyah); the ruling coalition is more interested in winning the Islamic Party to its side to gain a Sunni element in its lines. An overt attempt to give an ethno-sectarian coalition the national cover it needs.
In fact I’d even say that the Kurdish-Shia coalition since its inception has been ignoring logic and geography. Both of them have direct borders with the Sunni populated region, and almost no direct contact between their communities. The Kurds for instance allied themselves with the Shia, while it’s the Sunni who are in direct contact with them, standing between them and Kirkuk. Normally solving the problem would require dialogue and understanding with the influential party on the ground. Not with the party sitting hundreds of miles away.
The other side of this deliberate ignorance of logic is represented by the dream to build an ethnic Kurdish state in a region where neighboring countries have problems with significant Kurdish communities. Thinking about creating an ethnic state in the age of globalization reminds me of the Arab dream to create a racist mono-state in the last century. And the same is true of the Shia when they think of creating a state after the Iranian model when that very model is getting more isolated from the rest of the world with every move it makes. Here too there’s a geographic factor when they, the Shia, ignore the presence of hard-line Sunni states in the neighborhood.
So back to a short note on Allawi who made a rare public appearance yesterday. As usual his answers were elusive most of the time, but after some persistence from the host he finally voiced his frank opposition to Maliki, and said the latter was Prime Minister of the UIA, not of Iraq.
In general, the prospects of the two ventures are in critical equilibrium; Allawi’s has the appeal of non-sectarian secularism while its major weakness is the lack of a significant Kurdish component, which will no doubt reduce its chances to become the widely-representative ruling coalition unless it succeeds in snatching one of the major Kurdish parties and adding it to its ranks.
On the other hand the Shia-Kurdish core of the other camp has the weakness of still not having a Sunni component. The advantage it might enjoy from controlling key posts in the government which allow it access to resources and publicity, is counterbalanced by the heavy burden of a record of poor performance in running the state.
Finally, and although I don’t want to take sides in this, I have to note that the Kurdish-Shia attempt only seeks to secure a lasting parliamentary majority in order to pass legislation that fulfills their narrow ambitions. After all, the alliance between secular Sunni Kurds and conservative Shia Arabs highlights only the opportunist nature of the two sides.
Allawi’s ambitions on the other hand are more clear to some extent. He’s secular, but he’s also known to have some of the common qualities of authoritarian leaders.
However, time has shown that he too would play the game only if he is sure he can win. And the fear of the Kurds and Shia parties indicates that Allawi is taking the game seriously this time.
When this level of activity takes place while the cabinet has 13 void seats and the parliament has about 80 void seats we can expect that a big change is in the offing. Which front will lead this change is still up in the air.
Wednesday, June 27, 2007
There's more than numbers for those who want to understand
It's almost July now, and General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker will present their report about the situation in Iraq, military and political, at some point in September.
I don't know what parameters the two men are going to list statistics for in their report but I expect it to show the results of fighting al-Qaeda and other armed groups in numbers, the progress in building the ISF in numbers, also in numbers and of course the report would include the progress, if any, that our political leaders will have made by the time.
I think what matters more than the way of presentation would be how the data in the report is going to be read and afterwards interpreted into attitudes and actions.
One thing I hope the decision-makers and the media do when they read the report is to not isolate the war in Iraq from the war on terror and al-Qaeda as a whole, and at the same time put in mind the difference between war and nation-building. The latter takes much more time than winning a military conflict but requires different tools.
The results so far have been astounding, and please allow me to say that I'm proud of the change in attitude many of my fellow Iraqis are showing. Even if numbers don't suggest so because the change is happening but it will take time-perhaps beyond September-before this change will show in numbers.
A nation is not a corporation and when we deal with a nation we are dealing with a society; a mass of people with ever changing hearts and minds and that's why numbers alone can't be enough to assess the situation—thoughtful insight and looking at the bigger image are also required.
For over a year the media and many officials were spooking us with the exaggerated ghost of civil war. I wonder what they have to say now! I think their silence is more telling than anything they would've said.
Iraqis are awakening, one very telling example can be seen in the ongoing operation in Diyala; members of the 1920 revolution brigades, once bitter enemies of the US military and Iraqi government are now assisting US and Iraqi military in fighting al-Qaeda even though the majority of the Iraqi soldiers and officers are Shia.
If the change in exclusively Sunni Anbar is good then the change in Diyala is good beyond words.
Another great example that I have personally been in touch with is taking place in a place outside Baghdad. Maybe you remember the story I told you about the area where members of our tribe live. For months unfortunate bloodletting was going on between the tribes, militias and al-Qaeda terrorists in which most of the victims were no more than innocent farmers.
Last week I learned from relatives that two groups of tribes have separately formed two "battalions" of several hundred young tribesmen each; not to fight the other sect or the US or Iraqi forces but to fight al-Qaeda. Even better this step has been taken in cooperation with the authorities in the region and the arrangement will ultimately lead to turning many of those tribal fighters into legitimate law enforcement personnel.
Despite such examples of many promising changes, we have to remain realistic and not overlook the rest of challenges. Uniting against al-Qaeda and even defeating it is not enough to solve all of Iraq's problems and the greater challenge of nation-building still lies ahead.
However, I expect and hope the world to show some gratitude to the Iraqis and Americans who fought, suffered, bled and died ridding the world of thousands of al-Qaeda terrorists, each one of whom could have been capable of murdering as many innocent people as their fellow terrorists did in New York, London or the many cities across the world that paid a high price simply because they don't approve of the ways of those extremists.
