This morning, Al-Sabah had the exclusive right to publish the current draft of the constitution.
This draft will be submitted to the national Assembly to get the Assembly's approval before putting it to the October referendum.
Of course the draft is tool long to fully translate and it would've taken me a few more days to do that so I have chosen the most important parts of it and translated them.
Here are they for you to read:
*Words in between brackets are still not agreed upon by all members of the CDC.
*My comments are in Italics.
Section One:
Fundamental principles:
1-the republic of Iraq (the Islamic, federal) is a sovereign, independent country and the governing system is a democratic, republican, federal one.
The Islamic republic of Iraq!? NO WAY.
2-Islam is the official religion of the state and it is the main source of legislations and it is not allowed to make laws that contradict the fundamental teachings of Islam and its rules (the ones agreed upon by all Muslims) and this constitution shall preserve the Islamic identity of the majority of the Iraqi people (with its Shea't majority and its Sunni component) and respect the rights of all other religions.
This is the deadliest point if approved; Islam or any religion cannot and must not be the main source of legislation.
3-The Iraqi community is made of two main ethnicities; these are Arabic and Kurdish and of other main ethnicities; these are Turkmen, Chalideans, Assyrian, Armenian, Shabak and (Persian) and Yazidi and Mendayeen, all of which are equal in rights and duties of citizenship.
Why is it that no one heard of this ethnic component before? Or at least lets say that no one heard them (if they exsited) say that they want to be recognized as Persian Iraqis!
4-Arabic language is the official language of the Iraqi state and Kurdish language is (together with Arabic) the official language in the region of Kurdistan and for the central government, regions and provinces have the right to choose any local language as an additional official language if the majority of its citizens approved the choice in a referendum.
5-The Iraqi state is part of the Islamic and Arabic worlds or (the Iraqi state is a founding member of the Arab league and the Islamic conference organization).
Do we really need to put that in the constitution? After all, our "Muslim and Arab brothers" brought us nothing but troubles.
6-Sovereignty is for the law and the people is the source of authorities, practicing it through direct general secret voting (or by secret direct voting and referendum) and through its constitutional institutions.
8-The Iraqi state is one entity in land, people and sovereignty.
9-The family is the bas of the community and the state preserves the family's genuine Iraqi identity that is based on patriot, religious and ethical values and the state also is responsible for protecting maternity and childhood and looks after the youths and provide the appropriate environment to assure the development of their skills and capabilities.
I don't know for sure what they mean by saying "the state preserves the family's genuine Iraqi identity that is based on patriot, religious and ethical values" but it doesn't sound great anyway
10-Basic freedoms and rights that are stated in the constitution are granted for everyone and no law that undermines them shall be made (to be attached to no 2).
11-All ideologies that include racism, terrorism and "takfir" (or promote or publicize these concepts) are banned and especially the Saddmist Ba'ath and this one cannot be part of the political plurality of the state.
12-Internal and foreign relationship of the Iraqi state are to be built on principles of peace and cooperation with all nations, especially the neighboring ones.
13-Iraqi state commits to the international treaties unless if this could result in a conflict with this constitution.
14-Iraqi armed forces in all their forms and systems are part of the Iraqi people resembles it ethnic, religious and sectarian composition.
These forces are under the command of the civil authorities. Its duty is to defend the Iraqi state and must not interfere with political affairs and has no role in transition of power.
Using these forces in oppressing the Iraqi people is banned.
15-the religious references (the clergy) enjoys its independence and advisory position as a highly valued religious and national symbol (there are some reservations on this clause).
16-Holy places and shrines in the Iraqi state possess a legal character for what they represent as religious and cultural beings and the state has to preserve their sacredness and to protect the freedom of practicing ceremonies in these holy places.
17-the center of Baghdad is the capital of the Iraqi state.
Designating another city as a capital is possible under a special legislation.
18-The flag of the state, national and religious holidays are to be chosen and identified according to a law.
Section Two
Basic rights and public freedoms
1-All Iraqis are equal before the law regardless of gender, race, color, opinion, religion, sect or belief and discrimination based on these differences is prohibited.
2-Every Iraq has the right to live and be safe and enjoy freedom and privacy and it is not allowed to deprive any individual of these rights unless in accordance with the law and after a judicial order from a specialized judicial authority.
3-All Iraqis are to have equal opportunities in accordance with the law.
4/a-Iraqi nationality is a right for every Iraqi and a citizen may not be stripped of this nationality for any reason.
It is the foundation of the individual's citizenship and the source of his rights and duties and a citizen has the right to claim it back if it was taken from him.
Having more than one nationality is allowed.
4/b-The Iraqi is everyone born for Iraqi parents and a non-Iraqi women married to an Iraqi man has the right to claim Iraqi nationality after staying for 5 continuous years in Iraq after the marriage.
