Iran sends "sticky IEDs" to terorists in Iraq

First, it was flying IEDs...Now, sticky IEDs

Iraqi newspaper Al-Madad reports:

The government is taking measures to prevent assassinations by magnetic IEDs that militant groups have been using to target members of security forces, judges and civilians.
A source in the government said the cabinet asked all state officials to take utmost caution and to constantly inspect their vehicles before traveling even if the vehicle was left unattended for a short period of time.
[...]
The statement comes amid increasing attacks with sticky IEDs against government officials of various levels. Military analysts in Baghdad see that the successful operations by security forces in many parts of the country forced militants to change their tactics and switch to sticky IEDs that can be remotely detonated and do not require teams to place.

General Qasim Ata had accused Iran last April of supplying large amounts of sticky IEDs to militant groups. Ata also confirmed the discovery of such Iran-made sticky IEDa in different parts of Baghdad.
Security sources told Al-Mada yesterday that counter-explosives services proceeded to offer lectures to inform security personnel and government officials [about these devices] and distributed posters that show samples of these sticky/magnetic bombs.

Whether you're looking for 2,000km rockets, 150 meter flying IEDs, or palm-sized sticky IEDs...Iran is the one-stop-shop for all sorts of terrorist gear.

Coalition forces, US embassy ban Iranian media from accessing coalition bases

Coalition forces and the US embassy decided to ban reporters working with Iranian media from accessing coalition bases and American offices in Iraq.

Coalition forces media advisor Abdul Latif Rayan said security concerns are behind the decision and added “From a security standpoint, we think it’s inappropriate to grant Iranian networks or their employees the permission to access American or coalition bases and offices in Iraq”...Source: Radio Sawa.

Stopping potential spies from entering sensitive facilities is a long overdue decision. It makes perfect sense!

Why Iraq Is Changing Its Tune on Withdrawal

In a surprising development, Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki and his national security advisor Mowaffak al-Rubaie made a dramatic shift in their positions in the SOFA negotiations with the US.
By referring to the negotiated deal as a “memorandum of understanding” instead of using its official name, they are signaling that they are doing more than just taking a tougher stand: they are scrapping all that has been negotiated since February and starting new negotiations for a whole new deal.

In other words, Maliki is saying that he wants to negotiate the withdrawal of US forces, not their presence, after the UN mandate expires.
In order to understand why Maliki made this sharp turn from his formerly pragmatic neutral position, we need to examine three issues: the timing of the statements, the place from which they were made, and the parties that made them.

As to their source, it is noteworthy that the statements came from only religious Shiite leaders. Sunnis and Kurds who have been close to the negotiations and often spoke about the progress and obstacles concerning SOFA do not seem to share Maliki’s new demand.

The timing and location somewhat overlap with Maliki’s visit to the UAE, and almost coincides with Rubaie’s visit to Ayatollah Sistani in Najaf.
In my opinion, the only reason that Maliki made his demand from the UAE and not from Baghdad is that he wanted to send a message of reassurance to Tehran: basically to reassure the Iranians that recent reinforcement of ties with Arab states and the planned reopening of their embassies does not necessarily mean that Iraq has become part of a US-Arab alliance against them.

Of course the message was not received by Iranians only. Some Arab leaders may have seen this message as a sign of Maliki’s possible insincerity towards them. At least one of them (King Abdullah II of Jordan) postponed his planned visit to Baghdad — and I doubt “security concerns” are truly behind the decision.
As I predicted in an earlier post, Maliki waited before making adjustments in his position towards the deal. However, the change came more dramatically than expected. Maliki apparently yielded to Shiite pressure from Najaf and made his choice. He made two mistakes here.

First, he forgot that while he feels that he’s got to listen to what Najaf says, America does not. Neither do Sunnis, Kurds or even many among Shiite Iraqis. Second, by making unrealistic and unacceptable demands he put himself in an embarrassing position. He may have thought that America needs the deal so badly that it will be willing to make huge concessions that he can exploit in order to please Tehran and Najaf.

Something must have made Maliki and his security advisor think that they have the upper hand in the negotiations. After all, they declared: “Our stance in the negotiations under way with the American side will be strong… We will not accept any memorandum of understanding that doesn’t have specific dates to withdraw foreign forces from Iraq”
Here, we’re facing a typical case of the manifestations of the dual loyalties of many Iraqi politicians. The government as a whole has made achievements, especially in terms of security improvements. But these achievements have now been turned into a check that is being cashed to serve the sect and its allies.

For a long time, when the government was very weak, Maliki and Rubaie (especially Rubaie) were clearly against the idea of setting timetables, at least in public. What has changed now is that these politicians have gone to the Ayatollah and told him that their domestic foes have been more or less neutralized and that they are ready to use these gains for the benefit of the sect.
What I am saying here is that the statement “we are strong” does not reflect the Iraq-US balance of power in terms of two states negotiating a deal. It reflects the presumed balance of power between Shiite faith (in its regional context) on the one hand and the US, Sunni Arabs and Kurds on the other.

This calculation is obviously flawed. Maintaining the presence of American troops is crucial for the survival of Maliki and the future of Iraq — it is not as crucial for America. If America insists on a position of refusing to include a timetable for withdrawal in the agreement, it will be Maliki who will have to make concessions.
That will be very bad for his image.
People make mistakes, but the mistake here is aggravated by the fact that Iraq’s leader has allowed his misperceptions to drive him into making demands that are not in the best interest of his country.

Frankly, I’m disappointed by Maliki’s unjustified maneuver. Gambling with the future of nation and its people is an insult that will cast a shadow on his record as a leader of Iraq.

Support Freedom of Speech

Our friends and readers remember the Arabic blogging tool that we helped develop nearly 4 years ago. It was a pioneer project in making blogging easy for Arabic speakers in the Middle East. It’s been a story of exceptional success in dangerous times. Only with the strong will of good Iraqis and Americans the idea became solid reality.

The project did not wait for or receive any support from the Iraqi or US government; the success was only the fruit of cooperation between enthusiastic supporters of free speech in both countries.

It was a long journey to help introduce the idea of dialogue over the internet and activism to the Iraqi people. It’s been a real challenge on a land that witnesses the most brutal attacks of terrorism. However this did not discourage the volunteers who continued to move across the country offering training and promoting the culture of blogging and free speech. That journey reached even some of the most remote villages and most volatile zones. During that we lost two dear colleagues on what was known back then as the ‘death road’.

The project was built with generous donations and enthusiastic volunteer work, and above all blood. Today we’re proud that the blogging network has more than 2,300 users using the tool to express themselves and interact with one another. The community received more than 20 million readers since its inception three years ago and the average hits today reaches as many as 25,000 and continues to rise. The network of users expanded beyond Iraq to the rest of the Middle East where hundreds of blogger are now using the network, adding new dimensions to it by connecting all these bloggers, activists and NGOs.

On behalf of all the people using the service, I'd like to thank all those who took part in the first fund raising campaign that Spirit of America led which our dear readers and many respectable bloggers had an honorable role in. also thanks to Cato Institute and Dr. Tom Palmer for covering the expenses of the service for a full year, and to all the Iraqi volunteers who still manage the main site for free.

This project is now facing the danger of being shut down because we couldn’t find resources to pay the firm that hosts the service…the network will no longer exist by the end of the month, unless we find a way to save it.

We hope that the lovers and supporters of free speech and democracy will help us find the resources necessary to keep the project alive.
The managing and editing of the main site, as well as occasional Arabic-English translation are taken care of by Iraqi volunteers free of charge. What the service needs to survive are the expenses of the hosting firm and sufficient legal expertise to help with the negotiations and oversee the financial issues.

At a cost of less than $2,000 a month we can keep 2,300 bloggers online, their 25,000 daily readers informed and keep the doors open for many more to join. Please spread the word and email us in case you know individuals or groups that might be willing to offer assitance.


Related links and previous stories:
Friends of Democracy Home Page
Blogs Directory
Activities made possible by the network
Blogging...Blogging

Iran and the Coming War

The possibility of military action against Iran’s nuclear facilities is increasing every day: some even expect it could happen as early as the end of this year.

The strange thing is that Iran has been directing most of its recent rhetoric not against the most likely attacker — Israel — but against the United States.
On Monday, General Meer Faisal Baqir Zadeh of Iran’s armed forces general command declared that Iran will be digging 320,000 graves in a number of provinces bordering Iraq and the Gulf to bury dead American attackers. One wonders: why Americans and not Israeli attackers?