The internal struggle for power in Iraq will not end by pacifying al-Qaeda or the militias. It will continue in different forms until we have the correct legislations and institutions that can prevent bloodshed by facilitating peaceful sharing of power and treasure in a way that every individual or group get what they deserve, no more and no less. It goes without saying that these legislations and institutions will need an impartial, competent force to be able to function efficiently.
The impact of successful military operations, aside from people's direct safety, will not be visible immediately when it comes to the aspects of daily life in areas like economy, social life, education, etc. and here comes the role of true political reforms at all levels, from holding local elections to choose new and representative district and city councils to amending the general elections law to allow voters to choose their representatives directly instead of the current slate system. It might be also a good idea to adjust the federalism law to allow turning each province into an individual region within the federal state to avoid the sensitivities that could arise from forming regions on sectarian and/or ethnic basis.
Right there is where we will still need help from the world; not with more soldiers and tanks but with good will, compassion and thoughtful advice and guidance.
I don't know what parameters the two men are going to list statistics for in their report but I expect it to show the results of fighting al-Qaeda and other armed groups in numbers, the progress in building the ISF in numbers, also in numbers and of course the report would include the progress, if any, that our political leaders will have made by the time.
I think what matters more than the way of presentation would be how the data in the report is going to be read and afterwards interpreted into attitudes and actions.
One thing I hope the decision-makers and the media do when they read the report is to not isolate the war in Iraq from the war on terror and al-Qaeda as a whole, and at the same time put in mind the difference between war and nation-building. The latter takes much more time than winning a military conflict but requires different tools.
The results so far have been astounding, and please allow me to say that I'm proud of the change in attitude many of my fellow Iraqis are showing. Even if numbers don't suggest so because the change is happening but it will take time-perhaps beyond September-before this change will show in numbers.
A nation is not a corporation and when we deal with a nation we are dealing with a society; a mass of people with ever changing hearts and minds and that's why numbers alone can't be enough to assess the situation—thoughtful insight and looking at the bigger image are also required.
For over a year the media and many officials were spooking us with the exaggerated ghost of civil war. I wonder what they have to say now! I think their silence is more telling than anything they would've said.
Iraqis are awakening, one very telling example can be seen in the ongoing operation in Diyala; members of the 1920 revolution brigades, once bitter enemies of the US military and Iraqi government are now assisting US and Iraqi military in fighting al-Qaeda even though the majority of the Iraqi soldiers and officers are Shia.
If the change in exclusively Sunni Anbar is good then the change in Diyala is good beyond words.
Another great example that I have personally been in touch with is taking place in a place outside Baghdad. Maybe you remember the story I told you about the area where members of our tribe live. For months unfortunate bloodletting was going on between the tribes, militias and al-Qaeda terrorists in which most of the victims were no more than innocent farmers.
Last week I learned from relatives that two groups of tribes have separately formed two "battalions" of several hundred young tribesmen each; not to fight the other sect or the US or Iraqi forces but to fight al-Qaeda. Even better this step has been taken in cooperation with the authorities in the region and the arrangement will ultimately lead to turning many of those tribal fighters into legitimate law enforcement personnel.
Despite such examples of many promising changes, we have to remain realistic and not overlook the rest of challenges. Uniting against al-Qaeda and even defeating it is not enough to solve all of Iraq's problems and the greater challenge of nation-building still lies ahead.
However, I expect and hope the world to show some gratitude to the Iraqis and Americans who fought, suffered, bled and died ridding the world of thousands of al-Qaeda terrorists, each one of whom could have been capable of murdering as many innocent people as their fellow terrorists did in New York, London or the many cities across the world that paid a high price simply because they don't approve of the ways of those extremists.
The internal struggle for power in Iraq will not end by pacifying al-Qaeda or the militias. It will continue in different forms until we have the correct legislations and institutions that can prevent bloodshed by facilitating peaceful sharing of power and treasure in a way that every individual or group get what they deserve, no more and no less. It goes without saying that these legislations and institutions will need an impartial, competent force to be able to function efficiently.
The impact of successful military operations, aside from people's direct safety, will not be visible immediately when it comes to the aspects of daily life in areas like economy, social life, education, etc. and here comes the role of true political reforms at all levels, from holding local elections to choose new and representative district and city councils to amending the general elections law to allow voters to choose their representatives directly instead of the current slate system. It might be also a good idea to adjust the federalism law to allow turning each province into an individual region within the federal state to avoid the sensitivities that could arise from forming regions on sectarian and/or ethnic basis.
Right there is where we will still need help from the world; not with more soldiers and tanks but with good will, compassion and thoughtful advice and guidance.
Saturday, June 23, 2007
Sadr bites the hand that feeds him
In our last post we briefly mentioned a statement in which Sadr’s office accused Iran of hosting and assisting al-Qaeda, today I’ll talk about that statement in more detail.
The claim itself is not strange. What’s strange is whom it came from. Sadr was the last voice we’d expect to say such a thing. Accusing Iran of interfering in Iraq’s affairs is one thing, but accusing it of hosting and assisting al-Qeada is a whole new ballgame. It opens the door for speculation and analysis, especially since Sadr only weeks ago returned from a long stay in Iran in which he was a guest of the top leaders of the Islamic Republic. So why make this statement now?
Some say that the many accusations in and outside of Iraq that Sadr is Iran’s man forced his hand in an effort to distance himself from suspicion. But Sadr’s words do not support this theory because, as previously mentioned, he could have just said that Iran is maliciously interfering in Iraq. When the accusation went beyond that to link al-Qaeda with Iran it became a serious claim that put Iran, his ally, in a very embarrassing position. Are we seeing signs of a breakup? If so, is this breakup coming from an emerging conscience or patriotic feelings on Sadr’s part?