4/c-Iraqi nationality must not be granted for political reasons or in any way that could change the demography of the state.
4/d-The related processes are to be regulated by laws.
5-It is not allowed to exile an Iraqi citizen from his country and he cannot be prohibited from traveling inside or inside Iraq.
6-The state protects the basic rights of women including equality with men in accordance to the Islamic share'at and the state helps the women in creating balance between their duties within their families and their duties within the community.
Equality according to Islamic Share'at? Thia is totally new to me!
7/b-It is prohibited to employ children in demeaning jobs or in any job that does not suit their ages.
The state has to take enough measures to protect children
8-Private property is a protected right and every Iraqi has the right to use, invest and benefit from this property according to the law.
Private property cannot be confiscated unless for a case that serves public benefits and only after paying a fast and sufficient compensation.
9-Human freedom and dignity are protected by the law and no one can be arrested or interrogated unless by judicial orders.
All sorts of physical and mental torture or inhuman treatment are prohibited and any confession made under torture or threats is of no judicial value and those who have their rights violated have the right to as for to be compensated for the damage that was inflicted.
10-Papers of preliminary interrogation must be submitted to the specialized judge within 24 hours after the arrest is made and this 24 hour period is subject to renewal for one time only and for the same duration.
11-Every person has the right to express his opinion in any means granted by the law provided that order and ethics are not breached.
The state provides the following:
a-The freedom of press, journalism, advertising and peaceful demonstrations.
b-The freedom to establish organizations, political parties and union as well as the freedom of joining these entities.
12-The freedom of belief and religion is protected and so is the freedom to practice them in accordance with the law provided that the practice does not violate order and ethics.
13-Every person has the right to enjoy personal privacy and this includes:
a-The privacy of homes is protected and it's forbidden to search or enter homes unless in accordance with the law.
b-Conventional mail, E mails, faxes and phones are to remain secret and private and they must not be monitored unless there's a judicial or security need for that.
14/a-Crimes and punishments are to be defined only by the law.
b-The judiciary is independent and is liable to nothing but the law.
15-Every one has the right to claim justice in a court of law.
16-The right of defense is protected in all stages of trials.
17-The defendant is innocent until he's found guilty in a court of law.
18-Trilas are public unless otherwise stated by the court.
19-A defendant may not be tried for the same charge more than once unless new evidence appeared and no punishment harsher than the one valid at the time of committing the crime can be imposed.
20-Punishment is restricted to the criminal.
22-No law functions in a retrograde way unless otherwise stated by the law.
23-the defendant may not be forced to give a statement for any reason.
24-The court appoints a lawyer for the defendant and on the state's expense if the defendant was not able to pay for a lawyer.
25-The best law for the defendant is to be used.
27/b-The establishment of civil society organizations is prohibited if these organizations could harm the community.
The formation of militias or paramilitary organizations is prohibited whether they were in secret or in public.
Full document in Arabic.
This was all I could translate in the time I had and I guess this is what Iraqis care about most.
The parts I left are talking about the relationship between the regions/counties and the central administartion and other subjects like the rules for nominating the members of the supreme court and the duties of the different components of the government and these I will probably translate later.
Now back to what I think of this draft,
Although this document will be subject to further negotiations and modifications, my first look at it made me decide that I'm going to say "NO" to this constitution.
Islam has been introduced in many clauses and not only Islam, sectarianism was introduced into the draft in a disgusting way and frankly speaking, such things will make me feel so unsafe if results of the referendum came positive for this draft.
However, what eases my worries is that we're going to have the chance to say "YES" or "NO" and all of us know that it's much better to allow this critical step to take the time it needs than to end up with a useless (or even harmful) constitution.
And anyway, even this draft is way better than the 'no constitution' state we lived in for decades.
The other reassuring factor here is that amendments can be done two years after the constitution is 1st approved and then once again four years after that.
We have fought for a long time to reach the point where we can write a constitution that serves our needs and protects our future from oppression and dictatorship.
I say it once again, we're practicing AND learning democracy at the same time and the people may be fooled once but they can't be fooled all the time.
New points of view about the future of Iraq and the Middle East.
Showing posts sorted by relevance for query B-1. Sort by date Show all posts
Showing posts sorted by relevance for query B-1. Sort by date Show all posts
Tuesday, July 26, 2005
Friday, December 10, 2010
The National Council for Strategic Policies
The most recent draft of the legislation to govern the proposed National Council for Strategic Policies (NCSP) leaked to an Iraqi news website yesterday. This is the body which Ayad Allawi is supposed to chair under the deal between him, Barzani and Maliki. Allawi has set this as the condition for his bloc's participation in Maliki's government. The parliment is supposed to vote on this next week.