The answer to this question - and why the US is clearly worried about the threats - becomes apparent after examining the likely scope and nature of such a confrontation that takes all of the potential actors into account.
The most likely starting point is a quick and intensive Israeli air strike targeting Iran’s uranium enrichment plants and other nuclear facilities crucial to the Islamic Republic’s nuclear program. What would follow remains unclear right now. However, a logical path can be deduced from the initial action given the declared and implicit policies, fears, and ambitions of Iran.

According to the chief of the IRGC General Mohammed Ali Jaafari, Iran would seal off the Strait of Hormuz and the Gulf if attacked. It will even attack any countries from which an American attack comes.
Iran has long wanted to believe that America can’t take action against it because of America’s involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan and the U.S. public’s distaste for opening yet another front. Iran is trying to use this presumed situation to deter an Israeli attack by threatening to force the U.S. to participate in a large-scale operation against it should such an attack occur.

Tehran is thus strategically threatening to expand the war beyond the presumed limits of a) the American public’s tolerance or b) the price the U.S. is ready to pay to eliminate a threat to Israel, the Gulf, and maybe European — but not American — soil.
Iran has also threatened to use its surrogates in the Middle East to escalate operations against Israeli and U.S. troops. This means that Iran wants to have concerned countries apply pressure on Israel not to attack by threatening open war in the Middle East.

If Iran’s deterrence plan fails — and it most likely will since the threat is existential to Israel — it will clearly still try to expand the conflict. Dragging the U.S. into a war that cannot be won would provide Tehran with a propaganda victory that could be used to relieve the pain of losing their nuclear program. Not a bad trade, especially that Israel is going to bomb it anyway.
Seeking to expand the breadth of such a war could also help Tehran save face if, as seems likely, severe blows are dealt to its war machine.

Appearing helpless in the face of an offensive by a small state like Israel would severely damage the image of the regime among the population beyond the inflicted material loss. But losing in battle to a coalition of several states including the world’s sole superpower could be used to turn a defeat into a domestic propaganda victory that revolves around the survival of the regime.
Iran is relatively better positioned for something like this than Saddam was in 1991, at least in the sense that the nuclear program is seen as a more legitimate cause among Iranians than Saddam’s invasion of Kuwait was among Iraqis.

Iran could claim that the U.S. Air Force took part in the strikes, or at least that it provided logistical support to the waves of Israeli fighter jets. Such involvement, in their thinking, would justify attacks on U.S. bases in Iraq and the Gulf region, inviting American retaliation.
Tehran will be betting on the following as a plan to avoid the toppling of their regime:

First, the declared and internationally to-be-accepted objective of an Israeli/American strike is to stop Iran from going nuclear, much like the declared objective of Desert Storm was to liberate Kuwait. Toppling regimes is something that coalitions weren’t supportive of in 1991 and won’t support in the coming war.
Second, Iran has mastered the ways of guerrilla war. They may be justified in their belief that if their surrogates in Lebanon and Iraq can continue to survive Israel’s attacks or disrupt post-invasion efforts, then their own similarly trained forces in the IRGC would be able to perform even more spectacularly. The chaos could be multiplied if accompanied by simultaneous escalations against U.S. forces in Iraq and against Israel.

Furthermore, Iran believes it has a better organized and more loyal military than Saddam had in 2003 and that its nuclear and vital command-and-control facilities are considered more challenging targets than Saddam’s were.
The Tehran regime has chosen to set itself on a crash course with the rest of the world. They know war is coming and they hope they can escape with minimal damage to the regime.
A dictator’s mentality sees anything else as expendable.

Sadr movement, Mahdi army shrink under pressure

Special Analysis for The Long War Journal

Over the space of several days in early June, Muqtada al Sadr has issued two consequential orders that will affect the future of his movement and that of Iraq. Sadr has ordered the reorganization of his infamous Mahdi Army and has forbidden the Sadrist movement from participating in the upcoming provincial elections.

Sadr’s first declaration addressed the organization and operations of the Mahdi Army, the military arm of the Sadrist movement. Sadr ordered his militiamen to halt the fighting and announced that a small, specialized unit will have the exclusive right to fight the “occupier.” The unit, ironically called the “special groups,” is forbidden to attack Iraqi security forces or government officials.

Sadr’s second declaration addressed how the Sadrist movement would participate in the upcoming provincial elections, tentatively scheduled for October of this year. In the second order, Sadr told his followers not compete directly in elections that take place under “occupation” but said the movement would support “technocrat and independent politicians” to prevent rival Shiite parties from dominating provincial governments.

The two orders show that Sadr is being forced to scale down both his political and military ambitions as the Iraqi government and Iraqi security forces continue to pacify Mahdi Army strongholds during a series of offensives that started in Basrah at the end of March, and moved through Sadr City and the wider Shia South. Operations in Maysan, a Mahdi Army bastion, are currently in progress. The Maysan operations so far resulted in the capture of 354 wanted militiamen and the discovery of hundreds of rockets, artillery rounds, RPGs and surface to air missiles and various other weapons and munitions. More than two hundred militiamen also surrendered to the Iraqi security forces, according to Ministry of Interior spokesman Abdul Karim Khalaf.


Continue Reading...

Where is the Middle East heading?

It’s probably one of the most difficult questions to answer.
One of the main factors that make it very difficult to understand the Middle East especially for Westerners is that the region has been moving on an opposite course to that of Europe when it comes to socio-political evolution. Europe’s evolution took it from religious monarchies to nationalism-based states through socialism until it finally became the secular democratic mass that it is today. But the Middle East moved from constitutional monarchies a century ago to communism then to nationalism and now the growing trend appears to have been religion.

What makes it very difficult to understand and predict the future stops of this backwards movement is that change from one system to another was virtually never a genuine change from within, but largely a result of influence from without.
Growing up in a traditional dictatorship in a predominantly Arab Muslim country we were told that all our problems were the result of centuries of Western colonialism, domination and later manipulation and conspiracies. By told, it means that governments, intellectuals, opposition groups and everyone with a voice tried to convince us of this claim; for different purposes of course. In order to find excuses for their failure or to distract us from domestic causes of our misery, governments blamed the West for everything from the pillaging of our natural resources by greedy colonial Europeans, to the creation of Israel, to the borders the West sketched on a piece of paper to rip apart the so called Arab homeland to even the levels of illiteracy in our remote villages, you name it!

Opposition groups and intellectuals on the other hand blamed America and Europe for our underdeveloped undemocratic conditions which they say were a result of manipulating our political systems and public opinion since the creation of the modern states of the Middle East in the early 20th century. They also blame the West for planting and toppling regimes as they pleased; they’d tell you that the West aided the Hashemite against the Ottomans once, left the monarchs to fall later, then aided the nationalists against the communists and then the Islamists against both nationalists and communists and most recently an assortment of the above groups against fascists…the list goes long.

Coming to the West, we saw that the issue here too, surfaces quite often. We hear people to the left say they’re ashamed of what the West did in the Middle East. They blame Europe and America for the mess that the Middle East is, and for two purposes. For self-flagellation and, for attacking their political rivals in the conservative right. At least this is our perception of the debate.
People to the right, are perhaps equally embarrassed by the history of Western involvement in the Middle East, if in a different way. It can be felt that they regret the fact that doing what had to be done in the past led to undesirable outcomes.

What we want to say here is that we-east and west, left and right-all acknowledge that the West has a long history of successfully manipulating the course of events in the Middle East. Let’s look at a bunch of milestones in recent Middle East history. The creation of Hashemite monarchies, the creation of Israel, the counter-Mosaddaq coup in 1953, the Iraq-Iran war, the nationalists’ rise to power, or the Soviet’s defeat at the Mujahideen’s hands. These are all facts, and the decisive role of the West in shaping the outcome of all these events and many more is also a fact.

Now some may wonder why we think this can be useful. Here’s why;

This ability of the West to influence or induce a change in the Middle East can be used to consolidate our efforts to bring about, and sustain, a change in the right direction to produce a democratic secular mass similar to that in the West. This is what America has been trying to do for a while, alas with great opposition in Europe and inside America itself.
The time is perfect to push forward with this now, especially that in the first phase of US-led democratization, Islamist powers have been tested and their shortcomings are being exposed, at least in Iraq and the Palestinian territory.

One of the key questions that usually arise is whether Islam is compatible with democracy or if there’s an inherent obstacle that makes democracy impossible in Muslim societies.
It’s a good question, but it’s also irrelevant. Let’s consider the following questions:
Is Islam compatible with nationalism? Or better, could Islam ever be compatible with godless communism!? Recent history shows that religion did not prevent nationalism or communism from taking root in the region; there were times both ideologies took turns in becoming the prevailing trends.

