As fighting rages between government forces and Sadr’s militia in several cities, senior clerics from the hawza (senior Grand Ayatollahs) made a debut in the conflict.
Ayatollah Fadhil Al-Maliki issued a fatwa in which he openly called on police and army to abandon their duty, adding that operation Knights’ Charge is not targeting criminals but an aggression against “the majority of the Iraqi people.” Although there is news about a handful of soldiers and policemen abandoning their posts and joining the militia, this fatwa is not going to have a significant effect on operations. However it’s a reminder that there are still people who bet on fatwas as long as some are willing to offer allegiance to the sect instead of the country.
This fatwa revives the old conflict over legitimacy between the ethnic Arab and foreign clerics of the hawza. The former, like Ayatollah Al-Maliki or Sadr himself, accuse non-Arab clerics like Sistani of leading a “Hawza Samita” or a silent hawza in the face of what Sadr considers injustice and tyranny.
Iran, on the other hand and as we predicted yesterday, chose not to endorse Sadr’s position and did nothing more than issue a call through Ahmed Jannati, chief of the Guardians Council, for negotiations between Sadr and the government to resolve the crisis.
On the field, as fighting spread to include Karbala province, Sadrists rejected Maliki’s call to lay down their weapons and said they’d do that only surrender their weapons to a government that “fights the occupation”. Putting such an unrealistic condition is synonymous to “we will never lay down our weapons”. This defiance is logical from their perspective that is based on force and in order to justify the use of force they need to find a pretext—and what’s better than claiming to be fighting for the cause of national liberation!?
The clashes were not limited to the streets of Basra, the halls of the parliament saw some fighting as well, but in the form of fist-fights between Sadrist MPs and their counterparts from the other parties in the UIA. The UIA and Kurdish bloc walked out of last evening’s emergency session after an intense verbal exchange among some MPs developed into a fist fight, the chief of the UIA bloc Jalal al-Din Saghier told Radio Sawa.
The parliament as usual decided to form a committee to deal with the situation—a move to save face, no more; in Iraq we have a joke that says “if you want to not solve an issue, let a committee take care of it”.
Again, as predicted in an earlier post, Sadrists have approached tribal leaders and clerics and asked them to mediate between them and the government. The prince of the giant Rabi’a tribe will lead a delegation to negotiate a solution with the government.
Last but not least, it’s good to finally hear Maliki acknowledge the danger that Sadr’s militia pose to the country. Saying that Shia militias are “worse than al-Qaeda” signifies the ferocity of the battle and the enormous pressure it applies on the government. It makes me optimistic that the leadership has realized the extent and nature of the threat. In fact I hope that my expectation of a truce that spares the heads of evil proves wrong. Avoiding taking a battle to the end could cost us several times the price in recurrent outbreaks of violence.
While most influential parties seem to be in favor of the crackdown on Mahdi army (including Kurds who view Sadr as an obstacle to establishing the federal system that would grant them control over Kirkuk. Also recall that Masoud Barazani was so vocal in expressing his hostility to Sadr back in late 2003 when he was temporary president of the GC) Sadr’s old ally Ibrahim Jaafari stepped forward to call for an end to the fighting and to accept the Sadrists back in the political process. The statement was described by Maliki’s advisor Sami Askari as “inappropriate and meaningless“.
But ironically a similar call came from Adnan Duleimi of the Sunni Accord Front. In my opinion this came out of Duleimi’s concern about maintaining the balance of power among Shia parties—a Da’wa and SIIC with near absolute power in the center and south would put more power at the disposal of these parties in Baghdad with federalism again being the central issue.
I was going to stop here but now I see that Sadr finally decided to break his silence and make the first public appearance in several months. While the location of the interview remains undisclosed, the fact that he was interviewed by Ghassan Bin Jidou suggests that he’s either in Iran or is enjoying the generous hospitality of his Lebanese twin Nesrallah (can anyone check the recent stamps on Bin Jidou’s passport?).
I want to end this by saying that if we put together Sadr’s words that he’s in control of the Mahdi army and Maliki’s words that Shia militias are worse than al-Qaeda then the logical conclusion should be that Sadr must be dealt with in the same manner in which we deal with terrorist chiefs when we spot them.
New points of view about the future of Iraq and the Middle East.
Saturday, March 29, 2008
Friday, March 28, 2008
Behind the Bloodshed in Basra
One of the most notable things about the fierce and bloody confrontation taking place the government and Sadr’s militia is the spin on the operation by the commanders and the government; that it is a crackdown on outlaws with emphasis that the operation targets no particular movement or political line.
This generic label, includes the so-called rogue Sadrists. Sadr announced only weeks ago that whoever doesn’t uphold the ceasefire would no longer be considered a member of the movement.
Now, Sadr is watching those rogue elements being hit hard by the government forces. Instead of disavowing those who blatantly disobeyed his ceasefire orders we see him call for negotiations and condemning the government, thus once more revealing his real face as a defender of his own version of terrorism.
Another important dimension in this confrontation, largely ignored, regards Sadr’s rhetoric about security situation in Basra. The anti-Multinational Force powers always blamed British troops for insecurity in the province prior to their withdrawal.
Now it must be asked in a loud clear voice - who’s responsible for insecurity now that British troops are gone?
Another important aspect of this operation is the excessive enthusiasm of the UIA-led government in striking the Sadrists, who are supposed to be part of the UIA and are also Shiites.
This is the first sign of the rising election fever in the south. Word on the street is that Sadrists want to hijack the provincial elections. Everybody knows that their criminal methods can severely reduce the chances for holding fair elections and may grant Sadr’s people huge gains at the expense of other Shiite factions such as the SIIC, Da’wa and Fadheela. The stakes are high for the SIIC in particular whose federal dream in the south, which Sadr is opposed to, hinges on the results of provincial elections.
If Sadr is to be cut down to size before the provincial election law can be passed, presumably his rivals would be able to compete in a relatively more civil way.
The outcome of this operation in my opinion will not involve the extermination of Sadr’s militia but rather the reduction of its power.
A truce would then be put in place with mediation by senior clerics, tribal leaders and third-party politicians.
But this would be a mistake - similar to former interim prime minister Allawi’s when he didn’t finish the job back in Najaf four years ago, except that the situation is more complicated this time as both belligerents are from the UIA.
Why? Because leaders like Saddam, Nasrallah and Sadr always manage to turn defeat into symbolic victory for domestic consumption. If Sadr and a decent part of the movement’s command survive this round, he will portray his movement as an innocent victim of the “occupation and its agents” and will use this for an even louder propaganda campaign after the battle.
Those killed in the fighting are poor unfortunate followers, but the real outlaws, the heads of the movement, will likely escape punishment.
Just like Desert Storm or the summer 2006 Lebanon war, the survival of the leader can easily become synonymous to victory in their twisted dictionary.
And let’s not forget Iran. Its role in this chapter of the struggle for power in the south is still unclear to observers. Both sides of the conflict are friends of Iran, yet I think Iran will support the SIIC and prime minister Maliki this time.
It appears, for now, that Iran has begun to abandon this undisciplined movement. Iran has learned over time that Sadr’s militia, although powerful in some regions, is reckless and unpredictable - unlike the rest of the UIA which is consistent and organized in utilizing the power granted to them as the biggest party in the government to their advantage.
It is true that the grand strategies of Tehran and Sadr are quite the same when it comes to their ambitions in spreading their version of totalitarian Shia Islamism in the region. However, Sadr’s ambitious aspirations are not in harmony with Tehran’s tactical plans. He rejects a federal system in Iraq because he wants to control the whole country, while Iran at this stage is only looking forward to having an ally in a stable Iraqi south.
This is why supporting the SIIC makes more sense for Iran as the most reliable party that may be able to make the autonomous region in the south a reality—a reality in which Iran has a strategic interest, as it can turn the south into a friendly buffer zone instead of a thorn in its side.
This generic label, includes the so-called rogue Sadrists. Sadr announced only weeks ago that whoever doesn’t uphold the ceasefire would no longer be considered a member of the movement.
Now, Sadr is watching those rogue elements being hit hard by the government forces. Instead of disavowing those who blatantly disobeyed his ceasefire orders we see him call for negotiations and condemning the government, thus once more revealing his real face as a defender of his own version of terrorism.
Another important dimension in this confrontation, largely ignored, regards Sadr’s rhetoric about security situation in Basra. The anti-Multinational Force powers always blamed British troops for insecurity in the province prior to their withdrawal.
Now it must be asked in a loud clear voice - who’s responsible for insecurity now that British troops are gone?
Another important aspect of this operation is the excessive enthusiasm of the UIA-led government in striking the Sadrists, who are supposed to be part of the UIA and are also Shiites.
This is the first sign of the rising election fever in the south. Word on the street is that Sadrists want to hijack the provincial elections. Everybody knows that their criminal methods can severely reduce the chances for holding fair elections and may grant Sadr’s people huge gains at the expense of other Shiite factions such as the SIIC, Da’wa and Fadheela. The stakes are high for the SIIC in particular whose federal dream in the south, which Sadr is opposed to, hinges on the results of provincial elections.
If Sadr is to be cut down to size before the provincial election law can be passed, presumably his rivals would be able to compete in a relatively more civil way.
The outcome of this operation in my opinion will not involve the extermination of Sadr’s militia but rather the reduction of its power.
A truce would then be put in place with mediation by senior clerics, tribal leaders and third-party politicians.
But this would be a mistake - similar to former interim prime minister Allawi’s when he didn’t finish the job back in Najaf four years ago, except that the situation is more complicated this time as both belligerents are from the UIA.
Why? Because leaders like Saddam, Nasrallah and Sadr always manage to turn defeat into symbolic victory for domestic consumption. If Sadr and a decent part of the movement’s command survive this round, he will portray his movement as an innocent victim of the “occupation and its agents” and will use this for an even louder propaganda campaign after the battle.
Those killed in the fighting are poor unfortunate followers, but the real outlaws, the heads of the movement, will likely escape punishment.
Just like Desert Storm or the summer 2006 Lebanon war, the survival of the leader can easily become synonymous to victory in their twisted dictionary.
And let’s not forget Iran. Its role in this chapter of the struggle for power in the south is still unclear to observers. Both sides of the conflict are friends of Iran, yet I think Iran will support the SIIC and prime minister Maliki this time.
It appears, for now, that Iran has begun to abandon this undisciplined movement. Iran has learned over time that Sadr’s militia, although powerful in some regions, is reckless and unpredictable - unlike the rest of the UIA which is consistent and organized in utilizing the power granted to them as the biggest party in the government to their advantage.
It is true that the grand strategies of Tehran and Sadr are quite the same when it comes to their ambitions in spreading their version of totalitarian Shia Islamism in the region. However, Sadr’s ambitious aspirations are not in harmony with Tehran’s tactical plans. He rejects a federal system in Iraq because he wants to control the whole country, while Iran at this stage is only looking forward to having an ally in a stable Iraqi south.
This is why supporting the SIIC makes more sense for Iran as the most reliable party that may be able to make the autonomous region in the south a reality—a reality in which Iran has a strategic interest, as it can turn the south into a friendly buffer zone instead of a thorn in its side.
Thursday, March 27, 2008
Iraqis and US Presidential Elections
While common sense suggests that Iraq would be very interested in the U.S. presidential race — given the immense influence of U.S. decision-making on the situation in the country — we see that the local media in Iraq have largely been ignoring the developments of the Democratic and Republican primaries. Moreover, we have hardly heard any comments from the political class, and the average person on the street is not as interested about the American election as they were in 2004.
What could be the reasons for this?
The first, I believe, is that the clock in Baghdad ticks slower than the clock in Washington. It’s very likely that the media and politicians are not yet interested in the American election simply because there’s still plenty of time left until Americans get to make their final decision. Meanwhile, everyone in Iraq is busy living with immediate domestic challenges and issues of daily life.
There are, however, other likely reasons for the country’s lack of interest. The political class, for example, is perhaps reluctant to endorse or oppose any of the three candidates. This is a natural defense mechanism. They don’t want to throw in their lot with one candidate and then have to deal with a winner they opposed. That would be a great political risk to take for any Iraqi politician or party, especially since the Iraqi election is only 12 months after the American one. The media, being largely reflective of the viewpoints of the government or political parties outside the government, are expected then to exhibit the same kind of behavior in order not to undermine their political sponsors or affiliates.
While I expect the silence of the media and politicians to last through the coming months, the average Iraqi will begin to get more and more interested in the subject. From previous experience, I believe this will become visible once there are only two candidates competing for the presidency. That’s when the clock will — finally — start ticking in Baghdad.
No opinion polls have been conducted to see which of the three candidates (McCain, Clinton, Obama) is viewed most favorably by Iraqis. If I were to try to predict their feelings, I’d start by restating the fact that most Iraqis are concerned first and foremost about their living conditions — economy, security, water, electricity — and they care primarily about coming up with solutions to these problems. Iraqis have also come to realize that their problems are essentially domestic, arising from the struggle among political powers. These in turn are complicated by regional interference, which is most of the time permitted by those very same political powers.
Therefore, the solution has to come from within, and from within only. Yet we cannot ignore that this requires a foreign factor represented by the American presence. This presence is the only hope for creating the environment under which the solution from within can be reached. This is exactly the rationale for the surge, of which McCain has been one of the strongest proponents, if not its main architect.