In my opinion, patriotic feelings have no role in answering this question. At the same time, there’s more at work here than Sadr’s attempt to distract from his alliance with Iran. A cleric such as Sadr believes in a revolutionary ideology with strictly defined tenets of absolute right and absolute wrong. Patriotic goals represent only a step towards imposing this absolute vision on everyone.
Islamists do not believe in a homeland, they believe in a ‘Dar al-Islam’ (House of Islam) that will eventually encompass the whole world.
If we look at the articles written by Mr. Marwani (the consultant at the Cultural Supervision Committee of the Martyr Sadr office), and these are frequently published on the web, we see that his signature is followed by the words “From Baghdad, the occupied capital of the world.” In a way this means that the world, not Iraq alone, is the goal in their ideology and literature, and the “Mowatti’o al-Mahdai” (those who pave the way for the Imam Mahdi) led by Moqtada, will lead the Imam’s army to every point in the world spreading justice.
Then what made Moqtada go in the direction he did?
It was the result of factors that accumulated over time, and matured during his visit to Tehran. Sadr finally realized that his role was only second or third to that of the SIIC of Hakim, or the Dawa Party. A situation that a young revolutionary leader who won all his fame and clout in just a few short years couldn’t tolerate. In those years his name, and his army, rocketed upward in the media headlines and proved a powerful presence on the ground. Realizing that he’s being treated as a #2 made the ambitious, poorly educated youngster lose his balance. And he had little balance to give, compared to the older big-names who have extensive experience in the political world.
The publicity he got and the power he thinks he has put him in a position of accepting nothing less than being #1. This probably explains his attempts to reach out to some Sunni politicians as a more inclusive alternative, he thinks, to what the Dawa or SIIC offer.
The battles for control in the southern provinces and the manner in which smuggling money is being distributed showed Sadr how secondary his role is. Now he knows that his invitation to the political process and acceptance into the UIA was no more than a political lollipop to calm him down, or he’s finally seeing that his movement’s popularity was exploited to win ballots for other UIA members.
Here appear the signs of a rift that will be difficult for Shia leaders to work around, because winning over a man like Sadr with compromises doesn’t seem possible at this stage. His frustration and ambitions will not leave much room for negotiation.
Sadr believes he’s the strongman now, the one who deserves to rule Iraq. At least according to what one hears his followers say in Baghdad. Even though his pretensions to power clearly exaggerate reality, the Sadrists continue to say that they can take over Baghdad in ten hours if ordered to.
Sadr’s overestimation of his own power and popularity is likely to make the situation more complicated. As for Iran, well, Iran doesn’t care much about particular names and faces as long as they’re a part of the chaos.
And this rift will surely add to the chaos Iran desires, even though the accusation of assisting al-Qaeda suggests that the chaos could touch Iran as well. Playing with fire can sometimes get you burned.
The claim itself is not strange. What’s strange is whom it came from. Sadr was the last voice we’d expect to say such a thing. Accusing Iran of interfering in Iraq’s affairs is one thing, but accusing it of hosting and assisting al-Qeada is a whole new ballgame. It opens the door for speculation and analysis, especially since Sadr only weeks ago returned from a long stay in Iran in which he was a guest of the top leaders of the Islamic Republic. So why make this statement now?
Some say that the many accusations in and outside of Iraq that Sadr is Iran’s man forced his hand in an effort to distance himself from suspicion. But Sadr’s words do not support this theory because, as previously mentioned, he could have just said that Iran is maliciously interfering in Iraq. When the accusation went beyond that to link al-Qaeda with Iran it became a serious claim that put Iran, his ally, in a very embarrassing position. Are we seeing signs of a breakup? If so, is this breakup coming from an emerging conscience or patriotic feelings on Sadr’s part?
In my opinion, patriotic feelings have no role in answering this question. At the same time, there’s more at work here than Sadr’s attempt to distract from his alliance with Iran. A cleric such as Sadr believes in a revolutionary ideology with strictly defined tenets of absolute right and absolute wrong. Patriotic goals represent only a step towards imposing this absolute vision on everyone.
Islamists do not believe in a homeland, they believe in a ‘Dar al-Islam’ (House of Islam) that will eventually encompass the whole world.
If we look at the articles written by Mr. Marwani (the consultant at the Cultural Supervision Committee of the Martyr Sadr office), and these are frequently published on the web, we see that his signature is followed by the words “From Baghdad, the occupied capital of the world.” In a way this means that the world, not Iraq alone, is the goal in their ideology and literature, and the “Mowatti’o al-Mahdai” (those who pave the way for the Imam Mahdi) led by Moqtada, will lead the Imam’s army to every point in the world spreading justice.
Then what made Moqtada go in the direction he did?
It was the result of factors that accumulated over time, and matured during his visit to Tehran. Sadr finally realized that his role was only second or third to that of the SIIC of Hakim, or the Dawa Party. A situation that a young revolutionary leader who won all his fame and clout in just a few short years couldn’t tolerate. In those years his name, and his army, rocketed upward in the media headlines and proved a powerful presence on the ground. Realizing that he’s being treated as a #2 made the ambitious, poorly educated youngster lose his balance. And he had little balance to give, compared to the older big-names who have extensive experience in the political world.
The publicity he got and the power he thinks he has put him in a position of accepting nothing less than being #1. This probably explains his attempts to reach out to some Sunni politicians as a more inclusive alternative, he thinks, to what the Dawa or SIIC offer.