What many people forget is that in the Middle East, religion is only one identity, among many others, that people adhere to or use to describe themselves. I mentioned the two other identities; communist ideology and nationalistic sentiments because both were at times so strong in the Middle East. So strong that in Iraq in the late 50s and 60s the bloody competition for power was exclusively between the communists and nationalists-one is non-religious and the other is anti-religious.

Given the above points, we believe it is very possible to make the Middle East accept and endorse secular democracy, especially that this is the best among all systems of governance.
The West excelled at manipulating the course of events in the Middle East and we in the Middle East have always gone with the flow. Virtually everyone on the Middle East switched sides more than once and elder people of our parents’ generation for example knows this first hand. Pick a man from that generation, look at his path and you’ll see that he or she was a staunch supporter of the kings in the 1940s, then became a Marxist in the 1950s, then a nationalist in the 1960s and 70s, only to become an Islamist in the 80s or 90s. Some, however, were on the other side and did this course the other way around because of socioeconomic factors, location or mere personal impulses. Anyway, the former path was dominant among a majority of people.

The feeling that things have gone out of control in the region should not discourage us. Western powers have always managed to shepherd the Middle East into positions that seemed to best serve their interests. Now if the West believes that a secular democratic Middle East is in everyone’s best interest, all it has to do is push for it the same way it did at any time in the 20th century. And when we get there all it will have to do is to not rock the boat.


By Mohammed and Omar Fadhil

Can the US and Iraq Have a Long-Term Relationship?

The debate over immediate security conditions is taking a back seat in Iraq now as the debate over long-term fixes, particularly the U.S.-Iraq agreement, takes the lead.

The national scope of this debate goes beyond the talk of politicians –who are trying to use their position on the agreement for electoral campaigning– and people’s talk in the streets to Friday prayer sermons. Interestingly, the issue has also attracted curiously broad attention from Arab and regional leaders and media. Most notably, in his first speech following a crisis that brought Lebanon to the brink of a new civil war and on a day no less than the anniversary of his “victory” in the south, Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah dedicated a significant portion of his speech to the U.S.-Iraq agreement. In Iran, hard-line cleric Ahmed Khatami also denounced the proposed treaty in an earlier Friday sermon, warning Baghdad’s government that signing the agreement would be a betrayal of the Muslim world and particularly of the Shia faith. This frenzy with which Iran and allies scramble to preempt the agreement has a downside — their speeches embarrassed their allies in Iraq, making them appear as mere puppets.

It’s neither strange nor ironic that the pro-Iran extremists have made such a fuss about an agreement whose terms are yet to be fully made public — rumors and exaggerations of half-truths are enough to make the public in a place like the Middle East feel uneasy about any given issue. It’s enough for an aide of Sadr to tell fanatic followers that the treaty would grant the U.S. control over 99% of Iraq’s riches to make them take to the streets to denounce the agreement. This cleric didn’t need to find facts to back his argument: the crowd is easy to convince, thanks to widespread ignorance; sentimental rhetoric is more attractive to them than facts, numbers, and science.

Like I wrote a moment ago, some politicians have already begun using their positions from this agreement for electoral campaigning. Former PM Ibrahim Jaafari emerged with a new political alliance with supposed backing from Iran and Ayatollah Sistani. He showed his true colors too early when he made his main theme that the agreement is bad and our neighbors don’t like it. By “neighbors” I can only think of Iran and Syria, as I don’t see a reason for any other neighbor to be upset with the agreement.
I personally don’t have a full text of the agreement’s draft but I’ve always been a proponent of establishing a strategic alliance with the U.S.
For our government, I hope that accepting or rejecting it would be based on its impact on Iraq’s interests.

Will Iraqis accept the agreement? No one can tell at this point, and this is the difference between democracies and non-democracies. Had the question been posed in Iran or Syria, it would take one man’s word to offer an answer. I am pleased to see that our government is dealing pragmatically with the issue and is seeking the opinion of countries that have experience with long-term U.S. military presence. The government sent delegations to Germany, Japan, and South Korea to listen to what they, not the mullahs, have to say about it.

If not for the lack of information about this agreement, the clergy in Najaf wouldn’t have considered calling for a referendum on it. The ignorance of the public as to the content of the agreement makes it easy for a cleric to manipulate the outcome of such a referendum and still make it look as if it was the people who made the decision. All he needs to do is issue a fatwa that tells the simple, faithful citizen that his or her vote today could make the difference between hell and heaven. Such a disgusting exploitation of the trust of people who are just beginning to learn the alphabet of knowledge!
The political map when it comes to positions on the agreement looks something like this:

• For: Kurds, the Iraqi list of Ayad Allawi, and part of the Accord Front (Sunni)
• For, with reservations: the Islamic Party of VP Tariq Hashimi
• Undecided: SIIC of Abdul Aziz Hakim
• Against: Sadrists and Ibrahim Jaafari’s new group

As to PM Maliki and what’s left of the Da’wa Party (Jaafari took part of the party with him when he split), the man is being very careful here. He’s trying to make a choice between two sources of power, and it’s indeed a difficult one for a Shia Islamist. On the one hand he’s got the political achievements he made on his own as a statesman and his recent successes in terms of security and reconciliation; on the other there’s Shia unity and the blessings of the Najaf clergy.

The scale is very delicate and I think Maliki will wait for it to stop before he makes adjustments to his position. However, these adjustments are unlikely to move him far away from his current position and I see that ultimately the agreement will be signed, if with some modifications. Sorry, Tehran!

The Mideast Won't Change From Within

The Middle East has witnessed dramatic changes over the past few years, including the adoption in some countries – Iraq, Lebanon and the Palestinian territories – of the democratic system as the means for the transfer of political power. Though all of these countries are still troubled, the huge turnouts in all three electoral processes were clear evidence of the willingness of their peoples to switch to ballots over bullets.

Unfortunately, some Arab intellectuals seem bent on rejecting democracy as a foreign – in particular, Western – concept. I recall before Saddam's fall that many were repeating a slogan that says "No America and No Saddam," which ostensibly aimed at touting a nationalistic project for change. Today the same slogans are reiterated; sometimes out of good will and naïveté, other times to support the totalitarians and the extremists. People keep saying that if both Iran and the U.S. had stayed out of our business we would have been able to solve our problems on our own.
In my opinion this fantasy about change in isolation from foreign influence is ridiculous...

Continue Reading...

Iraq Hunts Al-Qaeda in Its Last Urban Stronghold

Although we haven’t written anything about the operation in Mosul which started a week ago, I’ve been closely following its developments. The reason why I waited is that we had often heard about a new operation, which would then turn out to be just a rumor. Anyway, the operation this time has actually started, and the arrival of Maliki and his defense and interior ministers in the city leaves no room for doubt about the seriousness of the government in seeing to the plan’s success.

The interesting thing about the operation is that it’s been suspiciously quiet, to the extent that one wonders if there’s actually any operation going on. In fact, Mosul has seen the calmest eight days of the last five years.
The operation won broad approval and support even before it started, which -especially among Sunni blocs- is another positive product of the Basra operations. As we can see, the usual sectarian rhetoric about biased targeting of Sunni regions without Shia ones has been absent this time. In addition to the parliamentary approval, the operation won public support represented by the tribes’ willingness to take part in the operation. The chief of the awakening councils in the province, Fawaz Jerba, said that there were ten thousand men ready to take part in the operation.

However, the government preferred not to get them involved right now and is moving forward to form seven battalions of police from the residents of the province. These battalions are likely to have an important role in maintaining security and order after the operation ends. Two of these units will be assigned to Tal Afar: one will guard the bridges in the city, another will operate fixed checkpoints on the main highways leading to the city. The rest will be added to the existing security forces in Mosul. All are to be led by former army officers.

Initial results of the operation included the capture of 1,100 suspects and wanted individuals, according to the spokesman of the defense ministry, Mohammed Askari. Most of those are officers in the former army and members of the military bureau of the Ba’ath Party, along with a bunch of al-Qaeda emirs; yet to be named, three of them are described as being among the most dangerous in Mosul.

What’s special about the name of the operation - “the Mother of Two Springs” - is that it’s the adorable second name of the city which it gained from the relatively nice climate it enjoys. It’s a smart replacement for “Lion’s Roar,” which some found to be needlessly scary, especially since we need a real lion more than we need the roar!

What’s unique about this city is its prestigious military history. The Iraqi army had long relied on Maslawis to build its officer corps, which is a source of pride for the city. In the beginning there were rumors in the Sunni community that stemmed from the fear that the operation might turn into an organized act of cleansing against those officers or a twisted implementation of the de-Ba’athification law. However, the defense and interior ministries strongly rejected that allegation and announced that 80 of those detained were released after they were not found guilty of crimes. The Ministry asserted that arrests were based on accurate intelligence. Actually, some in the government are boasting that this is the first operation in which most arrests have been made according to legitimate warrants.