While many Iraqis may be oblivious to that last fact, I believe there’s wide agreement that Iraq still needs America’s commitment to the democratic project in the country. Perhaps this belief is more prevalent among ordinary people than it is among politicians, particularly those who aren’t sincerely interested in the idea of a unified state. Those politicians, while still more or less silent, view the American presence as a restraint to their ambitions in the long run. They feel they have mustered the tools of power that would enable them to survive and prevail against their rivals — including the not-yet-strong central government in Baghdad — if they enter a struggle to realize their ambitions of walking away with a big enough chunk of the country; the SIIC of Hakim embodies this trend. There are also the Kurdish leaders who are growing more dissatisfied with the current administration’s “complicity” in Turkey’s operations in Kurdistan and are receiving American criticism for the undemocratic way in which they’ve been running their political parties and the Kurdish region so far.
In contrast with ordinary people — or at least with the predicted opinion of ordinary people — these two groups of politicians would rather see an administration that wants to walk away from the problem than one that wants to solve the problem.
This has encouraged Republican leaders, in particular John McCain, to visit Baghdad to negate the state of reluctance that accompanies the waiting for the American election results. This state of reluctance and the delay in passing laws are not good for the democratic process as a whole.
Visits like this, with the absence of similar visits from Democrats, have two dimensions: first, they push the political process in Iraq in order to achieve stability there, which would help the Republicans in the elections. Second, it makes Iraqi politicians and the public understand that a change in the administration does not necessarily mean abandoning Iraq and the immediate withdrawal of troops from the country. The Iraqi government has to work on these basics instead of standing by idly and wasting precious time.
What could be the reasons for this?
The first, I believe, is that the clock in Baghdad ticks slower than the clock in Washington. It’s very likely that the media and politicians are not yet interested in the American election simply because there’s still plenty of time left until Americans get to make their final decision. Meanwhile, everyone in Iraq is busy living with immediate domestic challenges and issues of daily life.
There are, however, other likely reasons for the country’s lack of interest. The political class, for example, is perhaps reluctant to endorse or oppose any of the three candidates. This is a natural defense mechanism. They don’t want to throw in their lot with one candidate and then have to deal with a winner they opposed. That would be a great political risk to take for any Iraqi politician or party, especially since the Iraqi election is only 12 months after the American one. The media, being largely reflective of the viewpoints of the government or political parties outside the government, are expected then to exhibit the same kind of behavior in order not to undermine their political sponsors or affiliates.
While I expect the silence of the media and politicians to last through the coming months, the average Iraqi will begin to get more and more interested in the subject. From previous experience, I believe this will become visible once there are only two candidates competing for the presidency. That’s when the clock will — finally — start ticking in Baghdad.
No opinion polls have been conducted to see which of the three candidates (McCain, Clinton, Obama) is viewed most favorably by Iraqis. If I were to try to predict their feelings, I’d start by restating the fact that most Iraqis are concerned first and foremost about their living conditions — economy, security, water, electricity — and they care primarily about coming up with solutions to these problems. Iraqis have also come to realize that their problems are essentially domestic, arising from the struggle among political powers. These in turn are complicated by regional interference, which is most of the time permitted by those very same political powers.
Therefore, the solution has to come from within, and from within only. Yet we cannot ignore that this requires a foreign factor represented by the American presence. This presence is the only hope for creating the environment under which the solution from within can be reached. This is exactly the rationale for the surge, of which McCain has been one of the strongest proponents, if not its main architect.
While many Iraqis may be oblivious to that last fact, I believe there’s wide agreement that Iraq still needs America’s commitment to the democratic project in the country. Perhaps this belief is more prevalent among ordinary people than it is among politicians, particularly those who aren’t sincerely interested in the idea of a unified state. Those politicians, while still more or less silent, view the American presence as a restraint to their ambitions in the long run. They feel they have mustered the tools of power that would enable them to survive and prevail against their rivals — including the not-yet-strong central government in Baghdad — if they enter a struggle to realize their ambitions of walking away with a big enough chunk of the country; the SIIC of Hakim embodies this trend. There are also the Kurdish leaders who are growing more dissatisfied with the current administration’s “complicity” in Turkey’s operations in Kurdistan and are receiving American criticism for the undemocratic way in which they’ve been running their political parties and the Kurdish region so far.
In contrast with ordinary people — or at least with the predicted opinion of ordinary people — these two groups of politicians would rather see an administration that wants to walk away from the problem than one that wants to solve the problem.
This has encouraged Republican leaders, in particular John McCain, to visit Baghdad to negate the state of reluctance that accompanies the waiting for the American election results. This state of reluctance and the delay in passing laws are not good for the democratic process as a whole.
Visits like this, with the absence of similar visits from Democrats, have two dimensions: first, they push the political process in Iraq in order to achieve stability there, which would help the Republicans in the elections. Second, it makes Iraqi politicians and the public understand that a change in the administration does not necessarily mean abandoning Iraq and the immediate withdrawal of troops from the country. The Iraqi government has to work on these basics instead of standing by idly and wasting precious time.
Tuesday, January 29, 2008
Al-Qaeda in Iraq's New Sponsor: Libya
After Iran, Syria and others it's now Libya's turn to sponsor terrorism in Iraq.
The news popped up for a second then it vanished; Gaddafi's son is accused by senior awakening officials in Anbar of funding and sending a group of foreign terrorists to Iraq. This particular group, awakening leaders believe, was responsible for the explosives cache that caused the devastating explosion in Mosul last week.
Does this not deserve thorough investigation?
We shouldn't be surprised to see young Gaddafi being accused of sponsoring terrorism in Iraq, not should we be surprised if he turns out to be actually involved in sponsoring that "battalion" of terrorists. The dictators of the Middle East have a long-established trend of sponsoring terrorism and provoking chaos in any relevant, or irrelevant, part of the world they have access to. The 2nd half of the 20th century was full of examples of this sort; Saddam funding insurgents in Chad, Egypt becoming part of a civil war in Yemen, Tunisia hosting the PLO, Saddam providing shelter for Dzhokhar Dudayev in 1993, and the list goes long.
However, I am very surprised that this news is being bizarrely ignored by the media.
Did the world get so used to the idea of terror-sponsoring regimes interfering sending death and murderers to Iraq, or did the world get so used to hearing about terrorist attacks in Iraq that an incident like this one is "just another bombing"?
I think this is a case that deserves a lot of attention and some serious investigation; maybe just as much attention as political assassinations in Lebanon have been getting.
On the one hand the accusation should be taken seriously simply because the accused-and his father- have the motive, the tools and a fairly long record of employing terrorism.
Gaddafi's regime is hardcore anti-American so there's every reason to think the regime would try to strike America's interest and efforts in Iraq. Although the tone changed since 2003 but I strongly doubt he did deep down. Gaddafi has also long treated Iraq as an enemy and he, along with Syria, were the only Arab regimes that were Iran's allies during the eight year war.
Moreover, there's a good reason to think that Gaddafi's son, Saif al-Islam want to take revenge upon America, and what's a better place than Iraq to do this!
Remember that his sister was killed in the US air strike on their home in the mid 1980s when he was still a teenager and I don’t think he forgot about it.
On the other hand, the awakening councils should be taken seriously when it comes to the intelligence they gather and offer. First and foremost the reason behind their success in Anbar was mostly their ability to gather and utilize reliable intelligence. The awakening fighters don't have the firepower, technology, training or discipline of organized armies yet they made huge success against al-Qaeda. The only asset I can think of that enabled them to do so is intelligence.
Let's not forget that those fighters were until recently close to, if not part of the network that includes al-Qaeda so it's not unlikely that some of them had access to information about operations and movements that are taking place just now. It's logical to think that terrorists would abort missions whose details have been compromised but the different times at which former insurgents split from al-Qaeda to join the awakening and the quick pace of changes on the ground provides room for confusion and mistakes.
One more important finding makes my suspicion stronger. Could it be a coincidence that the percentage that Libyan nationals make up of total foreign terrorists has spiked during 2007? According to recently captured documents that US military captured in Sinjar, a town west of Mosul, one fifth of foreign fighters who came to Iraq between in the year leading to August 2007 were Libyan nationals. Or could be another coincidence that Libya covertly sponsored a satellite TV channel in Iraq that was going to launch in late 2006, the same time the Libyan "surge" started? This is a new and surprising figure that suggests that there's an organized effort to recruit and send fighters from Libya to Iraq; an effort not easy to undertake in a repressive police state unless someone above the law is involved.
I think the least thing to do is to make sure that as operations in Mosul proceed and suspects and enemy fighters are captured that interrogators dig for information about Gaddafi's son involvement. Another thing that we can do would be to go back and interrogate all militants and suspects that were captured in and around Mosul since the estimated time of arrival of the "battalion" the awakening official mentioned.
The truth must be discovered and the criminals, whoever they are, must be exposed and made an example so that others think twice before trying to do the same.
The news popped up for a second then it vanished; Gaddafi's son is accused by senior awakening officials in Anbar of funding and sending a group of foreign terrorists to Iraq. This particular group, awakening leaders believe, was responsible for the explosives cache that caused the devastating explosion in Mosul last week.
Col. Jubair Rashid Naief, who also is a police official in Anbar province, said those attacks were carried out by the Seifaddin Regiment, made up of about 150 foreign and Iraqi fighters who slipped into the country several months ago from Syria.
Naief said the regiment, which is working with al-Qaida in Iraq, was supported by Seif al-Islam Gadhafi, 36, the eldest son of the Libyan leader.
"I am sure of what I am talking about, and it is documented," Naief said, adding that he was "100 percent sure" of the younger Gadhafi's role with the terror group.
Does this not deserve thorough investigation?
We shouldn't be surprised to see young Gaddafi being accused of sponsoring terrorism in Iraq, not should we be surprised if he turns out to be actually involved in sponsoring that "battalion" of terrorists. The dictators of the Middle East have a long-established trend of sponsoring terrorism and provoking chaos in any relevant, or irrelevant, part of the world they have access to. The 2nd half of the 20th century was full of examples of this sort; Saddam funding insurgents in Chad, Egypt becoming part of a civil war in Yemen, Tunisia hosting the PLO, Saddam providing shelter for Dzhokhar Dudayev in 1993, and the list goes long.
However, I am very surprised that this news is being bizarrely ignored by the media.
Did the world get so used to the idea of terror-sponsoring regimes interfering sending death and murderers to Iraq, or did the world get so used to hearing about terrorist attacks in Iraq that an incident like this one is "just another bombing"?
I think this is a case that deserves a lot of attention and some serious investigation; maybe just as much attention as political assassinations in Lebanon have been getting.
On the one hand the accusation should be taken seriously simply because the accused-and his father- have the motive, the tools and a fairly long record of employing terrorism.
Gaddafi's regime is hardcore anti-American so there's every reason to think the regime would try to strike America's interest and efforts in Iraq. Although the tone changed since 2003 but I strongly doubt he did deep down. Gaddafi has also long treated Iraq as an enemy and he, along with Syria, were the only Arab regimes that were Iran's allies during the eight year war.
Moreover, there's a good reason to think that Gaddafi's son, Saif al-Islam want to take revenge upon America, and what's a better place than Iraq to do this!
Remember that his sister was killed in the US air strike on their home in the mid 1980s when he was still a teenager and I don’t think he forgot about it.
On the other hand, the awakening councils should be taken seriously when it comes to the intelligence they gather and offer. First and foremost the reason behind their success in Anbar was mostly their ability to gather and utilize reliable intelligence. The awakening fighters don't have the firepower, technology, training or discipline of organized armies yet they made huge success against al-Qaeda. The only asset I can think of that enabled them to do so is intelligence.
Let's not forget that those fighters were until recently close to, if not part of the network that includes al-Qaeda so it's not unlikely that some of them had access to information about operations and movements that are taking place just now. It's logical to think that terrorists would abort missions whose details have been compromised but the different times at which former insurgents split from al-Qaeda to join the awakening and the quick pace of changes on the ground provides room for confusion and mistakes.
One more important finding makes my suspicion stronger. Could it be a coincidence that the percentage that Libyan nationals make up of total foreign terrorists has spiked during 2007? According to recently captured documents that US military captured in Sinjar, a town west of Mosul, one fifth of foreign fighters who came to Iraq between in the year leading to August 2007 were Libyan nationals. Or could be another coincidence that Libya covertly sponsored a satellite TV channel in Iraq that was going to launch in late 2006, the same time the Libyan "surge" started? This is a new and surprising figure that suggests that there's an organized effort to recruit and send fighters from Libya to Iraq; an effort not easy to undertake in a repressive police state unless someone above the law is involved.
I think the least thing to do is to make sure that as operations in Mosul proceed and suspects and enemy fighters are captured that interrogators dig for information about Gaddafi's son involvement. Another thing that we can do would be to go back and interrogate all militants and suspects that were captured in and around Mosul since the estimated time of arrival of the "battalion" the awakening official mentioned.
The truth must be discovered and the criminals, whoever they are, must be exposed and made an example so that others think twice before trying to do the same.
Friday, January 25, 2008
Hello my friends! We feel terrible about not writing anything all this time.
Mohammed and I are both doing fine, I'm doing fine at school as well, my grades from the first semester weren't exactly impressive but I'm quite satisfied given it was the first semester and I had to adjust to a completely new system.
First of all we want to thank all the friends who sent emails checking on us; thank you guys! That was really sweet of you.