Here's my rather quick, not so fancy translation:
The structure of the Council
A. The presidency of the council: Consists of the president of the council and the secretary general.
B. The members of the council: Include the president of the republic and his deputies, the presidency of the parliament, the presidency of the federation council, the PM, his deputies, the presidents of federal regions, and the president of the supreme judicial council.
C. Participants in the council meetings: concerned ministers, by invitation from the presidency of the council. Those ministers do not have the right to vote.
D. Advisors and experts.
E. Administrative staff.
F. Independent budget.
G. The council is part of the executive branch and its president has a rank equivalent to the Prime Minister.
H. The ministers are required to attend meetings concerning their specialties, without affecting their work at the council of ministers.
I. The Council has the right to appoint advisors in various fields of expertise as needed.
J. The Council is the place where the three branches of government work in cohesion in an integrated manner to build the state. The Council is not a replacement for either branch.
The functions of the council:
1. Domestic policies:
Achieving national reconciliation and supervising its implementation. Repatriation of refugees and internally displaced people, and compensating them in a manner commensurate with damages and suffering. Expediting the processing of detainees and the release of the innocent. Dealing with the decisions of the Justice and Accountability Committee within the judicial framework and recommending that the Parliament close this file. Building a common vision for constitutional amendments to overcome previous loopholes and improve the efficiency of the political system.
2. Foreign policy:
Preparing the prerequisites for:
a. regaining Iraq’s status within the Arab and Islamic community.
b. creating constructive relations with the regional and international surroundings.
c. removing Iraq from under Chapter VII of the UN charter.
3. Monetary and economic policy:
Planning national strategies for various economic activities to secure prosperity and decent living standards for the people. Adopting specific guidelines and standards for achieving sound economic growth and harmony between federal budget allocations and the priorities of the strategic goals and the investment and development plans and programs.
4. Security and military policies:
Planning the high strategic policies for Iraq’s internal and external security. To secure Iraq’s stability and the nation’s ability to deter and defend against any aggression. These policies include the following areas:
a. Defense policy
b. Armed forces buildup
c. Military doctrine
d. Procurement policy
e. Training doctrines
f. Military service policy
g. Unit deployment
h. Force employment
i. Internal security policy (nationwide)
j. Command structure, and defining powers and responsibilities (supreme commander, commander in chief, defense minister, interior minister, chairman of the join chiefs)
k. Intelligence strategy, and coordinating the functions of the different intelligence agencies
5. Oil, Gas and Electricity policy:
Establish a special commission, attached to the Council, to be comprised of experts, as well as the ministries of oil, electricity and water resources. The commission’s function is to review the principles and foundations of contracts and agreements, to make amendments to traties, and to expedite the drafting of the oil and gas law, and any other legislations, prior to sending them to the parliament.
6. Administrative policy:
Amending the CPA-issued Inspector General law. The Council also plays a role in planning and overseeing the execution of high policies for the preservation of national culture, heritage, and education.
7. Policies concerning the sovereignty and integrity of the judiciary:
Preparing a list of priorities to enact the necessary legislations, in coordination with the council of ministers. Evaluating the framework of active laws and legislations to identify and address weaknesses. Abolishing legislations, rules and regulations that were made by the former regime.
8. Constitutional amendments:
Building a common vision for constitutional amendments to overcome previous loopholes and improve the efficiency of the political system and support the nation’s stability (examples include the dispute over the definition of the “largest bloc”, fluid timetables for transfer of power, etc).
9. National priorities:
Since the Council deals with the highest policies of the nation, the matter requires adopting the following pattern:
1. Defining the concept of national reconciliation
2. Defining the objectives that must be met to achieve national reconciliation
3. Designing the grand strategy (the policies required to achieve the objectives), by defining the tasks, assigning duties, timeframes, alternatives, etc.
10. General considerations:
a. This Council does not act against the constitution
b. Technical meetings shall be held with concerned ministers and advisers.
c. The political meetings of the Council are convened by the presence of the members as explained above above.
d. The duties, specialties and decision-making mechanism are to be decided, and shall become part of the Council’s internal charter.
e. This Council is established by law for one electoral cycle, and may be extended for more than one cycle according to future agreements among the members of the council of representatives.
f. The decisions and recommendations of the Council are binding to all concerned entities.
g. The Council reserves the right to establish permanent or temporary commissions or workgroups to address specific issues.
Here's my rather quick, not so fancy translation:
The National Council for Strategic Policies
The structure of the Council
A. The presidency of the council: Consists of the president of the council and the secretary general.
B. The members of the council: Include the president of the republic and his deputies, the presidency of the parliament, the presidency of the federation council, the PM, his deputies, the presidents of federal regions, and the president of the supreme judicial council.
C. Participants in the council meetings: concerned ministers, by invitation from the presidency of the council. Those ministers do not have the right to vote.