In my opinion, the suspicions of both sides are understandable due to many years of distrust between Mosul and the government. On the one hand, the targeting of former officers and Ba’ath Party members is based on the fact that they made up the bulk of al-Qaeda hosts and supporters in many places in Iraq. On the other hand, there are former officers who don’t have blood on their hands but are terrified by the countless stories of Shia militias –particularly the Badr Brigades– undertaking acts of revenge against officers who fought against Iran in the 1980s.

As in Basra, the government gave an ultimatum for militants to hand in their weapons and offered amnesty to those not involved in crimes involving murder in order to make the operation as bloodless as possible. And indeed reports indicate that scores of militants have already handed in their weapons - an encouraging sign in a turbulent city that hardly ever trusted the government.

Among the results of the operation was the discovery of many weapons caches, which included several thousands of pounds of explosives and hundreds of rockets and artillery/mortar rounds. The amount may sound small given what’s expected to be found in a city that is the last urban stronghold of al-Qaeda, but it’s still an encouraging start since the operation began only a week ago.

Another important thing that distinguishes this operation from previous ones is the active participation of the infant Iraqi air force through transportation and daily reconnaissance sorties. Iraqi officers say that this is the first time they are able to rely on the Iraqi air force for valuable live imagery of the spread-out city.

Some of the critics of the operation noted that announcing the operation before its launch gave al-Qaeda a chance to leave the city for other places, including neighboring countries, thus enabling them to dodge the strike which might waste the chance to crush them in their last remaining stronghold. I personally disagree with this argument. What matters, after all, is to clean the city of al-Qaeda, preferably without fighting. This illustrates a very important trend that we first saw in the Baghdad operations last year; that al-Qaeda now knows that it cannot afford to confront the security forces anymore. Now, instead of digging in and fighting “glorious battles” in Fallujah or elsewhere, al-Qaeda is more inclined to run away than fight. This is a true sign of al-Qaeda’s weakening and of their ultimate defeat.

Last but not least, I was surprised to see the leading opposition newspaper Azzaman, which had always been skeptical of everything the government does, praise the operation. To see a headline on Azzaman that says “Al-Qaeda Is Limping, Its Leaders Flee Mosul” means a lot to anyone familiar with Iraqi affairs.

Iraq Quietly Confronts Iran With Evidence of Weapons Trafficking

The Iraqi minister of defense pushed the debate with the Iranians over their provision of weapons to Shia militias one more step on Monday. Minister Abdul Qadir Obeidi indirectly confronted the Iranians, without naming them, with new findings that prove their involvement in the arming of Shia militias.
On Monday, state-owned al-Sabah published a statement by the minister in which he spoke of the capture of a certain type of rocket that was never found in militia-held caches until now:

Defense minister Abdul Qadir Mohammed Obeidi revealed that army troops found a 200-mm ground-to-ground rocket manufactured in 2007 during a search operation by the troops north of Basra. Obeidi told al-Sabah in an exclusive interview that, under international laws and norms, this kind of rocket can be traded only with the approval of parliaments and is used only at times of extreme necessity during wars … and wondered how this rocket entered the country. Obeidi added that this rocket can be launched only from a special platform and by specialized crews.

From what I read in Iraq’s two biggest newspapers, it seems that the government is trying to step up the rhetoric against Iranian interference in Iraq and to induce uproar among the Iraqi public. Azzaman had the following information about the found rocket, provided by “intelligence officials“:

The rocket was manufactured in 2007 in Iran and is called Falaq-1. Falaq-1 is a strategic missile of immense destruction power and was used by Hezbollah against Israel in the July 2006 war. …The sources mentioned that launching this type of rockets requires a crew of several people with advanced technological expertise…The sources, that preferred to remain unnamed, said that if this rocket was launched at a target, it could obliterate an entire city and kill all of its inhabitants even if those numbered by the tens of thousands…the same sources added that increasing the range of the rocket is not a complex process and can be done inside Iraq and clarified that the discovery of this strategic rocket in Basra poses a threat to security in Iraq and the Middle East. The sources expressed fear that large numbers of this rocket might have entered Iraq with crews to launch them. If that happens then we'd be on the brink of a domestic and regional security crisis"

The exclusivity of the first statement and the anonymity of the "intelligence sources" that provided the second indicate that the message is selective in choosing the target audience; that is primarily the Iranian government and, as an inevitable byproduct, the Iraqi public. Iraqi government officials seem to have exaggerated the material significance of the finding on purpose. They also realize that western journalists and readers very unlikely to buy these exaggerated statement-that's irrelevant anyway since this is a conversation meant to be between only Baghdad and Tehran.

The minister of defense is of course no idiot when it comes to weapons and their uses and specifications and he knows that bigger rockets have occasionally been found or destroyed. He served in the former and new army and his old colleagues including the ITM father testify to his professionalism and knowledge. It's timing and attitude in Baghdad that decided the sudden intensification of the tone, not the caliber of rockets.
I think the government in Baghdad is trying to say the following to the Iranian counterpart:
1-the provision of small arms is one thing but the provision of heavy weapons that can cause panic and relatively much more destruction is another.
2-if we can accept that machineguns, RPGs and mortars can be smuggled into Iraq without the Iranian government's knowledge; we can't accept the same claim when it comes to weapons of this magnitude.
3-we know and you know that you're providing these weapons and we can't remain silent anymore. At the same time neither of us is going anywhere anytime soon, so we must learn to coexist. You don't wan us to be your enemies and we can't afford to make you ours at the moment, so knock it off and let's not show the world the dirty laundry.

The message is quite clear and simple. Baghdad sent a delegation last week to ask Iran to stop the flow of weapons and support to Shia militias. When the delegation returned empty handed the government immediately announced through spokesman Ali Dabbagh that it will work to collect and display evidence of this support-A day later the conversation escalates with the above statements. The question is; is Iran going to respond reasonably or is it going to keep denying its involvement in the crime? And if it does, I wonder what the next escalation in the conversation is going to look like.

Do Iraqis Want an Arab Nuclear Bomb?

The change that took place in Iraq was not only a political one but also, and more importantly, a change in awareness; something that isn't easy to detect.
This is what I see clear in the nature of Iraqi dialogue among the public, and I'm always pleased by the degree of awareness and open-mindedness that emerged in the years that followed the change. I believe it is an important indication about the future.

Recently I've been reading through one of the BBC forums whose topic is basically "do Arabs have the right to possess nuclear weapons?". I didn't hesitate to read all the contributions, which numbered over 600 from various Arab countries. I wasn't surprised by the nature of Iraqi contributions to the discussion. I had always called these "singing outside the Arab flock".
This "singing" is almost always faced by attacks from the rest of Arabs who often generously use the word "traitors" when addressing their Iraqi counterparts just because they have different views about one issue or another.

What made me tackle this issue was not only the difference between the Iraqi and mainstream Arab views but the characteristic understanding exhibited through these Iraqi contributions of the nature of the challenge posed Arab possession of nuclear weapons to the region and especially to Arabs and Muslims themselves.
42 out of 47 Iraqi commentators voiced absolute rejection to the idea of nuclear weapons in Arab hands. More important is the consensus among those commentators that stable democracy is prerequisite to the acquisition of immense tools of power such as WMDs. Not only that, in fact some of the commentators even emphasized that only Israel has the right the possess nuclear weapons in the region because of the hostility and fanaticism of the regimes it's surrounded by.