We can't make promises about writing more regularly except that we will try. You know, we both live far away from Iraq now and far away from each other as well while in the first four years of blogging we used to work as a team from the same spot; watching the same news, touring the same streets and witnessing the same events firsthand, so it's a big challenge to operate effectively when all of those things are no longer possible, but we'll see…
Now I just want to make a quick comment on a resurfacing story, which is the Lancet study.
Our friends at Iraqi bloggers central emailed me saying that the study has recently been proven wrong and wondered if the Iraqi bloggers who attacked us over our criticism of the study would apologize now since we were right in our criticism.
Frankly I neither need nor expect an apology. The people who deserve a sincere apology are Iraqis as a whole, especially those who are still inside. They deserve an apology from this group of bloggers who so much wanted to believe that an additional half a million of them were dead just to support their view of the war.
Ok, that's all I have to say for now. At least you can have a new fresh thread to post your comments because the number in the last one is getting ridiculous!
Mohammed and I are both doing fine, I'm doing fine at school as well, my grades from the first semester weren't exactly impressive but I'm quite satisfied given it was the first semester and I had to adjust to a completely new system.
First of all we want to thank all the friends who sent emails checking on us; thank you guys! That was really sweet of you.
We can't make promises about writing more regularly except that we will try. You know, we both live far away from Iraq now and far away from each other as well while in the first four years of blogging we used to work as a team from the same spot; watching the same news, touring the same streets and witnessing the same events firsthand, so it's a big challenge to operate effectively when all of those things are no longer possible, but we'll see…
Now I just want to make a quick comment on a resurfacing story, which is the Lancet study.
Our friends at Iraqi bloggers central emailed me saying that the study has recently been proven wrong and wondered if the Iraqi bloggers who attacked us over our criticism of the study would apologize now since we were right in our criticism.
Frankly I neither need nor expect an apology. The people who deserve a sincere apology are Iraqis as a whole, especially those who are still inside. They deserve an apology from this group of bloggers who so much wanted to believe that an additional half a million of them were dead just to support their view of the war.
Ok, that's all I have to say for now. At least you can have a new fresh thread to post your comments because the number in the last one is getting ridiculous!
Wednesday, December 05, 2007
How to eat an elephant
Most people would say it’s impossible. No one could eat an elephant. Others would argue that one actually could eat an elephant—with patience, one bite at a time.
The government cracked down on the Association of Muslim Scholars, an organization of Sunni clerics sympathetic to al-Qaeda and believed to have even been involved in leading, funding and hosting insurgent groups that have been responsible for countless attacks against Iraqis and Americans alike.
Unlike previous operations, this one is different in that the troops were sent following a request submitted to the government by the department of Sunni endowment, an entity in charge of overseeing Sunni mosques and other religious activities. The chief of the Sunni endowment, Sheikh Ahmed Abdul Ghafour Samarraie, is a moderate Sunni cleric who has renounced the insurgency and explicitly accused the association of assisting al-Qaeda by justifying their murderous attacks against Iraqis.
For four years now we’ve been waiting for this to happen. This al-Qaeda apologist, so-called association of Muslim scholars had to be dealt with and honestly it was frustrating to see them operate freely when the damage they caused was widely known, in nature if not in extent.
This incident, I believe, is not to be seen as abstract and it’s no coincidence that the raid on their office came amid efforts to prosecute corrupt officials from Sadr’s movement and the Fadheela Party. The list includes the former deputy minister of health, a Sadr follower who’s been accused of running sectarian death squads and the chief of the integrity committee in the parliament; a member of the Fadheela Party which is believed to be involved in massive oil smuggling operations in the south. He is now about to lose parliamentary immunity over corruption charges.
The interesting thing indeed is that the officials who are leading this campaign and rose to challenge the Sadrists and the association are from their respective sects and regions.
In Karbala, as a most recent example, the police chief finally declared the Mahdi Army an outlaw group. He accused them of murdering over 700 Iraqi civilians, 70 police officers, kidnapping over 130 civilians as well as conducting some 50 attacks with roadside bombs over the last three years in Karbala province alone.
In my opinion, what we’re seeing right now is an exploitation of the achievements of the surge strategy in the direction to establish rule of law-step by step.
I think, and it would be a practical approach if that was the case, that the campaign will involve multiple steps and will deal with targets one at a time according to a certain pattern; that is from the most aggressive, least reconcilable and less politically powerful to the less aggressive, more reconcilable and more politically powerful.
Yes, I consider Sadr now to fit in the less powerful politically category because a) PM Maliki became less dependent on him after withdrew his followers from the cabinet and from the UIA as well and b) his political weight comes from his ability to create chaos and fear; this ability is not as great as it used to be.
Of course such a pattern would require different means and tactics to deal with each target. For example with al-Qaeda it is simply a great military and intelligence effort to exterminate them. With Sunni insurgents it was a combination of coercion and persuasion. Those who agree to cooperate are welcome in the new Iraq-those contributed to the effort against al-Qaeda — while those who don’t suffer the consequences.
Now it’s Sadr’s and Dhari’s (the head of the association of Muslim scholars) turn. The two have been more or less defanged in many parts of the country as Dhari can’t find reliable bargaining power in al-Qaeda anymore and as Sadr is being squeezed with pressure from his former allies in the UIA and determined Iraqi military commanders in the south.
In my assessment of the situation, I think this phase of the campaign will focus on these two threats while momentarily purposely overlooking the smaller ones (small in the ability to create chaos, greater in political weight though). This can make a lot of sense. What stopped the US military from taking decisive action against Dhari or Sadr and his followers were the concerns that doing so might cause more harm than good. Now it seems that those two have lost the capacity to cause enough chaos. In other words they no longer can deter a decisive action by the US troops and Iraqi government. This is truer since the decisive action is coming in the form of legal processes and charges pushed by Iraqi officials supported by evidence, meaning the defendants are denied the use of the occupation /sectarian partiality cliché.
When this phase is completed, and it might take a while, the judicial and security institutions of the state will have gained confidence, popular support and will be galvanized by the experience. That would prepare the atmosphere for the launch of the next phase—cleaning the “house of moderates”. Those moderates (represented by parties such as the SIIC, Islamic Party, Kurdish parties, etc) have enjoyed a fairly long “grace period” since they have been indispensable in establishing the political process after the fall of the former regime. But when state institutions become stronger, terror and other threats and manipulation by extremists would be neutralized to a great extent; those parties will become more vulnerable to scrutiny and to the rule of law.
Our moderate politicians-I prefer to call them “less radical” politicians — might not like this in the future but I doubt they would be able to stop the moving wheel of evolution. The beautiful nature of democracy and power-sharing is that concessions will always be made in order to preserve both; the system for the state and the best possible position for the groups within.
The government cracked down on the Association of Muslim Scholars, an organization of Sunni clerics sympathetic to al-Qaeda and believed to have even been involved in leading, funding and hosting insurgent groups that have been responsible for countless attacks against Iraqis and Americans alike.
Unlike previous operations, this one is different in that the troops were sent following a request submitted to the government by the department of Sunni endowment, an entity in charge of overseeing Sunni mosques and other religious activities. The chief of the Sunni endowment, Sheikh Ahmed Abdul Ghafour Samarraie, is a moderate Sunni cleric who has renounced the insurgency and explicitly accused the association of assisting al-Qaeda by justifying their murderous attacks against Iraqis.
For four years now we’ve been waiting for this to happen. This al-Qaeda apologist, so-called association of Muslim scholars had to be dealt with and honestly it was frustrating to see them operate freely when the damage they caused was widely known, in nature if not in extent.
This incident, I believe, is not to be seen as abstract and it’s no coincidence that the raid on their office came amid efforts to prosecute corrupt officials from Sadr’s movement and the Fadheela Party. The list includes the former deputy minister of health, a Sadr follower who’s been accused of running sectarian death squads and the chief of the integrity committee in the parliament; a member of the Fadheela Party which is believed to be involved in massive oil smuggling operations in the south. He is now about to lose parliamentary immunity over corruption charges.
The interesting thing indeed is that the officials who are leading this campaign and rose to challenge the Sadrists and the association are from their respective sects and regions.
In Karbala, as a most recent example, the police chief finally declared the Mahdi Army an outlaw group. He accused them of murdering over 700 Iraqi civilians, 70 police officers, kidnapping over 130 civilians as well as conducting some 50 attacks with roadside bombs over the last three years in Karbala province alone.
In my opinion, what we’re seeing right now is an exploitation of the achievements of the surge strategy in the direction to establish rule of law-step by step.
I think, and it would be a practical approach if that was the case, that the campaign will involve multiple steps and will deal with targets one at a time according to a certain pattern; that is from the most aggressive, least reconcilable and less politically powerful to the less aggressive, more reconcilable and more politically powerful.
Yes, I consider Sadr now to fit in the less powerful politically category because a) PM Maliki became less dependent on him after withdrew his followers from the cabinet and from the UIA as well and b) his political weight comes from his ability to create chaos and fear; this ability is not as great as it used to be.
Of course such a pattern would require different means and tactics to deal with each target. For example with al-Qaeda it is simply a great military and intelligence effort to exterminate them. With Sunni insurgents it was a combination of coercion and persuasion. Those who agree to cooperate are welcome in the new Iraq-those contributed to the effort against al-Qaeda — while those who don’t suffer the consequences.
Now it’s Sadr’s and Dhari’s (the head of the association of Muslim scholars) turn. The two have been more or less defanged in many parts of the country as Dhari can’t find reliable bargaining power in al-Qaeda anymore and as Sadr is being squeezed with pressure from his former allies in the UIA and determined Iraqi military commanders in the south.
In my assessment of the situation, I think this phase of the campaign will focus on these two threats while momentarily purposely overlooking the smaller ones (small in the ability to create chaos, greater in political weight though). This can make a lot of sense. What stopped the US military from taking decisive action against Dhari or Sadr and his followers were the concerns that doing so might cause more harm than good. Now it seems that those two have lost the capacity to cause enough chaos. In other words they no longer can deter a decisive action by the US troops and Iraqi government. This is truer since the decisive action is coming in the form of legal processes and charges pushed by Iraqi officials supported by evidence, meaning the defendants are denied the use of the occupation /sectarian partiality cliché.
When this phase is completed, and it might take a while, the judicial and security institutions of the state will have gained confidence, popular support and will be galvanized by the experience. That would prepare the atmosphere for the launch of the next phase—cleaning the “house of moderates”. Those moderates (represented by parties such as the SIIC, Islamic Party, Kurdish parties, etc) have enjoyed a fairly long “grace period” since they have been indispensable in establishing the political process after the fall of the former regime. But when state institutions become stronger, terror and other threats and manipulation by extremists would be neutralized to a great extent; those parties will become more vulnerable to scrutiny and to the rule of law.
Our moderate politicians-I prefer to call them “less radical” politicians — might not like this in the future but I doubt they would be able to stop the moving wheel of evolution. The beautiful nature of democracy and power-sharing is that concessions will always be made in order to preserve both; the system for the state and the best possible position for the groups within.
Wednesday, November 14, 2007
Troops and locals stop twenty car bombs from reaching the streets of Baghdad.
Yesterday a joint US-Iraqi force with help from local anti-al-Qaeda awakening fighters in the Adhamiyah district in northeastern Baghdad found and disarmed more than 20 vehicles rigged as VBIEDs in a parking lot.
This is a great find by any standards but the timing makes it all the more significant.
The significance comes not only from the quantity of bombs, cars and other resources that al-Qaeda has been denied the ability to use. It comes from the amount of frustration they have to deal with right now that all these preparations and resources are lost.
What makes me think that this will indeed frustrate them is that al-Qaeda chose to mass this great number of VBIEDs instead of deploying them to the streets one, or a few, at a time fresh from the factory. Two possibilities arise here; they either couldn't find the means and safe routes to deploy the bombs and so they had to wait for more favorable circumstances, which is good news since it means their ability to conduct missions has really been reduced to a great extent.
Or it could mean that they were planning for something big, and I'm more inclined to think that this was the case.
Apparently their cells in Adhamiyah (in my estimation the strongest remaining in the eastern side of Baghdad proper) were planning a spectacular comeback during which a wave of car bombings would have sought to undermine the improvement in security.
A week of several car bombings a day would have been seen as a huge setback following several weeks of great decline in violence.
Fortunately this has been prevented and whatever their plan was, it's vapor now and they will have to start all over again… That's if they don't get caught, killed or kicked out of the neighborhood, which seems to be happening quite often these days!
This is a great find by any standards but the timing makes it all the more significant.
The significance comes not only from the quantity of bombs, cars and other resources that al-Qaeda has been denied the ability to use. It comes from the amount of frustration they have to deal with right now that all these preparations and resources are lost.
What makes me think that this will indeed frustrate them is that al-Qaeda chose to mass this great number of VBIEDs instead of deploying them to the streets one, or a few, at a time fresh from the factory. Two possibilities arise here; they either couldn't find the means and safe routes to deploy the bombs and so they had to wait for more favorable circumstances, which is good news since it means their ability to conduct missions has really been reduced to a great extent.
Or it could mean that they were planning for something big, and I'm more inclined to think that this was the case.
Apparently their cells in Adhamiyah (in my estimation the strongest remaining in the eastern side of Baghdad proper) were planning a spectacular comeback during which a wave of car bombings would have sought to undermine the improvement in security.
A week of several car bombings a day would have been seen as a huge setback following several weeks of great decline in violence.