The battles for control in the southern provinces and the manner in which smuggling money is being distributed showed Sadr how secondary his role is. Now he knows that his invitation to the political process and acceptance into the UIA was no more than a political lollipop to calm him down, or he’s finally seeing that his movement’s popularity was exploited to win ballots for other UIA members.
Here appear the signs of a rift that will be difficult for Shia leaders to work around, because winning over a man like Sadr with compromises doesn’t seem possible at this stage. His frustration and ambitions will not leave much room for negotiation.
Sadr believes he’s the strongman now, the one who deserves to rule Iraq. At least according to what one hears his followers say in Baghdad. Even though his pretensions to power clearly exaggerate reality, the Sadrists continue to say that they can take over Baghdad in ten hours if ordered to.
Sadr’s overestimation of his own power and popularity is likely to make the situation more complicated. As for Iran, well, Iran doesn’t care much about particular names and faces as long as they’re a part of the chaos.
And this rift will surely add to the chaos Iran desires, even though the accusation of assisting al-Qaeda suggests that the chaos could touch Iran as well. Playing with fire can sometimes get you burned.
Wednesday, June 20, 2007
War of The Shrines
Attacking the Askari shrine for the second time emphasizes how those who ordered the attacks have been betting their money on this tactic to spark civil war in Iraq. Civil war would kill any hope for the rise of a stable democracy and is also the best option to stop the change project in the region by associating it with the ugly image of civil war.
Such war would not only destroy Iraqis' hopes in stability and prosperity, it would also bury every aspiration in the region for pluralism and reform—the Iraqi example could be used then as call for accepting dictatorship or going back to the Salafi origins as an easy alternative for a change that leads to civil war.
Despite there have been some attempts to seize the chance and build on the emotions in the aftermath of the attack it seems that the effect is much less pronounced than what we experienced after the first attack last year and results are not going to be as spectacular as the perpetrators were hoping. Still this point, attacking shrines, would remain an issue that can spark violence and widen the gap among the people.
What made write about this today is an intersting article I saw that was written by an Iraqi author in which he outlined an unlikely yet truly scary scenario. You can read it here if you know Arabic but if you don't his point can be summarized by the following; he's saying that as long as there are attempts to ignite civil war through attacking shrines then we really should expect a large-scale incident that would make the entire Shia world shake and end any chance for peace in Iraq, that is attacking the Shrine of Imam Hussein.
This particular shrine is more important spiritually and emotionally than the shrine of Hussein's father Imam Ali. It represents the history of Kerbala and the legendary revolution of Hussein and his companions which is the most revered event in the history of Shia Islam. Any act against this place could lead to incontrollable chaos in Iraq. The author says such an attack is not unlikely because actual undercover control in Kerbala is in Iranian hands and perhaps the highly organized attack on the joint provincial coordination center on January 20 gives an idea about the depth of Iran's influence in the city and the force that protects the shrine is very likely to be infiltrated as well.
And then Kerbala would make a more logical target than Najaf because of its proximity with the al-Qaeda triangle and al-Qaeda did in fact carry out several operations in the vicinity of Kerbala which means it would be easy for Iran and its surrogates to deny involvement in operation and blame it on Sunni extremists. Actually regardless of who pulls the trigger such an operation could only happen with Iranian orders and consent.
What increases the fear that this scenario could be actually in the works is a senior Sadr's aide recent statement in which he alluded to close cooperation between al-Qaeda and Iran.
I hope the author is wrong but at the same time I see a need to double the effort to prevent further attacks on major Shia and Sunni shrines and make that part of the overall security plan. Assigning trust-worthy vetted forces can spare us the headache of thinking about the possible tragic effects of another bombing and from the worse possibility of dealing with them.
Update: Kerbala governor feels the danger too, from Radio Saw:
Such war would not only destroy Iraqis' hopes in stability and prosperity, it would also bury every aspiration in the region for pluralism and reform—the Iraqi example could be used then as call for accepting dictatorship or going back to the Salafi origins as an easy alternative for a change that leads to civil war.
Despite there have been some attempts to seize the chance and build on the emotions in the aftermath of the attack it seems that the effect is much less pronounced than what we experienced after the first attack last year and results are not going to be as spectacular as the perpetrators were hoping. Still this point, attacking shrines, would remain an issue that can spark violence and widen the gap among the people.
What made write about this today is an intersting article I saw that was written by an Iraqi author in which he outlined an unlikely yet truly scary scenario. You can read it here if you know Arabic but if you don't his point can be summarized by the following; he's saying that as long as there are attempts to ignite civil war through attacking shrines then we really should expect a large-scale incident that would make the entire Shia world shake and end any chance for peace in Iraq, that is attacking the Shrine of Imam Hussein.
This particular shrine is more important spiritually and emotionally than the shrine of Hussein's father Imam Ali. It represents the history of Kerbala and the legendary revolution of Hussein and his companions which is the most revered event in the history of Shia Islam. Any act against this place could lead to incontrollable chaos in Iraq. The author says such an attack is not unlikely because actual undercover control in Kerbala is in Iranian hands and perhaps the highly organized attack on the joint provincial coordination center on January 20 gives an idea about the depth of Iran's influence in the city and the force that protects the shrine is very likely to be infiltrated as well.
And then Kerbala would make a more logical target than Najaf because of its proximity with the al-Qaeda triangle and al-Qaeda did in fact carry out several operations in the vicinity of Kerbala which means it would be easy for Iran and its surrogates to deny involvement in operation and blame it on Sunni extremists. Actually regardless of who pulls the trigger such an operation could only happen with Iranian orders and consent.