There's no doubt how dangerous it is to allow dictatorships and WMDs to exist in the same place, and it seems that the change in Iraq has strengthened this conviction among the people. I am not surprised that Iraqis, whose country's been the field of war are more vocal and serious about rejecting proliferation and violence that peoples in countries where change hasn't happened yet. in my opinion this is the answer to present to those who claim that war has led to more extremism. In fact war did lead to more extremism, but only among those opposed to the change and who see in it a threat to their extreme ways which they try to impose on the others.
Now I leave you with some Iraqi comments. I will avoid translating comments from other Arabs since I'm sure you already know what those sound like…




"Besides the fact that nuclear programs place a heavy burden on the weak economies of Arab countries, harming the poor day in and day out…I indeed do not feel safe when I know that an Arab regime possesses such weapons because these weapons would be commanded by the desires and impulses of rulers who have been proven incompetent in anything except for repressing and impoverishing their peoples.
Mo'ammar Qaddafi has been sitting on the chest of his people for 40 years, so can you imagine figure what it's going to be like when he acquires nuclear bombs? Not to mention our horrible experience with Saddam Hussein who used WMDs against his own people."
Lateef Baghdadi. Baghdad/Iraq


"I wish from all my heart that Arabs get to build nuclear weapons because they will use them against one another and against their peoples-what Saddam did is the best example. Consequently this would lead to the extinction of Arabs and by that Arabs would be giving a free service to the civilized western world by ridding the world of themselves and their terror. The world will become safer."
Ammar Rahmatallah. Baghdad


"My name is Haider Mousawi from Arabic Basra. I absolutely refuse that Arabs acquire nuclear weapons, at least for the time being, for several reasons. First, it's dangerous for them before others, as Arab rulers are not wise and might use them against one another or against themselves (just like the former rulers of my country did to their people and the region's peoples). Second, nuclear weapons could not save super powers like the USSR from collapse. Third, they are very expensive, so it's better to [spend money] fighting poverty and unemployment. Fourth, those weapons are going to be a burden on their producers in the future and fifth, a peaceful program makes more sense."
Haider Mousawi. Basra


"Arabs' or Iranians' possession of nuclear weapons is like putting a live grenade in the hand of a six year old. That's what I consider it a huge crime against themselves and their countrymen first, and against the world second. I had worked at the Iraqi Atomic Energy Agency for several years. And although I completely believe that the Iraqi nuclear program was over by 1991 and although I refuse America's justifications for invading Iraq, I still thank God day and night that that program had been destroyed. That's because otherwise Iraq's situation would have been worse than it is right now.
No to any Arab nuclear program."
Dr. Imad Abdulwahab. Canada


"The world shall not permit Arab countries ruled by dictatorships to possess nuclear weapons or any other type of WMDs because these countries are often ruled by the impulses of one man such as the dictator Bashar Asad. This technically means that the weapons would belong to an individual, not a state and this individual might decide to sue them in a moment of anger or recklessness leading to disasters. We witnessed what Saddam did with his chemical weapons and how he decided to murder Iraqis with these weapons without a reasonable justification for their use. That's why no tyrannical regime should be allowed to possess these weapons."
Ahmed. Baghdad


"Even thinking about this subject should be forbidden to Arabs, Iranians and Muslims because of the factor of religious and sectarian extremism. The world would be living in the dark ages had these dangerous weapons fell into their hands."
Saad al-Iraqi. Baghdad


"Arabs do not have the right to possess nuclear weapons. The Arab mentality cannot handle uranium; they're good for no more than rifles. Had Saddam had nuclear weapons, he would have bombed all Arabs; Egypt, Kuwait, Lebanon, even Saudi Arabia and the Ka'aba."
Fadhil Bayati. Mosul


"No, no Arab country has the right to possess nuclear weapons. The reasons are as clear as the sun at noontime…All Arab leaders are not qualified for leadership; first they're stupid and second they're criminals. Imagine what someone who commits crimes against his own people do if he had nuclear weapons? Nuclear weapons should be in the hands of only civilized democratic regimes, not backward criminal regimes.
If Arab rulers get to acquire these weapons then, well, so much for planet earth!!!"
Abbas Husseini. Thi-Qar/Iraq


"Imagine that Arabs were in Israel's position and had these weapons, would they stand idle? Certainly they would bomb Gaza and destroy it altogether. Imagine that Hezbollah had these weapons, would it sit back and watch or use them? You have a big example in Saddam."
Tariq Sajid. Baghdad


"I think that only mature democracies have the right to have nuclear weapons…"
Ali al-Ali. An Iraqi in Jordan


"Only democracies like Israel or India can have these weapons while Arab countries would threaten world peace and the future of life on the planet. Even if Arabs don’t get to have strategic missiles to strike the west, they'd detonate [the weapons] in their homes and against their peoples in any case of revolt.
When Arabs acquired conventional explosives they strapped them to their cars and their own bodies and enhanced them with nails and ball bearings to attack civilian crowds at weddings and hospitals. This is what happened and keep happening in Iraq, Jordan, Israel and Egypt and all other places infested with terrorism."
Mohammed al-Iraqi. Baghdad/Iraq


"By no means can Syria, the member of the axis of evil and their followers be compared with Israel. If Israel wanted to strike Muslims with WMDs it would have done it long time ago. While if an organization like Hezbollah acquired these dangerous weapons-God forbid-they would murder the innocent and the guilty alike and then regret would be useless…peace be with those who want good for others the way they want it for themselves."
Ahmed. Kufa

Are Sadr and Al-Qaeda Teaming Up in Iraq?

A few days ago, there were two suspiciously coordinated statements emerging from Iraq. Muqtada al-Sadr made open-war threats followed immediately by a similar threat from al-Qaeda.
As they say, there is usually no smoke without fire.

Respected Iraqi writer and lawyer Suleiman Hakim (a prominent writer regularly published on the leading Iraqi politics and culture website Kitabat ) reported on April 11th -more than a week before Sadr and Abu Ayyub made their threats- about serious negotiations taking place between Sadr’s movement and a leader of the Islamic army group.
The meetings, Hakim believes, are taking place in Syria and Lebanon and are sponsored by a special Syrian security apparatus specialized in Iraqi affairs.

“Sheik Zergani [Sadr’s representative in Lebanon] and Sadr’s representative in Syria met in the Lebanese capital last March with Mr. Khalil Jumeily [a leader of the Islamic army] and after preliminary discussions in which they exchanged their views about the situation in Iraq and their plans for overthrowing the existing order and reviewing the positions of domestic and regional allies, they decided to resume the discussions in Damascus so that once they reach specific agreements, one certain Syrian security apparatus in charge of Iraqi issues would witness and sponsor those agreements. the relationships between Sadr movement and the Islamic army are not outside the frame of the Iran-Syria alliance. And so these relationships are being restored after being severed in the aftermath of the holy shrines bombings in 2006 and the massacres committed by Mahdi army indiscriminately against Sunni Iraqis. The main requirement of the new agreement is that the Islamic army launch wide operations against American and government targets and to take control of cities and towns near the army’s strongholds, in addition to the provision of assistance and backup to the Mahdi army once Muqtada unfreezes the army and gives the green light for starting the battle against the authority of the Shia coalition. … [The objective is] to create a new situation on the ground that forces the American forces to negotiate a new formula for power and authority in Iraq."

The fact that this story was written almost days before both al-Qaeda leaders sent in a wave of audio recordings and Muqtada threatened open war gives them increased credibility.
True, the idea of the Islamic army cooperating with Mahdi army sounds as peculiar as it always has. Not because of the sectarian difference, because the two groups did cooperate and sent reinforcements to each other back in 2004 during the battles of Fallujah and Najaf.
It’s because by considering a new joint venture with Sadr the Islamic army is making two huge mistakes. It’s true that the leaders of the group are likely not politically savvy and driven by emotion, but it still should be easy for them to understand that this would be a blunder.

Why?
First, by siding with Sadr they’d be obviously choosing a losing partner in the long run, and the bet on quick gains through a nationwide shock offensive is too much of a longshot stretch, with highly unpredictable outcome.
Second, and most important, is that former Sunni insurgent groups (the Islamic army being one of the most prominent), by turning against al-Qaeda, have already created for themselves better bargaining positions when it comes to negotiating the future distribution of power in the country with the government or the U.S.

It is close to impossible to truly gauge what the leaders of these groups are thinking because we still don’t have enough knowledge about the subtleties that underlie the relationships between the different factions within the Sunni insurgency in general, and the Islamic army in particular.
But we Iraqis need to stay alert, for something nasty might be brewing for us in Damascus.

Al-Qaeda in Iraq: Determined but Desperate

The latest three messages from al-Qaeda addressing the Sunni community uncover the depth of the crisis that al-Qaeda is facing in its former host community.
The threatening tone of the missives from the alleged Abu Omar Baghdadi and Aby Ayyub, and the insulting tone of the second by Zawahiri, reflect mistrust, anxiety and a dire need to retrieve what was lost.

Death threats do not represent a serious call for cooperation on an achievable objective. This “work-for-me-or-I-kill-you” tone is completely different from the usual recruiting slogans that have focused on the ideology of fighting for absolute truth against absolute evil.
Those slogans have failed, which is why they have been discarded and replaced by threats and an effort to seek out third parties to render verdicts on disagreements, which is what Baghdadi alluded to when he proposed that some (not all!) Sunni clerics come forward to mediate between al-Qaeda and the public.

This call for mediation indicates first, that al-Qaeda has lost direct contact with the public and second, that there are still some clerics involved with al-Qaeda.
This is the main reason why people have abandoned the Association of Muslim scholars and it’s also the reason that moderate Sunni clerics declare war on the organization.
This is also a reason for the conflict between some tribes with some members of the Islamic party. One suspects that a group of the party’s members are essentially stuck with al-Qaeda: they can’t walk away because of the incriminating evidence al-Qaeda has against them and could threaten to expose.