Fortunately this has been prevented and whatever their plan was, it's vapor now and they will have to start all over again… That's if they don't get caught, killed or kicked out of the neighborhood, which seems to be happening quite often these days!
Four Years!
On a day like this four years ago this blog was created...Time indeed goes by so fast, damn!
Anyway, just wanted to congratulate myself and my big brother (allow me to pat myself on the back!) and to say thanks to all the good people who have been with us in this long journey from the beginning...
Anyway, just wanted to congratulate myself and my big brother (allow me to pat myself on the back!) and to say thanks to all the good people who have been with us in this long journey from the beginning...
Tuesday, November 13, 2007
Baath Holds The White Flag
The formation of a so called political council for Iraqi resistance was met by different reactions from the public and the politicians who are now divided into proponents and opponents. Whereas the Accord Front called for mediation between the council and the government some parties in the UIA see that the council cannot be negotiated with and declared it a continuation of the former regime.
What is important in my opinion regarding this development and aside from whether to negotiate with it or not, is the very announcement of forming this new political entity.
It consists of remnants of the former regime and it had led the violent campaign against the change and now its leaders announce the transformation into a political entity seeking negotiations with the government. This represents an admission of the failure of the insurgency. The statement made was dignified with a triumphant tone but this is not the Baath we know. We never saw the Baath triumphant and seeking negotiations at the same time. The former regime never recognized the idea of negotiations and peaceful settlements and this is exactly what led the country to numerous conflicts with the neighbors or with inside adversaries.
Saddam accepted dialogue and negotiations only after he had met defeat. Power always came first in the ideology of the Baath and the cruelty with which Saddam oppressed his domestic adversaries reminds us that searching for negotiations means that the regime, or those who represent its way of thinking, are incapable of sustaining meaningful resistance.
The call for negotiations reflects the failure of the Baath's military option. This failure can be attributed to a number of reasons, the most significant of which is the determination of the Iraqi people and American administration to continue the march in spite of the pain involved in doing so. It became evident with time for the "resistance" that for the average Iraqis, going back to totalitarian rule is not an option and that an American pullout is not visible in the horizon.
Add to that the growing split between the two main current wings of the Baath; the more Islamist one led by Izzat Dori and the secular nationalist one led by Mahmoud Younis al-Ahmed and the deep conflict of interests between al-Qaeda and several Sunni militant groups. More important are the blows the joint troops dealt al-Qaeda and other extremists. For a long time the figures seemed inconclusive but now it seems obvious that the cumulative effect of their losses has made them hold the white flag.
Some of the other factors we can add are Saddam's execution and the legal proceedings taken against the leaders of the insurgency abroad. These have been choking them, especially those who remained active. Like we said before, the rope around Saddam's neck left scars on many other necks.
On the other hand, the rise of rational political and popular tribal Sunni leaderships, who are seen as heroes in the Iraqi west, caused the old "stars" to fade out. In fact the new leaderships seem to be more capable of leading the populace in the provinces where the insurgency was dominant even more efficiently than the Baath was.
The incremental building of a nation and the simultaneous prelude for the contraction of an insurgency were not easy to see through the smoke of battle, but now things have changed and the results will be clear.
Of course the challenges are still great, yet the defeat of al-Qaeda and the fall of the insurgency tell us clear and loud that determination can and will defeat the rest of the enemies.
What is important in my opinion regarding this development and aside from whether to negotiate with it or not, is the very announcement of forming this new political entity.
It consists of remnants of the former regime and it had led the violent campaign against the change and now its leaders announce the transformation into a political entity seeking negotiations with the government. This represents an admission of the failure of the insurgency. The statement made was dignified with a triumphant tone but this is not the Baath we know. We never saw the Baath triumphant and seeking negotiations at the same time. The former regime never recognized the idea of negotiations and peaceful settlements and this is exactly what led the country to numerous conflicts with the neighbors or with inside adversaries.
Saddam accepted dialogue and negotiations only after he had met defeat. Power always came first in the ideology of the Baath and the cruelty with which Saddam oppressed his domestic adversaries reminds us that searching for negotiations means that the regime, or those who represent its way of thinking, are incapable of sustaining meaningful resistance.
The call for negotiations reflects the failure of the Baath's military option. This failure can be attributed to a number of reasons, the most significant of which is the determination of the Iraqi people and American administration to continue the march in spite of the pain involved in doing so. It became evident with time for the "resistance" that for the average Iraqis, going back to totalitarian rule is not an option and that an American pullout is not visible in the horizon.
Add to that the growing split between the two main current wings of the Baath; the more Islamist one led by Izzat Dori and the secular nationalist one led by Mahmoud Younis al-Ahmed and the deep conflict of interests between al-Qaeda and several Sunni militant groups. More important are the blows the joint troops dealt al-Qaeda and other extremists. For a long time the figures seemed inconclusive but now it seems obvious that the cumulative effect of their losses has made them hold the white flag.
Some of the other factors we can add are Saddam's execution and the legal proceedings taken against the leaders of the insurgency abroad. These have been choking them, especially those who remained active. Like we said before, the rope around Saddam's neck left scars on many other necks.
On the other hand, the rise of rational political and popular tribal Sunni leaderships, who are seen as heroes in the Iraqi west, caused the old "stars" to fade out. In fact the new leaderships seem to be more capable of leading the populace in the provinces where the insurgency was dominant even more efficiently than the Baath was.
The incremental building of a nation and the simultaneous prelude for the contraction of an insurgency were not easy to see through the smoke of battle, but now things have changed and the results will be clear.
Of course the challenges are still great, yet the defeat of al-Qaeda and the fall of the insurgency tell us clear and loud that determination can and will defeat the rest of the enemies.
Wednesday, November 07, 2007
Why Southern Iraq Won't "Awaken" Like Anbar
There is growing popular dissatisfaction with the poor performance of local administrations across Iraq’s southern provinces and the growing pressures practiced by clerics who are trying to Islamize the society.
To make matters worse are the atrocities committed by some militias and the bitter fighting among ruling parties in which ordinary citizens pay the highest price.
I think clerics and politicians in Prime Minister Maliki’s United Iraq Alliance realize this dissatisfaction may lead to an awakening movement similar to the one that has taken place in Anbar province in the western part of Iraq.
In order to make a comparison, and try to predict what’s likely to happen in the south, one needs to first understand exactly what happened in Anbar.
The core of the struggle there is an old conflict of interests between clerics and tribal sheiks. The two groups competed for leadership of the society for centuries. Even though the sheik might show loyalty to the cleric he still hides enmity for him; they’re each other’s nemesis.
This conflict of interests was evident in what happened during the revolution of 1920, less than a century before the division between those who supported the clergy’s revolt and those who kept their allegiance to the tribe and preserving its interests.
The difference between clerics and sheiks is huge; the first do not believe in negotiation and speak in terms of “halal” and “haram” claiming to be representative of heaven’s justice. Obviously you can’t negotiate deals with God so as far as the clerics are concerned, society must follow them, without asking questions.
By contrast, the tribal sheik was raised and taught to know how to lead productive negotiations. Tribal leaders have long played the role of judges to settle disputes among individuals within the tribe or between different tribes and when they do so they try to make sure that decisions are reached through consultation with the two sides of the dispute and would acceptable to both as well. In other words a sheik has to be a good negotiator, willing to hear both sides of the story and convince them to make concession in order to contain the problem and restore order—it’s an important part of his job.
Now let’s take a look at the difference between the Iraqi west and south.
First: In the west, the situation was much worse than the south. The suffering of the populace under al-Qaeda was intolerable and this was a factor that made anti-al-Qaeda sentiment grow fast and speeded the emergence of the awakening movement.
Secondly: the Sunni clergy represented by the association of Muslim scholars in a fairly recent organization cannot be compared to the long-established Shia clergy in the south. Therefore there was no strong ideological and spiritual connection between the clergy and populace in the west and the struggle between the two organizations (tribe and mosque) intensified.
In the case of the west, the Islamic Party, which was the only political body representing the Sunnis, was opposed to the association. In turn, the clergy turn did not offer the Islamic party blessings during the elections but instead declared it a renegade infidel body. By contrast the Shia clergy offered invaluable support to Shia parties and made their climb to power much easier.
Third, the Islamic state that al-Qaeda sought to establish followed the Salafi doctrine which still represents a minority faction among Iraq’s Sunni community which largely follows the Hanafi doctrine.
These three points summarize why the west and south have some very distinct differences.
From this, I think that the emergence of a tribal awakening against the dominance of religion in the south would run a serious risk of being smeared as a treacherous revolt against the sect-as a community-itself at a time when the Shia are for the first time enjoying the rise of their sect’s role in Iraq’s politics. The pan-nationalist Arab Salafi hostility toward them could make their “awakening” a double-edged sword - it would weaken their unity in the frame of the sect at a time when they still don’t feel completely secure in a pluralistic country.
What happens then?
Both Shia clerics and politicians feel the growing unrest and they know that awakening is coming. Maybe more slowly, because of the factors I mentioned, but surely. This is why they want to stay ahead of the rising tide.
We are therefore likely see a race take place within the UIA towards taking over the coming awakening - even though the UIA itself is the target. In other words, some parties in the UIA will try to maneuver quickly to tame and lead the awakening instead of standing in its way.
Last week or so the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC) praised the efforts to establish awakening councils from among the tribes of the south “to fight outlaw Shia groups” but on the condition that the government, not the Americans, oversees the process.
Politicians and clerics are trying to avoid a scenario similar to that in the west and also to avoid repetition of what happened in the past when some tribes sided with the British administration and hampered the change called for by the clergy.
What the people in the UIA, particularly the SIIC, are thinking is the following ‘if there’s going to be an awakening that can be diverted from attacking us and exploited to serve our interests at the expense of our rivals then so be it!’
Here I think the SIIC is planning to shape the awakening to be exclusively an effort against Sadr movement which rejects the SIIC’s federal project and its control of local administrations to the extent that bloody skirmishes between the two are not uncommon.
This could be the case if the SIIC succeeds to put the awakening under the supervision of the Iraqi government, not American troops, and consequently under the leadership of Badr brigade.
If this happens the process would end up involving more infighting for partisan gains than awakening against the project to build an Islamic state.
The winner then would be the SIIC and to a lesser extent the Dawa, their grip over the region would become stronger, the position of the clergy preserved and popular dissatisfaction dissipated.
To make matters worse are the atrocities committed by some militias and the bitter fighting among ruling parties in which ordinary citizens pay the highest price.
I think clerics and politicians in Prime Minister Maliki’s United Iraq Alliance realize this dissatisfaction may lead to an awakening movement similar to the one that has taken place in Anbar province in the western part of Iraq.
In order to make a comparison, and try to predict what’s likely to happen in the south, one needs to first understand exactly what happened in Anbar.
The core of the struggle there is an old conflict of interests between clerics and tribal sheiks. The two groups competed for leadership of the society for centuries. Even though the sheik might show loyalty to the cleric he still hides enmity for him; they’re each other’s nemesis.
This conflict of interests was evident in what happened during the revolution of 1920, less than a century before the division between those who supported the clergy’s revolt and those who kept their allegiance to the tribe and preserving its interests.
The difference between clerics and sheiks is huge; the first do not believe in negotiation and speak in terms of “halal” and “haram” claiming to be representative of heaven’s justice. Obviously you can’t negotiate deals with God so as far as the clerics are concerned, society must follow them, without asking questions.
By contrast, the tribal sheik was raised and taught to know how to lead productive negotiations. Tribal leaders have long played the role of judges to settle disputes among individuals within the tribe or between different tribes and when they do so they try to make sure that decisions are reached through consultation with the two sides of the dispute and would acceptable to both as well. In other words a sheik has to be a good negotiator, willing to hear both sides of the story and convince them to make concession in order to contain the problem and restore order—it’s an important part of his job.
Now let’s take a look at the difference between the Iraqi west and south.
First: In the west, the situation was much worse than the south. The suffering of the populace under al-Qaeda was intolerable and this was a factor that made anti-al-Qaeda sentiment grow fast and speeded the emergence of the awakening movement.
Secondly: the Sunni clergy represented by the association of Muslim scholars in a fairly recent organization cannot be compared to the long-established Shia clergy in the south. Therefore there was no strong ideological and spiritual connection between the clergy and populace in the west and the struggle between the two organizations (tribe and mosque) intensified.
In the case of the west, the Islamic Party, which was the only political body representing the Sunnis, was opposed to the association. In turn, the clergy turn did not offer the Islamic party blessings during the elections but instead declared it a renegade infidel body. By contrast the Shia clergy offered invaluable support to Shia parties and made their climb to power much easier.
Third, the Islamic state that al-Qaeda sought to establish followed the Salafi doctrine which still represents a minority faction among Iraq’s Sunni community which largely follows the Hanafi doctrine.
These three points summarize why the west and south have some very distinct differences.
From this, I think that the emergence of a tribal awakening against the dominance of religion in the south would run a serious risk of being smeared as a treacherous revolt against the sect-as a community-itself at a time when the Shia are for the first time enjoying the rise of their sect’s role in Iraq’s politics. The pan-nationalist Arab Salafi hostility toward them could make their “awakening” a double-edged sword - it would weaken their unity in the frame of the sect at a time when they still don’t feel completely secure in a pluralistic country.
What happens then?
Both Shia clerics and politicians feel the growing unrest and they know that awakening is coming. Maybe more slowly, because of the factors I mentioned, but surely. This is why they want to stay ahead of the rising tide.