What increases the fear that this scenario could be actually in the works is a senior Sadr's aide recent statement in which he alluded to close cooperation between al-Qaeda and Iran.
I hope the author is wrong but at the same time I see a need to double the effort to prevent further attacks on major Shia and Sunni shrines and make that part of the overall security plan. Assigning trust-worthy vetted forces can spare us the headache of thinking about the possible tragic effects of another bombing and from the worse possibility of dealing with them.
Update: Kerbala governor feels the danger too, from Radio Saw:
Kerbala governor Aqeel Khazali pointed out the intent of security authorities to enforce additional security measures in the light of intelligence reports speaking of possible attacks on shrines in Kerbala. Khazali cautioned that any attack on these shrines would ignite sectarian war at not only the local level but at the regional and Islamic world levels.
The governor rejected demands by the locals to relax the security restriction imposed in the city adding that the danger of having shrines targeted is based on verified intelligence reports.
Tuesday, June 19, 2007
Creative chaos; Iran's way
One Arab journalist had this to say in a recent article "The Arab media is bewildered now as it's been shocked by multiple incidents and fires that are all important and deserve the front page or the main headline in broadcast; from the bombing in Samarra to the fire in Gaza to the assassination of a Lebanese member of parliament all are news worth covering but where shall we start from!?"
To me I didn't have to jump from one flash spot to another to determine which bit of news is more important or worth becoming a priority in commenting on. The region is connected and no part of it is isolated from the other parts that I think a commentator should look at the Middle Eastern map as a whole instead of one point at a time.
Perhaps what first comes to mind upon looking at the broader image would be the common factor among all these escalations from Afghanistan through Iraq, Gaza, and Lebanon to the war with the Hoothi followers in Yemen and it would be clear beyond confusion that Iran is behind all of these crises.
Iran itself isn't shy of admitting support to the troublemakers in these countries and even the Shia groups who are accused of being loyal to Iran have started to say that Iran supports al-Qaeda.
I think that when the president of the united states counted Iran among the members of the axis of evil the description was not unjustifiably incriminating, it just came before the evidence that support this claim became available.
In Iran there's an ideology that alienates everyone different, and that with power in the hands of extremist and the presence of wild ambitions based on a mythical vision, this combination can only lead us to the simple conclusion that Iran has a project that is in conflict with the new orientation of the region and most importantly this project aims far beyond the borders of Iran.
Mr. Ahmadinejad told the foreign minister of France a year or so ago something like "The path to God has to go through chaos" and I'm positive that Mr. Ahmadinejad wasn't speaking of the "creative chaos" that some western leaders talk about. I believe he was speaking of the kind of chaos based on the religious myth which says the rise of the savior Imam could be accelerated by wars and destruction that engulf the region.
It looks like those who have the power in Tehran don't want to miss a chance to cause more of such chaos. Let's just imagine a nuclear Iran led by someone who believes in chaos, what kind of chaos would we face then??
To me I didn't have to jump from one flash spot to another to determine which bit of news is more important or worth becoming a priority in commenting on. The region is connected and no part of it is isolated from the other parts that I think a commentator should look at the Middle Eastern map as a whole instead of one point at a time.
Perhaps what first comes to mind upon looking at the broader image would be the common factor among all these escalations from Afghanistan through Iraq, Gaza, and Lebanon to the war with the Hoothi followers in Yemen and it would be clear beyond confusion that Iran is behind all of these crises.
Iran itself isn't shy of admitting support to the troublemakers in these countries and even the Shia groups who are accused of being loyal to Iran have started to say that Iran supports al-Qaeda.
I think that when the president of the united states counted Iran among the members of the axis of evil the description was not unjustifiably incriminating, it just came before the evidence that support this claim became available.
In Iran there's an ideology that alienates everyone different, and that with power in the hands of extremist and the presence of wild ambitions based on a mythical vision, this combination can only lead us to the simple conclusion that Iran has a project that is in conflict with the new orientation of the region and most importantly this project aims far beyond the borders of Iran.
Mr. Ahmadinejad told the foreign minister of France a year or so ago something like "The path to God has to go through chaos" and I'm positive that Mr. Ahmadinejad wasn't speaking of the "creative chaos" that some western leaders talk about. I believe he was speaking of the kind of chaos based on the religious myth which says the rise of the savior Imam could be accelerated by wars and destruction that engulf the region.
It looks like those who have the power in Tehran don't want to miss a chance to cause more of such chaos. Let's just imagine a nuclear Iran led by someone who believes in chaos, what kind of chaos would we face then??
We're ok, and we're back
Hello my friends, we're back...
Sorry for the relatively long hiatus, I hate being away from blogging more than you think but I had to do some traveling to take care of some stuff and it took more than I had planned for; I was hoping to return home on Thursday but the curfew forced a change in plans. Anyway, I don't want to bother you with this right now.
What was really annoying for me is that I had to make this trip while the middle east is on fire at multiple fronts from Gaza to Lebanon to the main front in this country and the recent spectacular developments from the bombing in Samarra to the clashes in Nasiriyah and Amarah to the great battle of Diyala that as just started and most recently the barbaric bloody terrorist attack in Baghdad this afternoon.
Starting tonight Mohammed and I will be trying to catch up with, and cover, as many relevant topics as possible.
And to all the friends who were worried about our safety and sent emails to check on us, thank you so much.
Sorry for the relatively long hiatus, I hate being away from blogging more than you think but I had to do some traveling to take care of some stuff and it took more than I had planned for; I was hoping to return home on Thursday but the curfew forced a change in plans. Anyway, I don't want to bother you with this right now.