Of course the threatening messages had to be backed with action in order to be taken seriously; the bombings in Mosul, Anbar and Diyala served as the actual bloody part of the message.

Here we can note, however, that the act didn’t match the threat. Instead of killing security forces and “awakening” fighters only (whom al-Qaeda calls collaborators) the murderous crimes reached civilians who had nothing to do with the whole conflict. Although one attack targeted a funeral of two “awakening” members, the actual victims were noncombatant mourners.
These crimes demonstrate that the principles and values that al-Qaeda touted are false and that the old ways have failed. Otherwise al-Qaeda wouldn’t have switched to terrorizing fellow Sunnis instead of promising mansions in heaven and dozens of virgins.

It is worth noting a difference in style: while Baghdadi used threats, al-Zawahiri has instead resorted to insults. By asking “Are these Awakening Councils in need of someone to defend them and protect them?” al-Zawahiri is playing on the sensitivity of the issue of pride.
In Arabic, there are instances in which questions could serve as assertive statements, in this case an insulting one. Basically what he’s saying is “By seeking protection and cooperation from the US military you are behaving like helpless women and children”.

Such an insult directed against tribal warriors hardened by endless wars since 1980 to date could easily infuriate the target audience more than Baghdadi’s threats did.
It is likely the response of the people will be of the scale of al-Qaeda’s crimes and that blood will only bring blood. This is what we saw from the first reaction from sheik Ali Suleiman of the Duleim tribe (the most prominent tribe in Anbar) who said “we’re not going to let them walk out of our land alive” and called Baghdadi’s message “words of a mad man”. This last notion of madness technically indicates that what al-Qaeda is proposing is absolutely nonnegotiable; the sheik didn’t use words like unacceptable, inappropriate, too harsh, too arrogant; he simply called the proposal crazy.

Attacks on civilians are only going to make the “Awakening” warriors more determined to stand their ground and al-Qaeda is only going to get more solid resistance and more enmity from the people in return for keeping this course of action.
The bad news is that the timing of the newest message from Abu Ayyub suggests that Iraq is heading for tough times in the short term.
It appears that Abu Ayyub wants to synchronize his own campaign with that promised by Sadr.

They know that Iraqi army units have been pulled from Anbar and elsewhere to support the fight against Shia militias, meaning that escalation on a second front would make the job of the Iraqi and US military harder.
The messages in words and bombs indicate that al-Qaeda remains determined to fight on the Iraqi front, which Zawahiri once again called “the fortress” of al-Qaeda’s terror campaign and will keep directing resources towards this purpose.
But at the same time, the vocal anger and frustration reveal that al-Qaeda continues to lose allies and ground and that time on the long run is not on its side. Above all it means that those of us determined to fight terrorism must not lose resolve in this critical battle.

Al-Qaeda has made the Iraqi front its physical center of gravity, and so it’s exactly the place where we must fight, and win.

Iraq's Moment of Truth in Baghdad and Basra

The battle between criminal gangs and the state continues, yet the war is far from being over. Public statements keep coming from both sides and they don’t seem to promise a diplomatic resolution for the crisis.
The latest exchange included a pledge for a “final battle” by Sadr’s spokesman Bahaa Aaraji and an assertion by Maliki that the government will not stop pursuing gangs militarily and politically. Telling Sadr that his movement cannot take part in elections unless he disbands his militias and surrenders weapons is a turning point in Iraqi politics, especially because a broad political front including leading Sunni, Shia, and Kurdish powers emerged to back this new trend in dealing with this issue.

I think what encouraged Maliki to push the limits of the conflict to this unprecedented level was the first-of-a-kind success of the Political Council for National Security — an entity that includes the president, PM, and leaders of major parliamentary blocs — to reach consensus on a decision. This entity managed for the first time a week ago to overcome the impotence that had halted its mission since its inception. Evidence of the newfound potency of this entity is that Ayad Allawi, who had refused being part of it for a long time, is now sending delegates to negotiate terms for his membership.

The ongoing confrontation highlights a dramatic change in the inclination of the Iraqi leadership, which decided to face the challenge with unwavering resolve instead of shrinking away. We have learned from the experience of the last five years that unresolved fights tend to be very costly in the long run, as we will have to deal with recurrent fights over and over again. It can be understood from Maliki’s words that he came to realize that the decision to disband or exterminate illegal military entities should have been made a long time ago.

At this point neither side is happy with the results and I think that both have made up their minds to go to war because each one thinks his side is closer to winning and has greater backing from the public than his rival. However, I believe that Sadr is making the mistake of thinking that what worked for previous battles would be equally effective in future ones. I strongly think that if a final battle is to take place, it will unfold with a bitter defeat for Sadr militarily and politically; the balance of power by far favors the state in spite of the difficulty of the situation.

The Iraqi leadership represented by Maliki is standing before a historic opportunity to strengthen the foundations of the rule of law. This opportunity has been made available by the decision of the Shia to renounce and expel the extremists amongst them, a decision that was long avoided because of sectarian considerations that were proven wrong later.
Everyone has come to realize that allegiance to the country provides more security in the long run than sectarian entrenchment does, and in my opinion the awakening of the Iraqi west and the uprising against the perverted violent practices of co-religionists have provided an example for a similar awakening among the Shia — of course, with the main difference we outlined in an earlier post; that is, while in the west we had a tribal uprising against extremist religious powers, in the south the uprising is religious-on-religious, with the target highly identified with one particular group.

I believe that another promising sign further emphasizes, to the government and people alike, that putting sect and tribe above country is a bad idea. Today 1,300 police and soldiers who disobeyed orders or, worse, sided with the enemy in Basra will get to taste the consequences of that, the same way that the commanders who were in charge of recruiting them did.
This housecleaning is not limited to security forces; Maliki also issued an order to fire Habib Sadr, the director general of the Iraqi Media Network, obviously over the disgraceful coverage of the battle. I didn’t follow the coverage of Iraqiya TV, but there was a lot of misplaced sympathy for Sadr on the government-owned al-Sabah, and the reader could indeed feel that the network was apologizing for, if not defending, the militias.

Back to the awakening theme. In both cases, extremists did not look after their brethren and tried to impose their radical views and practices upon everyone else around them. That’s why although the sect was perceived as a source of security in the first place, people got to realize with time that those extremists who held the banner of the sect had a different agenda from the provision of security for their people.

No Iraqi leader since 2003 has had the same broad support for a policy that Maliki has right now. For the first time a leader has the support of a majority of Shia, along with the approval of the Sunni and Kurds in addition to the sympathy of the public, which has grown tired of the recklessness and violence of Sadr’s movement. For the first time the leader appears more like a leader of Iraq than a leader of a particular sect, party, or ethnic group. Moreover, he has won the support of the coalition to further build an unprecedented consensus among all concerned parties.
I see that Maliki and the government are standing before a chance that will not come again to move the country forward. I’m optimistic about Maliki’s promises and determination more than ever and I totally agree with him that the solution is in disbanding the Mahdi Army (or al-hal hoa al-hal; literally, “the solution is in the [dis]solution,” in a play on words of which Iraqis understand the implicit meaning).

Again, the main element in a resolution for the battle should not be exclusively military through disarming the Mahdi Army, nor exclusively political by excluding the movement from the political process. It has to be also judiciary.
The rule of law must be established and emphasized through prosecuting the heads of the movement who are involved in major atrocities. Evidence is abundant and damning; the movement repeatedly took up arms against the state and caused the deaths of many thousands of civilians and security personnel.
In fact the movement itself keeps offering free confessions every time they boast of their militiamen’s performance in battle. If we actually succeed in putting the leaders of the militia on trial, then I believe that all others who illegally carry arms will be facing a serious challenge. As the Arabic proverb says, “Hit the big and the little will be frightened.” Right now the Mahdi Army is the biggest among insurgents, so defeating it will make others think more than twice before they take up arms against the legitimate institutions of the state.

I hope the Iraqi leadership benefits from this moment of unity, not only to quell violence but also to promote political reconciliation. I agree with observers in Baghdad who say that we’re witnessing a political spring. The most important event so far has been Maliki’s meeting with VP Hashimi to discuss the revival of the national unity government. Actually, a political breakthrough is now more likely to take place than ever, especially since all rivals have acknowledged Maliki’s role as a leader of a central government that has the exclusive right, and the obligation, to restore the prestige of the state and establish the rule of law.
Again, it’s a great opportunity for making substantial progress in the process of building the state and we must not waste it.