We are therefore likely see a race take place within the UIA towards taking over the coming awakening - even though the UIA itself is the target. In other words, some parties in the UIA will try to maneuver quickly to tame and lead the awakening instead of standing in its way.
Last week or so the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC) praised the efforts to establish awakening councils from among the tribes of the south “to fight outlaw Shia groups” but on the condition that the government, not the Americans, oversees the process.
Politicians and clerics are trying to avoid a scenario similar to that in the west and also to avoid repetition of what happened in the past when some tribes sided with the British administration and hampered the change called for by the clergy.
What the people in the UIA, particularly the SIIC, are thinking is the following ‘if there’s going to be an awakening that can be diverted from attacking us and exploited to serve our interests at the expense of our rivals then so be it!’
Here I think the SIIC is planning to shape the awakening to be exclusively an effort against Sadr movement which rejects the SIIC’s federal project and its control of local administrations to the extent that bloody skirmishes between the two are not uncommon.
This could be the case if the SIIC succeeds to put the awakening under the supervision of the Iraqi government, not American troops, and consequently under the leadership of Badr brigade.
If this happens the process would end up involving more infighting for partisan gains than awakening against the project to build an Islamic state.
The winner then would be the SIIC and to a lesser extent the Dawa, their grip over the region would become stronger, the position of the clergy preserved and popular dissatisfaction dissipated.
Friday, October 26, 2007
A Tale of al-Qaeda Two Tribes and a Militia, Contd.
For some time I've been hearing some debate, that in many cases involved warnings, about the possible negative consequences of US troops and Iraqi government allying with Sunni tribes in fighting al-Qaeda. Honestly I wasn't inclined to comment on this since I thought it was a no-brainer—those tribal fighters are fighting al-Qaeda like no one else did and the change in Anbar testifies for their effectiveness.
But then someone sent me this video and asked for feedback; so here it is…
Now believe it or not this video talks about the very same part of Iraq where an earlier story we reported was taking place [earlier follow up here] Small world, isn't it? the significance of that story and the sequence of development does not arise from the magnitude of the local course of events but from the fact that these have close resemblance to many other situations in spots with mixed populations cursed by the presence and activity of both al-Qaeda and Shia militias.
Now if we compare the two accounts; namely the part in the video where the Shia citizen says " it's the Falahat.." and my distant relative's frustration with the attitude of some Shia neighbors we can see that distrust does indeed exist; people who belong to the two different sects within the "ordinary" populace are inclined to blame the extreme wing of the other sect but sometimes they would also blame the other sect in general.
What I found misleading in the video is that it focused on one side of the case and ignored the other, especially when it comes to refugees. Because as far as I know, from the people I know who live there, there was forced displacement and an intimidation campaign that affected all the population and did not spare a certain sect or tribe. Most important, the displacement happened before the Sunni tribes joined the US troops in fighting al-Qaeda, not after it. In other words, while it's true the new alliance hasn't yet helped reverse the tragedy, it must be remembered that the continuation of the tragedy is not caused by it.
I can tell that the producers through their work were trying to warn from the consequences of recruiting and assisting supposedly former insurgents and the risk to have a fertile ground for civil war that is entailed in doing so. My only objection is that the vision reflected in the production of the video has a flawed order of priorities in addition to the confused understanding of the history of sectarian displacement in that region.
let’s look at the situation realistically; this is a battle in which there are certain priorities and these must be addressed first before moving to address a potential danger and a tragedy it had nothing to do with . And I insist on saying potential because we can now see that forced displacement and the resistance for its reversal comes almost entirely from the two extremes, not from the groups closer to the middle of the spectrum of either side.
Here's for example what an American officer in Anbar said some ten days ago:
"Colonel Richard Simcock, commander of the Regimental Combat Team 6 of the US Marine Corps pointed out the improvement in security in Anbar province…and pointed out that somewhere between 30-40% of Shia families have returned to their homes in Anbar after they had been displaced..."
Or there's the most visible example that all Baghdadis are aware of which is Karradah; despite the vicious attacks that targeted this district and the attempts to spark sectarian displacement there is still no evidence of significant forced displacement of Sunni families by the Shia majority around them.
In Iraq right now, as have been for a while, the greatest two threats are al-Qaeda and the Shia militias that do fight Iran's proxy war. While the shadows of all-out civil war, thanks to the surge which stopped the terrorist gangs from pushing the country into one, has been forced back to the bottom of the list.
Civil war in Iraq is no longer an immediate and imminent threat (I'm not going to criticize those who were saying in 2006 that it was already underway since facts have already done that) yet I have to admit that establishing this new balance of power involves the potential risk of having future disputes and maybe violent contestation for power among the now-considered moderate/friendly powers once the primary threats are gone.
What I'm trying to say is that we probably need to accept that we can only deal with things one at a time since it would be much more costly and complicated, if not impractical, to deal with all of them at the same time.
After all, the advantages that can be gained from defeating al-Qaeda in terms of time and favorable environment will offer a greater margin of freedom in dealing with future possible power-sharing problems and the prospects for success would become even exponentially greater if the Shia tribes start their own awakening too and break the other wing of extremism.
But then someone sent me this video and asked for feedback; so here it is…
Now believe it or not this video talks about the very same part of Iraq where an earlier story we reported was taking place [earlier follow up here] Small world, isn't it? the significance of that story and the sequence of development does not arise from the magnitude of the local course of events but from the fact that these have close resemblance to many other situations in spots with mixed populations cursed by the presence and activity of both al-Qaeda and Shia militias.
Now if we compare the two accounts; namely the part in the video where the Shia citizen says " it's the Falahat.." and my distant relative's frustration with the attitude of some Shia neighbors we can see that distrust does indeed exist; people who belong to the two different sects within the "ordinary" populace are inclined to blame the extreme wing of the other sect but sometimes they would also blame the other sect in general.
What I found misleading in the video is that it focused on one side of the case and ignored the other, especially when it comes to refugees. Because as far as I know, from the people I know who live there, there was forced displacement and an intimidation campaign that affected all the population and did not spare a certain sect or tribe. Most important, the displacement happened before the Sunni tribes joined the US troops in fighting al-Qaeda, not after it. In other words, while it's true the new alliance hasn't yet helped reverse the tragedy, it must be remembered that the continuation of the tragedy is not caused by it.
I can tell that the producers through their work were trying to warn from the consequences of recruiting and assisting supposedly former insurgents and the risk to have a fertile ground for civil war that is entailed in doing so. My only objection is that the vision reflected in the production of the video has a flawed order of priorities in addition to the confused understanding of the history of sectarian displacement in that region.
let’s look at the situation realistically; this is a battle in which there are certain priorities and these must be addressed first before moving to address a potential danger and a tragedy it had nothing to do with . And I insist on saying potential because we can now see that forced displacement and the resistance for its reversal comes almost entirely from the two extremes, not from the groups closer to the middle of the spectrum of either side.
Here's for example what an American officer in Anbar said some ten days ago:
"Colonel Richard Simcock, commander of the Regimental Combat Team 6 of the US Marine Corps pointed out the improvement in security in Anbar province…and pointed out that somewhere between 30-40% of Shia families have returned to their homes in Anbar after they had been displaced..."
Or there's the most visible example that all Baghdadis are aware of which is Karradah; despite the vicious attacks that targeted this district and the attempts to spark sectarian displacement there is still no evidence of significant forced displacement of Sunni families by the Shia majority around them.
In Iraq right now, as have been for a while, the greatest two threats are al-Qaeda and the Shia militias that do fight Iran's proxy war. While the shadows of all-out civil war, thanks to the surge which stopped the terrorist gangs from pushing the country into one, has been forced back to the bottom of the list.
Civil war in Iraq is no longer an immediate and imminent threat (I'm not going to criticize those who were saying in 2006 that it was already underway since facts have already done that) yet I have to admit that establishing this new balance of power involves the potential risk of having future disputes and maybe violent contestation for power among the now-considered moderate/friendly powers once the primary threats are gone.
What I'm trying to say is that we probably need to accept that we can only deal with things one at a time since it would be much more costly and complicated, if not impractical, to deal with all of them at the same time.
After all, the advantages that can be gained from defeating al-Qaeda in terms of time and favorable environment will offer a greater margin of freedom in dealing with future possible power-sharing problems and the prospects for success would become even exponentially greater if the Shia tribes start their own awakening too and break the other wing of extremism.
Sunday, October 07, 2007
It's been two weeks since we last updated this blog so it's time I come up with some excuses for that…
Well, honestly I have come to realize that trying to keep a serious blog frequently updated while attending an intense program at graduate school is a very difficult task.
However this does not at all mean I intend to stop blogging…
With time being the main constraint we are considering other means of publishing that can at the same time be less time consuming for me and perhaps more interesting to you than reading plain text. Several ideas and options in this regard are being weighed right now and I will let you know when and if those new means are finalized and ready to use, so bear with us please.
This also does not mean that usual blogging will stop; it will continue but probably at a lower frequency.
Well, honestly I have come to realize that trying to keep a serious blog frequently updated while attending an intense program at graduate school is a very difficult task.
However this does not at all mean I intend to stop blogging…
With time being the main constraint we are considering other means of publishing that can at the same time be less time consuming for me and perhaps more interesting to you than reading plain text. Several ideas and options in this regard are being weighed right now and I will let you know when and if those new means are finalized and ready to use, so bear with us please.
This also does not mean that usual blogging will stop; it will continue but probably at a lower frequency.
Saturday, September 22, 2007
Al-Qaeda's War of Villages
Apparently this is the latest chapter in al-Qaeda's war manual in their war against the Iraqi people and the coalition; raiding remote peaceful villages, burning down homes and slaughtering both man and beast.
This campaign I will call a campaign of self-destruction. For probably a year al-Qaeda was trying to build their so called Islamic State in Iraq and several times they declared parts of Baghdad or other provinces as the capital of that state.
But now that they have been losing one base after another their objective changed from adding more towns and villages to the "state" to destroying the very same towns and villages! Obviously it's all about making headlines regardless of the means to do that!
This change in plans began to take face with the battle between al-Qaeda and the joint forces on September 6-7 in Hor Rijab and then the massacre that followed in the same spot a week later and finally the attacks on other villages north, south and east of Baghdad in the last week or so.
Actually first I'd like to recommend reading a good post by Jules Crittenden about the flawed timing of this Little Tet.
Anyway, our interest today is more about the field situation and strategy than about timing since the latter seems to be not so friendly to al-Qaeda. Well, actually timing is very important here too but at a rather different level.
In my opinion al-Qaeda found itself forced to start this villages war. It wasn’t a choice as much as a last resort because villages are among the few fighting spaces that al-Qaeda can still utilize as large cities become increasingly difficult for them to operate in.
They know that without engaging the enemy-that's us by the way-their existence and influence would end and I'm almost positive that they feel bitter about having to fight this way.
In order to fight a "good" guerilla war one has to stay in fluid state, have no permanent bases or barracks, no distinguishable uniform and above all one should be able to always have civilians around so as to deter the enemy-that's again us-from attacking out of concern about collateral damages and casualties among innocent civilians.
No one questions the fact that no army in the middle east, and I doubt there are any elsewhere, that can engage and defeat the US military power in open terrain, in other words in a case of two traditional armies fighting on traditional battlefield.
The last factor is exactly what al-Qaeda is sacrificing by waging this war on villages;
But how can we make advantage of this situation? The greatest challenge I guess would be to have an alarm and information system through which the nearest available troops could be notified when an attack begins so they could interfere and repel the attack. This might be logistically difficult to establish in a short time since villages are usually far from the cities. In fact I worked in some such villages and I know that most of them are outside the administrative divisions or "civil planning" of provinces therefore they lack their own government offices and departments which means the nearest hospital, fire department, even phone and above all police station could be many miles away.
But even then if the troops fail to arrive in time to intercept the attack, which would be truly sad, the long distance that al-Qaeda fighters would have to travel to go back to their base would require them to lose precious time since they have to rely only on ground transport on mostly exposed terrain while the troops very often have the advantage of the much faster air transport.
In the worst case scenario what's left of a village if the attack is not intercepted would be only al-Qaeda fighters and the remains of what used to be a village. Now isn't that the perfect target for the countless aggressive fire units of the US military?
Now please let's put emotions aside for a while because this is war we're talking about and if sacrifices cannot be avoided we should make sure the enemy pays the heaviest price possible.
If reaction is quick enough-and timing here is of crucial importance-the hunt would be great and the results would be spectacular.
Again, of course it would be much more pleasant if the attacks can be prevented or repelled but since I doubt there's such an alarm system we could at least make benefit of the gap in time that immediately follows the action of the attackers taking advantage of faster transportation means and the old principle in combat that says the enemy can be best attacked immediately after he makes his move.
For the duration of the war on al-Qaeda in Iraq so far, the most frustrating fact for soldiers and military commanders has been that they were asked to identify terrorists who move like ghosts, separate them from civilians and kill or capture them and that's a truly difficult mission. That's partly because a soldier would have to be careful when and where each bullet he fires would hit. But when the ghosts are identified, isolated and far from any friendly objects/personnel a pilot could drop even as gruesome a weapon as a napalm bomb and rest assured that even if it misses the enemy which is quite unlikely, it couldn't hurt a friend.
That's why I think the troops should seize each and every such opportunity (which are technically moments during which the crippling rule of engagement become much more flexible) and strike as hard as they can once they are sure the battlefield falls in the category we just described.