What was really annoying for me is that I had to make this trip while the middle east is on fire at multiple fronts from Gaza to Lebanon to the main front in this country and the recent spectacular developments from the bombing in Samarra to the clashes in Nasiriyah and Amarah to the great battle of Diyala that as just started and most recently the barbaric bloody terrorist attack in Baghdad this afternoon.
Starting tonight Mohammed and I will be trying to catch up with, and cover, as many relevant topics as possible.
And to all the friends who were worried about our safety and sent emails to check on us, thank you so much.
Friday, June 08, 2007
Baghdad Summer Politics
The hysterical verbal threats and accusations among Iraq’s politicians and leaders have moved up several notches since the coup panic was first felt in Baghdad. Now the hysteria has reached the top of the government pyramid.
Iraqis often say that when the summer heat goes up people lose their minds. Frankly I’ve seen this happen to some people I know and sometimes the damage is temporary, sometimes not. We’re already having days as hot as 45 degrees Celsius [113 degrees Fahrenheit] and our politicians are evidently not immune to the heat driven insanity.
The escalation began with a highly offensive joint statement by president Talabani and Masoud Barazani president of Kurdistan. Here’s part of it as it was published on al-Mashriq newspaper on June 6 [emphasis added]:
(*Wifaq is the Iraqi National Accord movement (INA), the original party of Allawi.)
I can see why they are angry and terrified; a couple months ago Turkey hosted at least one meeting of some of the groups attacked in this statement. And at this moment Turkey’s soldiers and tanks are standing at the gates of Kurdistan. While hunting the PKK elements is Turkey’s declared objective, protecting Kirkuk from Kurdish domination is not an impossible mission upgrade to Turkey’s ambitions in the region.
The paper also provided some reactions to this statement from the other camp:
Usama al-Nijeifi, former minister of industry and member of Allawi’s bloc (the Iraqi list) said “This is provocative rhetoric and reflects a desire to monopolize power” and defended his bloc’s political movement by saying “The idea of forming a new political body came after we felt that the political process is stumbling and that we must (do something to) fix this…The reform project that this political body seeks will be according to the democratic ways and the constitution does not prohibit this type of discussions”
Saleem Abdullah al-Jubouri, member of the Islamic Party, part of the Accord Front said “The Islamic Party is dismayed by the Barazani-Talabani statement that should not come from heads of states… It’s the right of any political party to whatever it deems appropriate within the constitutional ways”
Salih al-Mutlaq, chief of the national Dialogue Front (11 seats) “harshly criticized Talabani’s and Barazani’s statement” according to the paper, and said, “we’re moving towards forming a bloc of moderate elements and the discussions involve the Accord Front, the party of former PM Iyad Allawi and a number of smaller parties”
Perhaps the only frank voice here is that of Mahdi al-Hafiz, the former minister of planning who stepped out of Allawi’s bloc last week over a disagreement between him and other members of the bloc concerning the policy of the bloc.
Hafiz spoke honestly about his vision. He has recently been calling for early elections based on a new election law that replaces slates with direct election of individual representatives and after that forming a new government on basis of parliamentary majority without sectarian or ethnic quotas.
But just when you think the insanity has reached a peak, it gets better!
For the second day in a row Maliki has been waving his “Iron Fist” vowing to use this fist to strike implied enemies of the country. On Wednesday he was apparently referring to some parties in Basra, probably the Fadheela, for allegedly planning to sabotage the ports and oil facilities in the southern city. Al-Sabah provided this report about statement:
I wonder why he hadn’t exposed those criminals yet if their intentions were very well known to the government? Ideally a policeman who turns a blind eye to criminals is considered corrupt, so what does this make of a head of state if the threat he’s talking about was true?
Thursday’s “Iron Fist” show was even more bizarre. Here’s part of Al-Sabah’s lead story:
My conclusion:
Since a coup using military force is technically impossible at this stage, the accusations and threats by Maliki, Barazani and Talabani do indeed reflect a desire to remain in power no matter what. This means they are prepared to use military force to suppress the attempts by some politicians to bring about a change in the government.
The other camp, with a few exceptions, doesn’t represent a good replacement option. It’s largely a combination of Islamists and pan-nationalists. However we can’t ignore that the leadership of this group will largely devolve to the secular elements. The secular leaders (Allawi’s group) will provide the support from the region and perhaps from the west. Hence, the relatively weak Sunni Islamists and defeated pan-nationalists will have to accept the secular leadership. After all, I don’t think Allawi would repeat Chalabi’s mistake when he relinquished power to the Shia Islamists.
Back to the guys in the current government: the Kurds are careful about protecting their alliance with the Shia alliance not out of patriotic feelings. It’s about the tactical cooperation through which the Kurds want to put article 140—which will decide the future of Kirkuk—into action. This is because the Shai alliance doesn’t care much about Sunni Kirkuk. After all there’s much more easy oil to be had in the south.
As for Maliki, time is critical for him. His declared plans for reform were not as effective as desired. He kept the situation — whether on purpose or not — within the framework of the old Kurd-Shia alliance. I can’t blame him. He’s been under extreme pressure, especially from within his bloc.
Iraqis often say that when the summer heat goes up people lose their minds. Frankly I’ve seen this happen to some people I know and sometimes the damage is temporary, sometimes not. We’re already having days as hot as 45 degrees Celsius [113 degrees Fahrenheit] and our politicians are evidently not immune to the heat driven insanity.