Iraq: Whither Sadr and the Mahdi Army?

As fighting rages between government forces and Sadr’s militia in several cities, senior clerics from the hawza (senior Grand Ayatollahs) made a debut in the conflict.

Ayatollah Fadhil Al-Maliki issued a fatwa in which he openly called on police and army to abandon their duty, adding that operation Knights’ Charge is not targeting criminals but an aggression against “the majority of the Iraqi people.” Although there is news about a handful of soldiers and policemen abandoning their posts and joining the militia, this fatwa is not going to have a significant effect on operations. However it’s a reminder that there are still people who bet on fatwas as long as some are willing to offer allegiance to the sect instead of the country.

This fatwa revives the old conflict over legitimacy between the ethnic Arab and foreign clerics of the hawza. The former, like Ayatollah Al-Maliki or Sadr himself, accuse non-Arab clerics like Sistani of leading a “Hawza Samita” or a silent hawza in the face of what Sadr considers injustice and tyranny.
Iran, on the other hand and as we predicted yesterday, chose not to endorse Sadr’s position and did nothing more than issue a call through Ahmed Jannati, chief of the Guardians Council, for negotiations between Sadr and the government to resolve the crisis.

On the field, as fighting spread to include Karbala province, Sadrists rejected Maliki’s call to lay down their weapons and said they’d do that only surrender their weapons to a government that “fights the occupation”. Putting such an unrealistic condition is synonymous to “we will never lay down our weapons”. This defiance is logical from their perspective that is based on force and in order to justify the use of force they need to find a pretext—and what’s better than claiming to be fighting for the cause of national liberation!?

The clashes were not limited to the streets of Basra, the halls of the parliament saw some fighting as well, but in the form of fist-fights between Sadrist MPs and their counterparts from the other parties in the UIA. The UIA and Kurdish bloc walked out of last evening’s emergency session after an intense verbal exchange among some MPs developed into a fist fight, the chief of the UIA bloc Jalal al-Din Saghier told Radio Sawa.
The parliament as usual decided to form a committee to deal with the situation—a move to save face, no more; in Iraq we have a joke that says “if you want to not solve an issue, let a committee take care of it”.
Again, as predicted in an earlier post, Sadrists have approached tribal leaders and clerics and asked them to mediate between them and the government. The prince of the giant Rabi’a tribe will lead a delegation to negotiate a solution with the government.

Last but not least, it’s good to finally hear Maliki acknowledge the danger that Sadr’s militia pose to the country. Saying that Shia militias are “worse than al-Qaeda” signifies the ferocity of the battle and the enormous pressure it applies on the government. It makes me optimistic that the leadership has realized the extent and nature of the threat. In fact I hope that my expectation of a truce that spares the heads of evil proves wrong. Avoiding taking a battle to the end could cost us several times the price in recurrent outbreaks of violence.

While most influential parties seem to be in favor of the crackdown on Mahdi army (including Kurds who view Sadr as an obstacle to establishing the federal system that would grant them control over Kirkuk. Also recall that Masoud Barazani was so vocal in expressing his hostility to Sadr back in late 2003 when he was temporary president of the GC) Sadr’s old ally Ibrahim Jaafari stepped forward to call for an end to the fighting and to accept the Sadrists back in the political process. The statement was described by Maliki’s advisor Sami Askari as “inappropriate and meaningless“.

But ironically a similar call came from Adnan Duleimi of the Sunni Accord Front. In my opinion this came out of Duleimi’s concern about maintaining the balance of power among Shia parties—a Da’wa and SIIC with near absolute power in the center and south would put more power at the disposal of these parties in Baghdad with federalism again being the central issue.

I was going to stop here but now I see that Sadr finally decided to break his silence and make the first public appearance in several months. While the location of the interview remains undisclosed, the fact that he was interviewed by Ghassan Bin Jidou suggests that he’s either in Iran or is enjoying the generous hospitality of his Lebanese twin Nesrallah (can anyone check the recent stamps on Bin Jidou’s passport?).

I want to end this by saying that if we put together Sadr’s words that he’s in control of the Mahdi army and Maliki’s words that Shia militias are worse than al-Qaeda then the logical conclusion should be that Sadr must be dealt with in the same manner in which we deal with terrorist chiefs when we spot them.

Behind the Bloodshed in Basra

One of the most notable things about the fierce and bloody confrontation taking place the government and Sadr’s militia is the spin on the operation by the commanders and the government; that it is a crackdown on outlaws with emphasis that the operation targets no particular movement or political line.
This generic label, includes the so-called rogue Sadrists. Sadr announced only weeks ago that whoever doesn’t uphold the ceasefire would no longer be considered a member of the movement.

Now, Sadr is watching those rogue elements being hit hard by the government forces. Instead of disavowing those who blatantly disobeyed his ceasefire orders we see him call for negotiations and condemning the government, thus once more revealing his real face as a defender of his own version of terrorism.
Another important dimension in this confrontation, largely ignored, regards Sadr’s rhetoric about security situation in Basra. The anti-Multinational Force powers always blamed British troops for insecurity in the province prior to their withdrawal.

Now it must be asked in a loud clear voice - who’s responsible for insecurity now that British troops are gone?
Another important aspect of this operation is the excessive enthusiasm of the UIA-led government in striking the Sadrists, who are supposed to be part of the UIA and are also Shiites.

This is the first sign of the rising election fever in the south. Word on the street is that Sadrists want to hijack the provincial elections. Everybody knows that their criminal methods can severely reduce the chances for holding fair elections and may grant Sadr’s people huge gains at the expense of other Shiite factions such as the SIIC, Da’wa and Fadheela. The stakes are high for the SIIC in particular whose federal dream in the south, which Sadr is opposed to, hinges on the results of provincial elections.
If Sadr is to be cut down to size before the provincial election law can be passed, presumably his rivals would be able to compete in a relatively more civil way.
The outcome of this operation in my opinion will not involve the extermination of Sadr’s militia but rather the reduction of its power.
A truce would then be put in place with mediation by senior clerics, tribal leaders and third-party politicians.

But this would be a mistake - similar to former interim prime minister Allawi’s when he didn’t finish the job back in Najaf four years ago, except that the situation is more complicated this time as both belligerents are from the UIA.
Why? Because leaders like Saddam, Nasrallah and Sadr always manage to turn defeat into symbolic victory for domestic consumption. If Sadr and a decent part of the movement’s command survive this round, he will portray his movement as an innocent victim of the “occupation and its agents” and will use this for an even louder propaganda campaign after the battle.
Those killed in the fighting are poor unfortunate followers, but the real outlaws, the heads of the movement, will likely escape punishment.

Just like Desert Storm or the summer 2006 Lebanon war, the survival of the leader can easily become synonymous to victory in their twisted dictionary.
And let’s not forget Iran. Its role in this chapter of the struggle for power in the south is still unclear to observers. Both sides of the conflict are friends of Iran, yet I think Iran will support the SIIC and prime minister Maliki this time.
It appears, for now, that Iran has begun to abandon this undisciplined movement. Iran has learned over time that Sadr’s militia, although powerful in some regions, is reckless and unpredictable - unlike the rest of the UIA which is consistent and organized in utilizing the power granted to them as the biggest party in the government to their advantage.

It is true that the grand strategies of Tehran and Sadr are quite the same when it comes to their ambitions in spreading their version of totalitarian Shia Islamism in the region. However, Sadr’s ambitious aspirations are not in harmony with Tehran’s tactical plans. He rejects a federal system in Iraq because he wants to control the whole country, while Iran at this stage is only looking forward to having an ally in a stable Iraqi south.

This is why supporting the SIIC makes more sense for Iran as the most reliable party that may be able to make the autonomous region in the south a reality—a reality in which Iran has a strategic interest, as it can turn the south into a friendly buffer zone instead of a thorn in its side.

Iraqis and US Presidential Elections

While common sense suggests that Iraq would be very interested in the U.S. presidential race — given the immense influence of U.S. decision-making on the situation in the country — we see that the local media in Iraq have largely been ignoring the developments of the Democratic and Republican primaries. Moreover, we have hardly heard any comments from the political class, and the average person on the street is not as interested about the American election as they were in 2004.

What could be the reasons for this?

The first, I believe, is that the clock in Baghdad ticks slower than the clock in Washington. It’s very likely that the media and politicians are not yet interested in the American election simply because there’s still plenty of time left until Americans get to make their final decision. Meanwhile, everyone in Iraq is busy living with immediate domestic challenges and issues of daily life.