This campaign I will call a campaign of self-destruction. For probably a year al-Qaeda was trying to build their so called Islamic State in Iraq and several times they declared parts of Baghdad or other provinces as the capital of that state.
But now that they have been losing one base after another their objective changed from adding more towns and villages to the "state" to destroying the very same towns and villages! Obviously it's all about making headlines regardless of the means to do that!
This change in plans began to take face with the battle between al-Qaeda and the joint forces on September 6-7 in Hor Rijab and then the massacre that followed in the same spot a week later and finally the attacks on other villages north, south and east of Baghdad in the last week or so.
Actually first I'd like to recommend reading a good post by Jules Crittenden about the flawed timing of this Little Tet.
Anyway, our interest today is more about the field situation and strategy than about timing since the latter seems to be not so friendly to al-Qaeda. Well, actually timing is very important here too but at a rather different level.
In my opinion al-Qaeda found itself forced to start this villages war. It wasn’t a choice as much as a last resort because villages are among the few fighting spaces that al-Qaeda can still utilize as large cities become increasingly difficult for them to operate in.
They know that without engaging the enemy-that's us by the way-their existence and influence would end and I'm almost positive that they feel bitter about having to fight this way.
In order to fight a "good" guerilla war one has to stay in fluid state, have no permanent bases or barracks, no distinguishable uniform and above all one should be able to always have civilians around so as to deter the enemy-that's again us-from attacking out of concern about collateral damages and casualties among innocent civilians.
No one questions the fact that no army in the middle east, and I doubt there are any elsewhere, that can engage and defeat the US military power in open terrain, in other words in a case of two traditional armies fighting on traditional battlefield.
The last factor is exactly what al-Qaeda is sacrificing by waging this war on villages;
But how can we make advantage of this situation? The greatest challenge I guess would be to have an alarm and information system through which the nearest available troops could be notified when an attack begins so they could interfere and repel the attack. This might be logistically difficult to establish in a short time since villages are usually far from the cities. In fact I worked in some such villages and I know that most of them are outside the administrative divisions or "civil planning" of provinces therefore they lack their own government offices and departments which means the nearest hospital, fire department, even phone and above all police station could be many miles away.
But even then if the troops fail to arrive in time to intercept the attack, which would be truly sad, the long distance that al-Qaeda fighters would have to travel to go back to their base would require them to lose precious time since they have to rely only on ground transport on mostly exposed terrain while the troops very often have the advantage of the much faster air transport.
In the worst case scenario what's left of a village if the attack is not intercepted would be only al-Qaeda fighters and the remains of what used to be a village. Now isn't that the perfect target for the countless aggressive fire units of the US military?
Now please let's put emotions aside for a while because this is war we're talking about and if sacrifices cannot be avoided we should make sure the enemy pays the heaviest price possible.
If reaction is quick enough-and timing here is of crucial importance-the hunt would be great and the results would be spectacular.
Again, of course it would be much more pleasant if the attacks can be prevented or repelled but since I doubt there's such an alarm system we could at least make benefit of the gap in time that immediately follows the action of the attackers taking advantage of faster transportation means and the old principle in combat that says the enemy can be best attacked immediately after he makes his move.
For the duration of the war on al-Qaeda in Iraq so far, the most frustrating fact for soldiers and military commanders has been that they were asked to identify terrorists who move like ghosts, separate them from civilians and kill or capture them and that's a truly difficult mission. That's partly because a soldier would have to be careful when and where each bullet he fires would hit. But when the ghosts are identified, isolated and far from any friendly objects/personnel a pilot could drop even as gruesome a weapon as a napalm bomb and rest assured that even if it misses the enemy which is quite unlikely, it couldn't hurt a friend.
That's why I think the troops should seize each and every such opportunity (which are technically moments during which the crippling rule of engagement become much more flexible) and strike as hard as they can once they are sure the battlefield falls in the category we just described.
Monday, September 17, 2007
An Iraqi Alliance Breaks Apart
On Saturday, exactly six months after the Fadheela Party announced its defection from the United Iraqi Alliance (UIA), the Sadr bloc made a similar decision and withdrew from the alliance as well.
Abdul Kareem Inizi, the chief of Dawa Party-The Iraqi Organization (this is the other half of the Dawa, has 10 seats in the parliament) was the first to comment on the news:
Inizi said that his party too is thinking about following the steps of the Sadrists:
Developments are moving so fast that the Sadrists and Fadheela have already announced that they have joined forces in a new political alliance, according to MP Hassan Shemmari from the Fadheela who made the announcement at a joint press conference with the Sadrists in Najaf yesterday. [Arabic Link]
The other opposition groups were also quick to seize the opportunity and flirt with the Sadr bloc, though a day later than Fadheela did:
This feverish movement to attract the Sadr bloc seems strange given the long history of rivalries between the Sadrists on one hand and the Iraqi list and Accord Front on the other - and it looks even stranger in the case of Fadheela with whom the Sadrists have been technically at a state of war in Basrah for a long time now.
But then it’s not strange at all since they all share the common goal of weakening Maliki’s ruling coalition and ultimately succeeding it.
So as expected, announcing the coalition of four is doing more harm than good to its members, especially Maliki so far.
Just before the two Kurdish and two Shia parties announced their coalition, the ruling coalition held a total of about 170 seats in the parliament; only a dozen votes short of the majority enough to pass legislation.
Now that the Sadrists have left it has been reduced to only 140 with a high possibility to go further down to 127 if the group of Inizi decides to go forward with their threat to leave the UIA.
Until now our math has been based on the assumption that the independent MP’s in the UIA (20 plus seats) preserve the status quo, but those too had flirted with the idea of abandoning the UIA and were just shy of declaring the step: now if the defection of the Sadrists encourages them to do so, the loss would go up to about 55 seats, leaving Maliki with little more than a 100 votes to work with on his side.
On the other hand, the Sadrists are unlikely to be successful in future political adventures in other coalitions be it with the Fadheela, Iraqi list or the Accord Front.
Largely because all four more or less believe their visions are representative of those of the Iraqi people. And so to them, entering any alliance won’t be about promoting the mutual interests of the members of an alliance but about using other members’ votes to impose the vision of their party - not exactly a recipe for a cohesive coalition.
Abdul Kareem Inizi, the chief of Dawa Party-The Iraqi Organization (this is the other half of the Dawa, has 10 seats in the parliament) was the first to comment on the news:
“The first spark that marked the beginning of the UIA collapse was the announcement of the coalition of four, which is considered a bad move because [it implies that] the SIIC and the supporters of Prime Minister Maliki within the Dawa Party consider themselves to be the main powers [in the UIA] and this is arrogant and despotic thinking….after the withdrawal of the Sadrists nothing that counts remains in the UIA.”
Inizi said that his party too is thinking about following the steps of the Sadrists:
“The Dawa Party-The Iraq Organization is currently engaged in negotiations with the Sadr movement and Fadheela Party over the formation of a new bloc and in light of these negotiations we will announce our withdrawal from the UIA.”
Developments are moving so fast that the Sadrists and Fadheela have already announced that they have joined forces in a new political alliance, according to MP Hassan Shemmari from the Fadheela who made the announcement at a joint press conference with the Sadrists in Najaf yesterday. [Arabic Link]
The other opposition groups were also quick to seize the opportunity and flirt with the Sadr bloc, though a day later than Fadheela did:
“The Accord Front and Iraqi List welcomed the decision by the Sadr bloc to withdraw from the UIA, and pointed out that they will soon negotiate the formation of a new parliamentary front with the Sadr movement.”
This feverish movement to attract the Sadr bloc seems strange given the long history of rivalries between the Sadrists on one hand and the Iraqi list and Accord Front on the other - and it looks even stranger in the case of Fadheela with whom the Sadrists have been technically at a state of war in Basrah for a long time now.
But then it’s not strange at all since they all share the common goal of weakening Maliki’s ruling coalition and ultimately succeeding it.
So as expected, announcing the coalition of four is doing more harm than good to its members, especially Maliki so far.
Just before the two Kurdish and two Shia parties announced their coalition, the ruling coalition held a total of about 170 seats in the parliament; only a dozen votes short of the majority enough to pass legislation.
Now that the Sadrists have left it has been reduced to only 140 with a high possibility to go further down to 127 if the group of Inizi decides to go forward with their threat to leave the UIA.
Until now our math has been based on the assumption that the independent MP’s in the UIA (20 plus seats) preserve the status quo, but those too had flirted with the idea of abandoning the UIA and were just shy of declaring the step: now if the defection of the Sadrists encourages them to do so, the loss would go up to about 55 seats, leaving Maliki with little more than a 100 votes to work with on his side.
On the other hand, the Sadrists are unlikely to be successful in future political adventures in other coalitions be it with the Fadheela, Iraqi list or the Accord Front.
Largely because all four more or less believe their visions are representative of those of the Iraqi people. And so to them, entering any alliance won’t be about promoting the mutual interests of the members of an alliance but about using other members’ votes to impose the vision of their party - not exactly a recipe for a cohesive coalition.
Friday, September 14, 2007
Iraq Invades Washington
The American capital is going to witness intensified Iraqi presence and political activity in the coming few weeks.
First there are Sunni leaders who have been invited by members of Congress. The Sunni leaders are likely to make this visit coincide with former Prime Minister Iyad Allawi expected visit to Washington since the Sunni alliance with the Shia Allawi became more evident recently, especially after the latter confirmed that he had meetings with former leaders in the Baath Party to persuade them to join the political process.
A Sunni delegation at the level being reported wouldn’t go without a countermeasure from the current Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, who represents the Shia-Kurdish coalition of four. In order to avoid any threat for this ruling coalition, the government announced that Maliki is going to head a big delegation to Washington later this month as well. I am certain that it will include important leaders that have good relations and contacts in Washington, such as Mowafak Rubaie and Hoshyar Zebari.
The Sunni-Allawi visit seems to be an effort to give more momentum to the emerging Sunni-American friendliness following the progress that has been made on the ground in several Sunni-dominated regions, and the dramatic change in attitude among the Sunni who turned from fighting the American presence to fighting al-Qaeda.
Add to this mix the dialogue between Allawi and former Baathist leaders, which actually diluted the enmity that some Sunni groups had towards America and made them think deeply about the end result should they keep up the fight against America and the Iraqi government. This proximity was crowned by Bush’s visit to Anbar and the praise he gave to its people.
Returning the visit aims to take advantage of what we just mentioned: it would serve the case of the opposition represented by the Sunni and Allawi, and to convince the American administration that it should cut the support for Maliki whom they’re going to undermine by describing him as a sectarian leader who puts Iran’s interests above anything else.
Tracking the statements coming from Sunni leaders we find a huge difference in the tone between the past and nowadays.
Until recently, most of the Sunni leaders used to say that the only solution for the situation in Iraq lied in the immediate —whether complete or gradual— withdrawal of “occupying” forces. Today, we see a firebrand leader like Salih Mutlaq say that he returned to the parliament because “we’re getting hints from America about an imminent change in the government.”
Yes, that Mutlaq: the politician famous for his firebrand statements is now ending his bloc’s boycott of the parliament because of “hints” from America!
On the other hand, the coalition of four realizes the threat posed by the initiatives of the opposition and so it will try hard to remind Washington of the old Shia-Kurdish-American alliance. Yet this attempt will probably have limited chances for success given the failure to bring about national reconciliation among rival parties, the disappointing performance of the government and the obvious tendency to side with Iran.
The last factor is very clear — not a single time al-Maliki did find the courage to criticize Iran; not even when Ahmedinejad made his extremely dangerous statement and offered to “fill the vacuum in Iraq”.
A few days ago one of the members of parliament asked al-Maliki what he thought about Ahmedinajad’s description of the opposition to the coalition of four in Iraq as “corruptors”. Maliki’s response was “and are they all good people?”
This kind of answers reflects the deeply rooted fear inside al-Maliki and his awareness about Iran’s reach. It obviously makes him afraid of responding to what the leaders in Iran say; even when he knows he’d be right in what he’s say.
Al-Maliki’s job will be very difficult this time, and it won’t be easy for him to convince his hosts. That’s why I think he will rely on his two right hand men, Rubaie and Zebari, who are still well-received in the American administration, to plead for more support and a second chance for his limping cabinet.
In my opinion the most exciting part of this is that the Sunni, Shia and Kurds all have come to realize and accept that America is the main player in Iraq.
On the one hand the Sunnis now understand that listening to those who pushed them to resist the political process made them lose so much. On the other hand al-Maliki, who just a few weeks ago responded to criticism from President Bush by saying that “Iraq could find friends elsewhere,” now clearly sees that those friends are not serious enough about their support when he is in the crosshairs. So now al-Maliki thinks, with advice from the Kurds, that the visit of the opposition poses serious threats to his position and that seeking help from Syria and/or Iran one more time wouldn’t be the right countermeasure.
I believe this will be a good opportunity for Washington as well. As long as everyone in Baghdad fears that the US would support one party and not the other, and as long as they know the consequences of this and that the solution is in rushing to Washington before the others, then Washington can apply more pressure on all three parties to put some serious effort into building true political reconciliation and rise above sectarian and ethnic considerations.
Washington can also say “Hey! We’re not here just to listen to you whining and complaining from each other. It’s time you listen to us and act as serious partners.”