The escalation began with a highly offensive joint statement by president Talabani and Masoud Barazani president of Kurdistan. Here’s part of it as it was published on al-Mashriq newspaper on June 6 [emphasis added]:
With regret and puzzlement the political bureaus of the KDP and PUK were informed about the statement dated April 29, 2007 that announces the formation of a political front that includes, in addition to the Islamic Party and Wifaq* movement, long-time traitors of the Kurdish people, the orphans of Saddam the butcher and chauvinist elements who are enemies of the rights and aspirations of the Iraqi people in its two major ethnicities, Arabic and Kurdish…
The meeting that was set up by the intelligence services of foreign countries led to the formation of a political front that is against the democratic march of the Iraqi people and working to destroy their constitutional achievements…Is it the quality of patriots to ignore their main, long-time allies and provoke them by cooperating with the representatives of racist traitors and suspicious chauvinists?… As the political bureaus of the KDP and PUK condemn this separatist act that is harmful to national unity and Iraq’s march towards democracy, we call upon the good among the brothers in the Islamic Party, Iraqi list and the Kurdistan Islamic Union to return to the lines of the broad coalition and withdraw from this suspicious political front.
(*Wifaq is the Iraqi National Accord movement (INA), the original party of Allawi.)
I can see why they are angry and terrified; a couple months ago Turkey hosted at least one meeting of some of the groups attacked in this statement. And at this moment Turkey’s soldiers and tanks are standing at the gates of Kurdistan. While hunting the PKK elements is Turkey’s declared objective, protecting Kirkuk from Kurdish domination is not an impossible mission upgrade to Turkey’s ambitions in the region.
The paper also provided some reactions to this statement from the other camp:
Usama al-Nijeifi, former minister of industry and member of Allawi’s bloc (the Iraqi list) said “This is provocative rhetoric and reflects a desire to monopolize power” and defended his bloc’s political movement by saying “The idea of forming a new political body came after we felt that the political process is stumbling and that we must (do something to) fix this…The reform project that this political body seeks will be according to the democratic ways and the constitution does not prohibit this type of discussions”
Saleem Abdullah al-Jubouri, member of the Islamic Party, part of the Accord Front said “The Islamic Party is dismayed by the Barazani-Talabani statement that should not come from heads of states… It’s the right of any political party to whatever it deems appropriate within the constitutional ways”
Salih al-Mutlaq, chief of the national Dialogue Front (11 seats) “harshly criticized Talabani’s and Barazani’s statement” according to the paper, and said, “we’re moving towards forming a bloc of moderate elements and the discussions involve the Accord Front, the party of former PM Iyad Allawi and a number of smaller parties”
Perhaps the only frank voice here is that of Mahdi al-Hafiz, the former minister of planning who stepped out of Allawi’s bloc last week over a disagreement between him and other members of the bloc concerning the policy of the bloc.
Hafiz spoke honestly about his vision. He has recently been calling for early elections based on a new election law that replaces slates with direct election of individual representatives and after that forming a new government on basis of parliamentary majority without sectarian or ethnic quotas.
But just when you think the insanity has reached a peak, it gets better!
For the second day in a row Maliki has been waving his “Iron Fist” vowing to use this fist to strike implied enemies of the country. On Wednesday he was apparently referring to some parties in Basra, probably the Fadheela, for allegedly planning to sabotage the ports and oil facilities in the southern city. Al-Sabah provided this report about statement:
The government vowed to strike with an iron fist on anyone who undermines public security in Iraq and executes evil plots that harm the highest interests of the country…A statement by the office of the Prime Minister said:
The government is warning all outlaws off harming the institutions of the state. The government will itself obliged to expose the local entities who stand behind the attempt to damage the ports and oil facilities and will expose their suspicious links to some countries in the region.
I wonder why he hadn’t exposed those criminals yet if their intentions were very well known to the government? Ideally a policeman who turns a blind eye to criminals is considered corrupt, so what does this make of a head of state if the threat he’s talking about was true?
Thursday’s “Iron Fist” show was even more bizarre. Here’s part of Al-Sabah’s lead story:
The Prime Minister sent a firm message to those who are paving the way for interference in Iraq’s internal affairs, he told the commanders of the armed forces “Strike on them with an iron fist for they have moved from the stage of conspiring to the stage of undermining security and siding with terrorism…The days of coups are gone with the former regime and there’s no going back to the days of ignorance, sidelining and despotism. There’s no place for conspiracies and we shall accept only what the democratic process yields”
My conclusion:
Since a coup using military force is technically impossible at this stage, the accusations and threats by Maliki, Barazani and Talabani do indeed reflect a desire to remain in power no matter what. This means they are prepared to use military force to suppress the attempts by some politicians to bring about a change in the government.
The other camp, with a few exceptions, doesn’t represent a good replacement option. It’s largely a combination of Islamists and pan-nationalists. However we can’t ignore that the leadership of this group will largely devolve to the secular elements. The secular leaders (Allawi’s group) will provide the support from the region and perhaps from the west. Hence, the relatively weak Sunni Islamists and defeated pan-nationalists will have to accept the secular leadership. After all, I don’t think Allawi would repeat Chalabi’s mistake when he relinquished power to the Shia Islamists.
Back to the guys in the current government: the Kurds are careful about protecting their alliance with the Shia alliance not out of patriotic feelings. It’s about the tactical cooperation through which the Kurds want to put article 140—which will decide the future of Kirkuk—into action. This is because the Shai alliance doesn’t care much about Sunni Kirkuk. After all there’s much more easy oil to be had in the south.