There are, however, other likely reasons for the country’s lack of interest. The political class, for example, is perhaps reluctant to endorse or oppose any of the three candidates. This is a natural defense mechanism. They don’t want to throw in their lot with one candidate and then have to deal with a winner they opposed. That would be a great political risk to take for any Iraqi politician or party, especially since the Iraqi election is only 12 months after the American one. The media, being largely reflective of the viewpoints of the government or political parties outside the government, are expected then to exhibit the same kind of behavior in order not to undermine their political sponsors or affiliates.

While I expect the silence of the media and politicians to last through the coming months, the average Iraqi will begin to get more and more interested in the subject. From previous experience, I believe this will become visible once there are only two candidates competing for the presidency. That’s when the clock will — finally — start ticking in Baghdad.

No opinion polls have been conducted to see which of the three candidates (McCain, Clinton, Obama) is viewed most favorably by Iraqis. If I were to try to predict their feelings, I’d start by restating the fact that most Iraqis are concerned first and foremost about their living conditions — economy, security, water, electricity — and they care primarily about coming up with solutions to these problems. Iraqis have also come to realize that their problems are essentially domestic, arising from the struggle among political powers. These in turn are complicated by regional interference, which is most of the time permitted by those very same political powers.
Therefore, the solution has to come from within, and from within only. Yet we cannot ignore that this requires a foreign factor represented by the American presence. This presence is the only hope for creating the environment under which the solution from within can be reached. This is exactly the rationale for the surge, of which McCain has been one of the strongest proponents, if not its main architect.

While many Iraqis may be oblivious to that last fact, I believe there’s wide agreement that Iraq still needs America’s commitment to the democratic project in the country. Perhaps this belief is more prevalent among ordinary people than it is among politicians, particularly those who aren’t sincerely interested in the idea of a unified state. Those politicians, while still more or less silent, view the American presence as a restraint to their ambitions in the long run. They feel they have mustered the tools of power that would enable them to survive and prevail against their rivals — including the not-yet-strong central government in Baghdad — if they enter a struggle to realize their ambitions of walking away with a big enough chunk of the country; the SIIC of Hakim embodies this trend. There are also the Kurdish leaders who are growing more dissatisfied with the current administration’s “complicity” in Turkey’s operations in Kurdistan and are receiving American criticism for the undemocratic way in which they’ve been running their political parties and the Kurdish region so far.

In contrast with ordinary people — or at least with the predicted opinion of ordinary people — these two groups of politicians would rather see an administration that wants to walk away from the problem than one that wants to solve the problem.
This has encouraged Republican leaders, in particular John McCain, to visit Baghdad to negate the state of reluctance that accompanies the waiting for the American election results. This state of reluctance and the delay in passing laws are not good for the democratic process as a whole.

Visits like this, with the absence of similar visits from Democrats, have two dimensions: first, they push the political process in Iraq in order to achieve stability there, which would help the Republicans in the elections. Second, it makes Iraqi politicians and the public understand that a change in the administration does not necessarily mean abandoning Iraq and the immediate withdrawal of troops from the country. The Iraqi government has to work on these basics instead of standing by idly and wasting precious time.

Al-Qaeda in Iraq's New Sponsor: Libya

After Iran, Syria and others it's now Libya's turn to sponsor terrorism in Iraq.
The news popped up for a second then it vanished; Gaddafi's son is accused by senior awakening officials in Anbar of funding and sending a group of foreign terrorists to Iraq. This particular group, awakening leaders believe, was responsible for the explosives cache that caused the devastating explosion in Mosul last week.

Col. Jubair Rashid Naief, who also is a police official in Anbar province, said those attacks were carried out by the Seifaddin Regiment, made up of about 150 foreign and Iraqi fighters who slipped into the country several months ago from Syria.
Naief said the regiment, which is working with al-Qaida in Iraq, was supported by Seif al-Islam Gadhafi, 36, the eldest son of the Libyan leader.
"I am sure of what I am talking about, and it is documented," Naief said, adding that he was "100 percent sure" of the younger Gadhafi's role with the terror group.

Does this not deserve thorough investigation?

We shouldn't be surprised to see young Gaddafi being accused of sponsoring terrorism in Iraq, not should we be surprised if he turns out to be actually involved in sponsoring that "battalion" of terrorists. The dictators of the Middle East have a long-established trend of sponsoring terrorism and provoking chaos in any relevant, or irrelevant, part of the world they have access to. The 2nd half of the 20th century was full of examples of this sort; Saddam funding insurgents in Chad, Egypt becoming part of a civil war in Yemen, Tunisia hosting the PLO, Saddam providing shelter for Dzhokhar Dudayev in 1993, and the list goes long.

However, I am very surprised that this news is being bizarrely ignored by the media.
Did the world get so used to the idea of terror-sponsoring regimes interfering sending death and murderers to Iraq, or did the world get so used to hearing about terrorist attacks in Iraq that an incident like this one is "just another bombing"?

I think this is a case that deserves a lot of attention and some serious investigation; maybe just as much attention as political assassinations in Lebanon have been getting.

On the one hand the accusation should be taken seriously simply because the accused-and his father- have the motive, the tools and a fairly long record of employing terrorism.
Gaddafi's regime is hardcore anti-American so there's every reason to think the regime would try to strike America's interest and efforts in Iraq. Although the tone changed since 2003 but I strongly doubt he did deep down. Gaddafi has also long treated Iraq as an enemy and he, along with Syria, were the only Arab regimes that were Iran's allies during the eight year war.
Moreover, there's a good reason to think that Gaddafi's son, Saif al-Islam want to take revenge upon America, and what's a better place than Iraq to do this!
Remember that his sister was killed in the US air strike on their home in the mid 1980s when he was still a teenager and I don’t think he forgot about it.

On the other hand, the awakening councils should be taken seriously when it comes to the intelligence they gather and offer. First and foremost the reason behind their success in Anbar was mostly their ability to gather and utilize reliable intelligence. The awakening fighters don't have the firepower, technology, training or discipline of organized armies yet they made huge success against al-Qaeda. The only asset I can think of that enabled them to do so is intelligence.
Let's not forget that those fighters were until recently close to, if not part of the network that includes al-Qaeda so it's not unlikely that some of them had access to information about operations and movements that are taking place just now. It's logical to think that terrorists would abort missions whose details have been compromised but the different times at which former insurgents split from al-Qaeda to join the awakening and the quick pace of changes on the ground provides room for confusion and mistakes.

One more important finding makes my suspicion stronger. Could it be a coincidence that the percentage that Libyan nationals make up of total foreign terrorists has spiked during 2007? According to recently captured documents that US military captured in Sinjar, a town west of Mosul, one fifth of foreign fighters who came to Iraq between in the year leading to August 2007 were Libyan nationals. Or could be another coincidence that Libya covertly sponsored a satellite TV channel in Iraq that was going to launch in late 2006, the same time the Libyan "surge" started? This is a new and surprising figure that suggests that there's an organized effort to recruit and send fighters from Libya to Iraq; an effort not easy to undertake in a repressive police state unless someone above the law is involved.

I think the least thing to do is to make sure that as operations in Mosul proceed and suspects and enemy fighters are captured that interrogators dig for information about Gaddafi's son involvement. Another thing that we can do would be to go back and interrogate all militants and suspects that were captured in and around Mosul since the estimated time of arrival of the "battalion" the awakening official mentioned.

The truth must be discovered and the criminals, whoever they are, must be exposed and made an example so that others think twice before trying to do the same.

Hello my friends! We feel terrible about not writing anything all this time.
Mohammed and I are both doing fine, I'm doing fine at school as well, my grades from the first semester weren't exactly impressive but I'm quite satisfied given it was the first semester and I had to adjust to a completely new system.

First of all we want to thank all the friends who sent emails checking on us; thank you guys! That was really sweet of you.
We can't make promises about writing more regularly except that we will try. You know, we both live far away from Iraq now and far away from each other as well while in the first four years of blogging we used to work as a team from the same spot; watching the same news, touring the same streets and witnessing the same events firsthand, so it's a big challenge to operate effectively when all of those things are no longer possible, but we'll see…

Now I just want to make a quick comment on a resurfacing story, which is the Lancet study.
Our friends at Iraqi bloggers central emailed me saying that the study has recently been proven wrong and wondered if the Iraqi bloggers who attacked us over our criticism of the study would apologize now since we were right in our criticism.

Frankly I neither need nor expect an apology. The people who deserve a sincere apology are Iraqis as a whole, especially those who are still inside. They deserve an apology from this group of bloggers who so much wanted to believe that an additional half a million of them were dead just to support their view of the war.

Ok, that's all I have to say for now. At least you can have a new fresh thread to post your comments because the number in the last one is getting ridiculous!