So I believe this would be a good opportunity for the administration to convince the Sunni, Shia and Kurds that it’s time to accept one another and that there’s no other choice but to learn to coexist and work together. And, most importantly, to tell them that America doesn’t want to meet Sunni, Shia or Kurdish leaders defined as such; that it’s more interested in speaking to leaders who identify themselves as Iraqis first and foremost.
If those leaders continue to put their sectarian and nationalistic feelings first then they are bound to failure sooner or later: they will be rejected not only by Washington but most importantly by Iraqis themselves.
First there are Sunni leaders who have been invited by members of Congress. The Sunni leaders are likely to make this visit coincide with former Prime Minister Iyad Allawi expected visit to Washington since the Sunni alliance with the Shia Allawi became more evident recently, especially after the latter confirmed that he had meetings with former leaders in the Baath Party to persuade them to join the political process.
A Sunni delegation at the level being reported wouldn’t go without a countermeasure from the current Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, who represents the Shia-Kurdish coalition of four. In order to avoid any threat for this ruling coalition, the government announced that Maliki is going to head a big delegation to Washington later this month as well. I am certain that it will include important leaders that have good relations and contacts in Washington, such as Mowafak Rubaie and Hoshyar Zebari.
The Sunni-Allawi visit seems to be an effort to give more momentum to the emerging Sunni-American friendliness following the progress that has been made on the ground in several Sunni-dominated regions, and the dramatic change in attitude among the Sunni who turned from fighting the American presence to fighting al-Qaeda.
Add to this mix the dialogue between Allawi and former Baathist leaders, which actually diluted the enmity that some Sunni groups had towards America and made them think deeply about the end result should they keep up the fight against America and the Iraqi government. This proximity was crowned by Bush’s visit to Anbar and the praise he gave to its people.
Returning the visit aims to take advantage of what we just mentioned: it would serve the case of the opposition represented by the Sunni and Allawi, and to convince the American administration that it should cut the support for Maliki whom they’re going to undermine by describing him as a sectarian leader who puts Iran’s interests above anything else.
Tracking the statements coming from Sunni leaders we find a huge difference in the tone between the past and nowadays.
Until recently, most of the Sunni leaders used to say that the only solution for the situation in Iraq lied in the immediate —whether complete or gradual— withdrawal of “occupying” forces. Today, we see a firebrand leader like Salih Mutlaq say that he returned to the parliament because “we’re getting hints from America about an imminent change in the government.”
Yes, that Mutlaq: the politician famous for his firebrand statements is now ending his bloc’s boycott of the parliament because of “hints” from America!
On the other hand, the coalition of four realizes the threat posed by the initiatives of the opposition and so it will try hard to remind Washington of the old Shia-Kurdish-American alliance. Yet this attempt will probably have limited chances for success given the failure to bring about national reconciliation among rival parties, the disappointing performance of the government and the obvious tendency to side with Iran.
The last factor is very clear — not a single time al-Maliki did find the courage to criticize Iran; not even when Ahmedinejad made his extremely dangerous statement and offered to “fill the vacuum in Iraq”.
A few days ago one of the members of parliament asked al-Maliki what he thought about Ahmedinajad’s description of the opposition to the coalition of four in Iraq as “corruptors”. Maliki’s response was “and are they all good people?”
This kind of answers reflects the deeply rooted fear inside al-Maliki and his awareness about Iran’s reach. It obviously makes him afraid of responding to what the leaders in Iran say; even when he knows he’d be right in what he’s say.
Al-Maliki’s job will be very difficult this time, and it won’t be easy for him to convince his hosts. That’s why I think he will rely on his two right hand men, Rubaie and Zebari, who are still well-received in the American administration, to plead for more support and a second chance for his limping cabinet.
In my opinion the most exciting part of this is that the Sunni, Shia and Kurds all have come to realize and accept that America is the main player in Iraq.
On the one hand the Sunnis now understand that listening to those who pushed them to resist the political process made them lose so much. On the other hand al-Maliki, who just a few weeks ago responded to criticism from President Bush by saying that “Iraq could find friends elsewhere,” now clearly sees that those friends are not serious enough about their support when he is in the crosshairs. So now al-Maliki thinks, with advice from the Kurds, that the visit of the opposition poses serious threats to his position and that seeking help from Syria and/or Iran one more time wouldn’t be the right countermeasure.
I believe this will be a good opportunity for Washington as well. As long as everyone in Baghdad fears that the US would support one party and not the other, and as long as they know the consequences of this and that the solution is in rushing to Washington before the others, then Washington can apply more pressure on all three parties to put some serious effort into building true political reconciliation and rise above sectarian and ethnic considerations.
Washington can also say “Hey! We’re not here just to listen to you whining and complaining from each other. It’s time you listen to us and act as serious partners.”
So I believe this would be a good opportunity for the administration to convince the Sunni, Shia and Kurds that it’s time to accept one another and that there’s no other choice but to learn to coexist and work together. And, most importantly, to tell them that America doesn’t want to meet Sunni, Shia or Kurdish leaders defined as such; that it’s more interested in speaking to leaders who identify themselves as Iraqis first and foremost.
If those leaders continue to put their sectarian and nationalistic feelings first then they are bound to failure sooner or later: they will be rejected not only by Washington but most importantly by Iraqis themselves.
Thursday, September 13, 2007
Abu Dsheer, a massacre and a moment of unity
A story of the savagery of al-Qaeda and the compassion of Iraqis took place two days ago in one of the southern suburbs of Baghdad.
The story began when the people of Hor Rijab, a village inhabited by mostly Sunni farmers, made up their mind that enough is enough and formed a "battalion" of local fighters to confront al-Qaeda hardly two weeks ago.
Al-Qaeda was definitely not happy with this rebellion and on Tuesday morning attacked the village, Radio Sawa has the details: [Arabic]
So, the terrorists of al-Qaeda attacked the Sunni families in this poor village and no one was there for the rescue; not the government and not the MNF. The rescue came from was thought to be a very unlikely source; the Shia families in the neighboring district of Abu Dsheer:
The tragedy of this village offers us a lesson that we must learn. First, al-Qaeda wanted through this barbaric massacre that belongs to the dark ages of history to prove that anyone regardless of sect who dares turn against them would become the target of the most horrific ways of revenge. Second, the noble behavior of the neighboring Shia town proves once again that violence in Iraq isn't civil war and that the reconciliation we should be looking for is one among politicians, not among ordinary Iraqis.
Third, it is really disappointing that neither the government nor the MNF was quick enough to intervene and stop the massacre. This means the government and MNF are likely to lose the trust of those families and this is a precious asset that we can't afford to lose at this critical stage of the war.
The government and MNF must pay the utmost attention to such movements of awakening in Baghdad and elsewhere and make sure that they get all the support they need.
Today al-Qaeda also assassinated the leader of the Anbar Awakening; a hero who will not be easily forgotten. This crime will not pass without punishment and I believe this will even strengthen the resolve and morale of the tribes of Anbar. Al-Qaeda have always miscalculated its role and chances in this province and I think killing Abu Risha is going to cost them a lot.
But as we lose Abu Risha, more patriots arise to stand up to al-Qaeda; this time in Mosul and the movement is lead by another tribal leader; sheik Fawaz al-Jarbah of the giant Shemmar tribe: [Arabic]
The active forces of this movement will consist of 3,000 volunteers and with the size of Mosul and its suburbs we can expect those men to be distributed in a large number of small units. So I hope the government and MNF be serious this time about the support they pledge. Otherwise those men would be facing the risk of being outnumbered and overridden by the focused terrorists of al-Qaeda and that could mean more massacres of innocent people. We must not allow this to happen again.
The story began when the people of Hor Rijab, a village inhabited by mostly Sunni farmers, made up their mind that enough is enough and formed a "battalion" of local fighters to confront al-Qaeda hardly two weeks ago.
Al-Qaeda was definitely not happy with this rebellion and on Tuesday morning attacked the village, Radio Sawa has the details: [Arabic]
Locals fleeing the area said the attack started at 10 in the morning and the shooting didn't stop until after 5 in the evening. Al-Qaeda militants who are mostly Afghans and non-Iraqi Arabs killed dozens of the locals; some were beheaded and their heads were put on top of their chests; among them were women and children.
One woman who was fleeing the fighting added:
The people of Hor Rijab turned against al-Qaeda but since there was no support for them al-Qaeda returned back, broke into the homes and slaughtered men, women and children. And the Americans did nothing…
So, the terrorists of al-Qaeda attacked the Sunni families in this poor village and no one was there for the rescue; not the government and not the MNF. The rescue came from was thought to be a very unlikely source; the Shia families in the neighboring district of Abu Dsheer:
Al-Qaeda started to kill people and burn down homes. They killed women and children. The people of Abu Dsheer received us they way noble people do, and they started to offer us water and food…they told us we are family…
The tragedy of this village offers us a lesson that we must learn. First, al-Qaeda wanted through this barbaric massacre that belongs to the dark ages of history to prove that anyone regardless of sect who dares turn against them would become the target of the most horrific ways of revenge. Second, the noble behavior of the neighboring Shia town proves once again that violence in Iraq isn't civil war and that the reconciliation we should be looking for is one among politicians, not among ordinary Iraqis.
Third, it is really disappointing that neither the government nor the MNF was quick enough to intervene and stop the massacre. This means the government and MNF are likely to lose the trust of those families and this is a precious asset that we can't afford to lose at this critical stage of the war.
The government and MNF must pay the utmost attention to such movements of awakening in Baghdad and elsewhere and make sure that they get all the support they need.
Today al-Qaeda also assassinated the leader of the Anbar Awakening; a hero who will not be easily forgotten. This crime will not pass without punishment and I believe this will even strengthen the resolve and morale of the tribes of Anbar. Al-Qaeda have always miscalculated its role and chances in this province and I think killing Abu Risha is going to cost them a lot.
But as we lose Abu Risha, more patriots arise to stand up to al-Qaeda; this time in Mosul and the movement is lead by another tribal leader; sheik Fawaz al-Jarbah of the giant Shemmar tribe: [Arabic]
When terrorism became a serious threat we all felt that we had a duty to stand up to this threat, and so was the agreement with our brothers in the tribes of Mosul. There was a meeting that hasn't been made public yet and there we decided to create the awakening and salvation council of Mosul to confront terrorism in cooperation with the government forces and MNF.
The active forces of this movement will consist of 3,000 volunteers and with the size of Mosul and its suburbs we can expect those men to be distributed in a large number of small units. So I hope the government and MNF be serious this time about the support they pledge. Otherwise those men would be facing the risk of being outnumbered and overridden by the focused terrorists of al-Qaeda and that could mean more massacres of innocent people. We must not allow this to happen again.
Saturday, September 08, 2007
Islam, The Solution..!? (Part II) The Bin Laden Video
It looks like Bin Laden didn't read my last post about Islam being the solution so I will repeat the question to him.
First of all what form of Islam are you inviting America to endorse? If it's Sunni Islam then do you reccomend the Hanafi, Shafi'i or Salafi doctrine? And if it's Shi Islam, which hierarchy would you recommend? The Iranianone of Khamenai, the Iraqi with its four great Ayatollahs, or the Lebanese represented by Hussein Fadhlallah? Or maybe sheik Bin Laden is going to graciously leave America to choose its new faith freely!?
Second, Bin Laden didn't specify how this endorsement of Islam would be enforced; should it be by an executive order from the Bush administration, a legislation from the Democratic Congress, or would it be up to the American people to answer Bin Laden's call, voluntarily?
The sheik had better leave people to choose their faith as they please but of course this isn't part of the ideology of dark intolerance that sees an enemy in anyone who doesn't endorse his exact same path.
This extremist path declared democracy an enemy and here although Bin Laden was referring to the Iraqi experiment he certainly doesn't limit this animosity to this case alone. I don't think he likes other democracies and that's why arguing that it was America that provoked al-Qaeda to interfere in Iraq, or that al-Qaeda didn't exist in Iraq under Saddam, is a stupid thing to say.
The man clearly says that he despices democracy as well as those who believe in it whether in Iraq or elsewhere. Now if he has the right to invite others to Islam then it should be equally our right to invite others to democracy. Except only if we admit that democracy is a sinful path and that Bin Laden is right, then America and the world should retreat from Iraq, abandon the mission to support the fledgling democracy over there and sit back and wait for other democracies to have their turn on Bin Laden's death menu.
America didn't bring al-Qaeda to Iraq, it's democracy in Iraq that made the extremists panic—their greatest fear is that if the once capital of the Islamic empire fell in the lap of democracy, what would "protect" other parts of the "land of Islam" from "falling" too!?
The conflict is not about Bin Laden and America; it's an ideological conflict in which there are people and regimes across the world that support one side or another, meaning that the conflict was inevitable even if America hadn't taken part. Otherwise the region would have been living in peace and prosperity now!
In fact, and I think many people agree with me, the American-led intervention was defensive rather than offensive when Bin Laden's ideology jumped to strike the towers in New York. At that point it became evident that such an ideology, in the presence of regimes that support it, could threaten any spot on the map with no exception from Bali to Madrid—and although the victims of this ideology have been mostly from the middle east, this could well change in the future if the extremist manage to take over the region.
We shouldn’t think that such crazy messages could come only from a Salafi extremist like Bin Laden; because it actually reminds me of a similar call from Khomeini to the leaders in Moscow to convert to Islam shortly before the collapse of the Soviet Union. The late Ayatollah also said that Islam was the solution, so the point we should realize here is that this way of thinking is not an aspect of one particular sect as much as its part of the totalitarian ideology of Islamists that is deeply rooted in the minds of those, from one sect or another, who want to revive the Caliph rule.