As for Maliki, time is critical for him. His declared plans for reform were not as effective as desired. He kept the situation — whether on purpose or not — within the framework of the old Kurd-Shia alliance. I can’t blame him. He’s been under extreme pressure, especially from within his bloc.
Tuesday, June 05, 2007
Has Sadr returned stronger?
Given the combination of SIIC leader Abdul Aziz al-Hakim’s [wiki] absence from the Shia political scene, the training Sadr received in Iran, and the timing Tehran chose for his return, Moqtada al-Sadr has obviously returned strong. Strong enough to summon seven Iraqi governors to meet him and listen to his instructions about how they should run their respective provinces in central and southern Iraq at the same time his militiamen were fighting the police forces of at least one of those provinces.
In the speech Sadr made at that meeting he called for the peaceful coexistence and cooperation of the police and army on one side, and the Mahdi Army on the other.
Setting aside the fact that endorsing an armed outlaw militia is a brazen violation of the constitution and criminal law (militias that existed prior to OIF are something of a different case, though they too remain constitutionally unacceptable), the meeting sets a dangerous precedent. Sadr is presenting himself as a head of state, leading senior state officials to his meeting like sheep, and challenging the power of the legitimate leaders of the country.
Maliki reacted quickly and gathered the governors around his table in an attempt to minimize Sadr’s influence, and ordered the governors to cleanse their security forces of any elements whose loyalties lie outside of the Iraqi government. It remains unclear which man made a bigger impact. And it remains painfully disappointing that no one in the government did anything to condemn Sadr’s move, or publicly denounce his undermining of the structure of the state.
It’s become clear now that Iraq will not become a successful state when such violations of the law can happen in the open and remain unchecked. Confronting Sadr’s militia with limited operations is not enough—it’s time to deal with him seriously.
The declared objective of the new strategies emanating from Washington and Baghdad is to enforce the rule of law and bring outlaws to justice. Our government persists in saying that no one, including members of that government, is above the law. But this promise has not been translated into action thus far. It makes sense if the reason for the delay in taking serious action to put an end to Sadr’s flouting of the law was a lack of troops, but I’d also expect it to mean that this action should coming soon.
Four years of hesitation have only served to make Sadr stronger and the situation worse, but we have nothing to fear. They can’t make more trouble than they already have. While Al-Qaeda poses a serious security challenge in some provinces, Sadr threatens the future of the whole country. He can paralyze or disrupt the proper functioning of whole ministries and provinces.
The nature of the Mahdi Army means that without political guidance and a figurehead to rally around they would be reduced to making trouble in the streets like any other gang. But they wouldn’t be able to control the institutions of state.
In light of the talk among our British friends of leaving Iraq in 12 months, the south will be in great danger, and a tough decision must be made before that time comes. By the time Sadr can manipulate the civil authority, or Iraqi officers, the number of soldiers we can train and equip won’t make a difference.
Sadr is not simply an outlaw; he represents Iran’s project in Iraq just like Hamas and Nasrallah represent it in the Palestinian territories and Lebanon. These are the three arms of Iran in the Middle East that have worked consistently to ruin every emerging democratic project. And these arms must be cut off sooner rather than later.
In the speech Sadr made at that meeting he called for the peaceful coexistence and cooperation of the police and army on one side, and the Mahdi Army on the other.
Setting aside the fact that endorsing an armed outlaw militia is a brazen violation of the constitution and criminal law (militias that existed prior to OIF are something of a different case, though they too remain constitutionally unacceptable), the meeting sets a dangerous precedent. Sadr is presenting himself as a head of state, leading senior state officials to his meeting like sheep, and challenging the power of the legitimate leaders of the country.
Maliki reacted quickly and gathered the governors around his table in an attempt to minimize Sadr’s influence, and ordered the governors to cleanse their security forces of any elements whose loyalties lie outside of the Iraqi government. It remains unclear which man made a bigger impact. And it remains painfully disappointing that no one in the government did anything to condemn Sadr’s move, or publicly denounce his undermining of the structure of the state.
It’s become clear now that Iraq will not become a successful state when such violations of the law can happen in the open and remain unchecked. Confronting Sadr’s militia with limited operations is not enough—it’s time to deal with him seriously.
The declared objective of the new strategies emanating from Washington and Baghdad is to enforce the rule of law and bring outlaws to justice. Our government persists in saying that no one, including members of that government, is above the law. But this promise has not been translated into action thus far. It makes sense if the reason for the delay in taking serious action to put an end to Sadr’s flouting of the law was a lack of troops, but I’d also expect it to mean that this action should coming soon.
Four years of hesitation have only served to make Sadr stronger and the situation worse, but we have nothing to fear. They can’t make more trouble than they already have. While Al-Qaeda poses a serious security challenge in some provinces, Sadr threatens the future of the whole country. He can paralyze or disrupt the proper functioning of whole ministries and provinces.
The nature of the Mahdi Army means that without political guidance and a figurehead to rally around they would be reduced to making trouble in the streets like any other gang. But they wouldn’t be able to control the institutions of state.
In light of the talk among our British friends of leaving Iraq in 12 months, the south will be in great danger, and a tough decision must be made before that time comes. By the time Sadr can manipulate the civil authority, or Iraqi officers, the number of soldiers we can train and equip won’t make a difference.
Sadr is not simply an outlaw; he represents Iran’s project in Iraq just like Hamas and Nasrallah represent it in the Palestinian territories and Lebanon. These are the three arms of Iran in the Middle East that have worked consistently to ruin every emerging democratic project. And these arms must be cut off sooner rather than later.
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