Like we said in the previous post, regimes that follow this ideology, be it the Sunni Taliban or the Shia Mullahs, have failed to offer a civilized model of life so they chose instead to beautify and sell the idea of death under the old slogan of "Our dead are in heaven and your dead are in hell".
It's even more interesting in a way that this call for converting to Islam is a big fantasy since Bin Laden and the like know very well than America or other countries in the west would never impose a certain faith on their people. This message marks a deep trouble in the way extremists think; they live in illusions with complete disregard for facts, which is a very dangerous phenomenon when it's at this magnitude. And it leaves no room to doubt that they would do anything to drag the region, and the world, to an uncalculated confrontation.
It is evident from the naivety of the message that logic is completely missing in their ideology which means that dialogue with those people would be equally nonsense.
First of all what form of Islam are you inviting America to endorse? If it's Sunni Islam then do you reccomend the Hanafi, Shafi'i or Salafi doctrine? And if it's Shi Islam, which hierarchy would you recommend? The Iranianone of Khamenai, the Iraqi with its four great Ayatollahs, or the Lebanese represented by Hussein Fadhlallah? Or maybe sheik Bin Laden is going to graciously leave America to choose its new faith freely!?
Second, Bin Laden didn't specify how this endorsement of Islam would be enforced; should it be by an executive order from the Bush administration, a legislation from the Democratic Congress, or would it be up to the American people to answer Bin Laden's call, voluntarily?
The sheik had better leave people to choose their faith as they please but of course this isn't part of the ideology of dark intolerance that sees an enemy in anyone who doesn't endorse his exact same path.
This extremist path declared democracy an enemy and here although Bin Laden was referring to the Iraqi experiment he certainly doesn't limit this animosity to this case alone. I don't think he likes other democracies and that's why arguing that it was America that provoked al-Qaeda to interfere in Iraq, or that al-Qaeda didn't exist in Iraq under Saddam, is a stupid thing to say.
The man clearly says that he despices democracy as well as those who believe in it whether in Iraq or elsewhere. Now if he has the right to invite others to Islam then it should be equally our right to invite others to democracy. Except only if we admit that democracy is a sinful path and that Bin Laden is right, then America and the world should retreat from Iraq, abandon the mission to support the fledgling democracy over there and sit back and wait for other democracies to have their turn on Bin Laden's death menu.
America didn't bring al-Qaeda to Iraq, it's democracy in Iraq that made the extremists panic—their greatest fear is that if the once capital of the Islamic empire fell in the lap of democracy, what would "protect" other parts of the "land of Islam" from "falling" too!?
The conflict is not about Bin Laden and America; it's an ideological conflict in which there are people and regimes across the world that support one side or another, meaning that the conflict was inevitable even if America hadn't taken part. Otherwise the region would have been living in peace and prosperity now!
In fact, and I think many people agree with me, the American-led intervention was defensive rather than offensive when Bin Laden's ideology jumped to strike the towers in New York. At that point it became evident that such an ideology, in the presence of regimes that support it, could threaten any spot on the map with no exception from Bali to Madrid—and although the victims of this ideology have been mostly from the middle east, this could well change in the future if the extremist manage to take over the region.
We shouldn’t think that such crazy messages could come only from a Salafi extremist like Bin Laden; because it actually reminds me of a similar call from Khomeini to the leaders in Moscow to convert to Islam shortly before the collapse of the Soviet Union. The late Ayatollah also said that Islam was the solution, so the point we should realize here is that this way of thinking is not an aspect of one particular sect as much as its part of the totalitarian ideology of Islamists that is deeply rooted in the minds of those, from one sect or another, who want to revive the Caliph rule.
Like we said in the previous post, regimes that follow this ideology, be it the Sunni Taliban or the Shia Mullahs, have failed to offer a civilized model of life so they chose instead to beautify and sell the idea of death under the old slogan of "Our dead are in heaven and your dead are in hell".
It's even more interesting in a way that this call for converting to Islam is a big fantasy since Bin Laden and the like know very well than America or other countries in the west would never impose a certain faith on their people. This message marks a deep trouble in the way extremists think; they live in illusions with complete disregard for facts, which is a very dangerous phenomenon when it's at this magnitude. And it leaves no room to doubt that they would do anything to drag the region, and the world, to an uncalculated confrontation.
It is evident from the naivety of the message that logic is completely missing in their ideology which means that dialogue with those people would be equally nonsense.
Wednesday, September 05, 2007
Islam, The Solution...!?
Yesterday Maliki went to visit Sistani to discuss the latest security and political developments with him.
It's the kind of a move that reflects the government's persistence to let clerics make the political decisions for the country. As if they haven't done enough harm so far!
Instead of reaching out to his partners in the political process from other groups he goes in the exact opposite direction and I really don't know what he thought such visit could do to improve his position, especially at a time when he's in desperate need to mend the rift in his cabinet.
When I think of this meeting I see that it can't do anything good for Iraq. It probably can serve one particular segment of the people but most likely it's an attempt to fix the damage caused by the Shia-Shia conflict following the recent incidents in Karbala which further isolated the "coalition of four" from the rest of Shia parties.
It remains difficult for Sistani to deal with that too because he doesn't only not represent all Iraqis; he doesn't represent all the Shia either. This man had isolated himself in a small room in the back alleys of Najaf and he communicates with the world only through his agents and representatives so he can't be expected to offer much help to anyone. And it's wrong to think that the man can solve any problem with a single fatwa—we had seen many examples where fatwas and statements by dozens of clerics of both sects that called for calm and rejecting violence got ignored and couldn't change a thing in the situation on the ground.
The problem with Maliki who's the leader of the Islamic Dawa Party is that he's just like all other Islamists who insist that Islam is the solution and that clerics are the ones who can deliver that solution.
But reality proved that political Islam is in fact the problem, not the solution. And this is true not only in Iraq but in many other countries in the region that are full of political Islamist movements. They build their rhetoric on what they like to call the golden age of Islam and promise that a new golden age could come if people returned to the roots of Islam…but what happened when Islamists ruled? Definitely not a golden age of any sort.
The first problem with their theory is that they can't say which version of Islam represents the solution. With all the sectarian differences we can see, saying that Islam is the solution is an empty slogan that requires a lot of clarification.
But the truth is, every rival party believes that their faith is the only true faith and when this dispute infected the political scene in the most violent way Islam became the most prominent problem. And that's how we ended up in the middle of a Sunni-Shia conflict as well as Sunni-Sunni and Shia-Shia conflicts.
The recent incidents in Karbala are striking evidence on how mixing politics with religion made brothers slaughter one another in a bloody war for power. Even the holy shrines were not spared in the fighting.
It's ironic that when a Muslim kills another Muslim or destroys the sites revered by his own people no one speaks of it here as a major problem but if a non-Muslim does that the uproar would be legendary!
In spite of all that Islamists still insist on their slogan and after all what happened Ahmedinejad wants Shia Iran and Sunni Saudi Arabia to "fill the vacuum" when America leaves Iraq…I can only imagine the way in which the vacuum would be filled and levels of violence that would accompany that!
The people remain the most important item in the equation as they are the ones who have the actual power to decide the long-term strategic choices with their votes.
In Iraq the experience with the rule of Islamists has certainly reduced the numbers of people who support the idea of Islamic rule and a there's a growing number of people who now began to question the idea about Islam being the solution.
So, there will be a great long battle between the two ideas; between Islamic rule and the separation between religion and the state--the current problem is that the people are divided into two, almost equal, groups in this respect. This means none of the two can prevail at this stage but at the same time the performance of the government made mostly of Islamists will no doubt lead to a steady decrease in its popularity.
Islamists have failed to offer a chance for a better life whether when they were in the opposition or when they got to rule the country. I think that's why they try to sell the idea of death instead of life; they failed to offer a better life so they picked up the slogan of death and "martyrdom" to promise a better life, but in an imaginary heaven; not in real life.
This strategy, in some time that cannot be specified right now, will mark the beginning of actual death but it will the death of political Islamist movements and maybe Iraq, the country where people have the right to make a choice, will become a grave for political Islam.
It will take more than one round of elections to declare them dead but I see that time is not on the Islamists' side.
The war is going to be long because it's a war of ideas—the conflict is not going to be a localized one and will have different forms because I believe the whole world is concerned and will take part in one way or another.
Identifying and supporting the true moderates would be a fair weapon to use in this war and I think American and the rest of the free world will keep trying to support positive reforms towards a better life to defeat the ideology of death.
It's the kind of a move that reflects the government's persistence to let clerics make the political decisions for the country. As if they haven't done enough harm so far!
Instead of reaching out to his partners in the political process from other groups he goes in the exact opposite direction and I really don't know what he thought such visit could do to improve his position, especially at a time when he's in desperate need to mend the rift in his cabinet.
When I think of this meeting I see that it can't do anything good for Iraq. It probably can serve one particular segment of the people but most likely it's an attempt to fix the damage caused by the Shia-Shia conflict following the recent incidents in Karbala which further isolated the "coalition of four" from the rest of Shia parties.
It remains difficult for Sistani to deal with that too because he doesn't only not represent all Iraqis; he doesn't represent all the Shia either. This man had isolated himself in a small room in the back alleys of Najaf and he communicates with the world only through his agents and representatives so he can't be expected to offer much help to anyone. And it's wrong to think that the man can solve any problem with a single fatwa—we had seen many examples where fatwas and statements by dozens of clerics of both sects that called for calm and rejecting violence got ignored and couldn't change a thing in the situation on the ground.
The problem with Maliki who's the leader of the Islamic Dawa Party is that he's just like all other Islamists who insist that Islam is the solution and that clerics are the ones who can deliver that solution.
But reality proved that political Islam is in fact the problem, not the solution. And this is true not only in Iraq but in many other countries in the region that are full of political Islamist movements. They build their rhetoric on what they like to call the golden age of Islam and promise that a new golden age could come if people returned to the roots of Islam…but what happened when Islamists ruled? Definitely not a golden age of any sort.
The first problem with their theory is that they can't say which version of Islam represents the solution. With all the sectarian differences we can see, saying that Islam is the solution is an empty slogan that requires a lot of clarification.
But the truth is, every rival party believes that their faith is the only true faith and when this dispute infected the political scene in the most violent way Islam became the most prominent problem. And that's how we ended up in the middle of a Sunni-Shia conflict as well as Sunni-Sunni and Shia-Shia conflicts.
The recent incidents in Karbala are striking evidence on how mixing politics with religion made brothers slaughter one another in a bloody war for power. Even the holy shrines were not spared in the fighting.
It's ironic that when a Muslim kills another Muslim or destroys the sites revered by his own people no one speaks of it here as a major problem but if a non-Muslim does that the uproar would be legendary!
In spite of all that Islamists still insist on their slogan and after all what happened Ahmedinejad wants Shia Iran and Sunni Saudi Arabia to "fill the vacuum" when America leaves Iraq…I can only imagine the way in which the vacuum would be filled and levels of violence that would accompany that!
The people remain the most important item in the equation as they are the ones who have the actual power to decide the long-term strategic choices with their votes.
In Iraq the experience with the rule of Islamists has certainly reduced the numbers of people who support the idea of Islamic rule and a there's a growing number of people who now began to question the idea about Islam being the solution.
So, there will be a great long battle between the two ideas; between Islamic rule and the separation between religion and the state--the current problem is that the people are divided into two, almost equal, groups in this respect. This means none of the two can prevail at this stage but at the same time the performance of the government made mostly of Islamists will no doubt lead to a steady decrease in its popularity.
Islamists have failed to offer a chance for a better life whether when they were in the opposition or when they got to rule the country. I think that's why they try to sell the idea of death instead of life; they failed to offer a better life so they picked up the slogan of death and "martyrdom" to promise a better life, but in an imaginary heaven; not in real life.
This strategy, in some time that cannot be specified right now, will mark the beginning of actual death but it will the death of political Islamist movements and maybe Iraq, the country where people have the right to make a choice, will become a grave for political Islam.
It will take more than one round of elections to declare them dead but I see that time is not on the Islamists' side.
The war is going to be long because it's a war of ideas—the conflict is not going to be a localized one and will have different forms because I believe the whole world is concerned and will take part in one way or another.
Identifying and supporting the true moderates would be a fair weapon to use in this war and I think American and the rest of the free world will keep trying to support positive reforms towards a better life to defeat the ideology of death.
Whereabouts
Today I have an announcement to make...
Just two days ago I arrived in New York City and for the coming two years I will be studying international affairs at Columbia University, hopefully by the end of that I will get the master's degree I want!
So far I'm still in the process of settling in and figuring out what I need to do in order to actually start my studies.
However posting on this blog will continue and a new post will be coming tomorrow if not tonight.
And by the way, in case some of Ali's old readers are wondering where he is and like to contact him, he's going to college at Stony Brooks in Long Island.
Just two days ago I arrived in New York City and for the coming two years I will be studying international affairs at Columbia University, hopefully by the end of that I will get the master's degree I want!
So far I'm still in the process of settling in and figuring out what I need to do in order to actually start my studies.
However posting on this blog will continue and a new post will be coming tomorrow if not tonight.
And by the way, in case some of Ali's old readers are wondering where he is and like to contact him, he's going to college at Stony Brooks in Long Island.
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