D. Advisors and experts.
E. Administrative staff.
F. Independent budget.
G. The council is part of the executive branch and its president has a rank equivalent to the Prime Minister.
H. The ministers are required to attend meetings concerning their specialties, without affecting their work at the council of ministers.
I. The Council has the right to appoint advisors in various fields of expertise as needed.
J. The Council is the place where the three branches of government work in cohesion in an integrated manner to build the state. The Council is not a replacement for either branch.
The functions of the council:
1. Domestic policies:
Achieving national reconciliation and supervising its implementation. Repatriation of refugees and internally displaced people, and compensating them in a manner commensurate with damages and suffering. Expediting the processing of detainees and the release of the innocent. Dealing with the decisions of the Justice and Accountability Committee within the judicial framework and recommending that the Parliament close this file. Building a common vision for constitutional amendments to overcome previous loopholes and improve the efficiency of the political system.
2. Foreign policy:
Preparing the prerequisites for:
a. regaining Iraq’s status within the Arab and Islamic community.
b. creating constructive relations with the regional and international surroundings.
c. removing Iraq from under Chapter VII of the UN charter.
3. Monetary and economic policy:
Planning national strategies for various economic activities to secure prosperity and decent living standards for the people. Adopting specific guidelines and standards for achieving sound economic growth and harmony between federal budget allocations and the priorities of the strategic goals and the investment and development plans and programs.
4. Security and military policies:
Planning the high strategic policies for Iraq’s internal and external security. To secure Iraq’s stability and the nation’s ability to deter and defend against any aggression. These policies include the following areas:
a. Defense policy
b. Armed forces buildup
c. Military doctrine
d. Procurement policy
e. Training doctrines
f. Military service policy
g. Unit deployment
h. Force employment
i. Internal security policy (nationwide)
j. Command structure, and defining powers and responsibilities (supreme commander, commander in chief, defense minister, interior minister, chairman of the join chiefs)
k. Intelligence strategy, and coordinating the functions of the different intelligence agencies
5. Oil, Gas and Electricity policy:
Establish a special commission, attached to the Council, to be comprised of experts, as well as the ministries of oil, electricity and water resources. The commission’s function is to review the principles and foundations of contracts and agreements, to make amendments to traties, and to expedite the drafting of the oil and gas law, and any other legislations, prior to sending them to the parliament.
6. Administrative policy:
Amending the CPA-issued Inspector General law. The Council also plays a role in planning and overseeing the execution of high policies for the preservation of national culture, heritage, and education.
7. Policies concerning the sovereignty and integrity of the judiciary:
Preparing a list of priorities to enact the necessary legislations, in coordination with the council of ministers. Evaluating the framework of active laws and legislations to identify and address weaknesses. Abolishing legislations, rules and regulations that were made by the former regime.
8. Constitutional amendments:
Building a common vision for constitutional amendments to overcome previous loopholes and improve the efficiency of the political system and support the nation’s stability (examples include the dispute over the definition of the “largest bloc”, fluid timetables for transfer of power, etc).
9. National priorities:
Since the Council deals with the highest policies of the nation, the matter requires adopting the following pattern:
1. Defining the concept of national reconciliation
2. Defining the objectives that must be met to achieve national reconciliation
3. Designing the grand strategy (the policies required to achieve the objectives), by defining the tasks, assigning duties, timeframes, alternatives, etc.
10. General considerations:
a. This Council does not act against the constitution
b. Technical meetings shall be held with concerned ministers and advisers.
c. The political meetings of the Council are convened by the presence of the members as explained above above.
d. The duties, specialties and decision-making mechanism are to be decided, and shall become part of the Council’s internal charter.
e. This Council is established by law for one electoral cycle, and may be extended for more than one cycle according to future agreements among the members of the council of representatives.
f. The decisions and recommendations of the Council are binding to all concerned entities.
g. The Council reserves the right to establish permanent or temporary commissions or workgroups to address specific issues.
Thursday, February 15, 2007
Operation Baghdad Update.
After being technically in progress for about over a week, Operation Imposing the Law officially started yesterday.
Al-Maliki who's been on a tour in the mid-southern region announced the beginning of the operation from Kerbala. This choice I think delivers two messages; first it looks that Maliki was trying to show that the plan is solid enough and could go on without his immediate supervision and presence in Baghdad and that the military commanders are operating without interference from politicians. And second I think he wanted to say that even though the focus has been in Baghdad for months, the situation elsewhere was not ignored; and this part could be seen in the tough-worded warnings he made to local officials and militants alike.
First he gave militants in Kerbala 48 hours to disarm or face the consequences and then turned to the local officials and told them if they couldn't do their job right they'd better step down and let someone better take their place.
The Kerbala provincial administration's reputation isn't quite impressive when it comes to corruption and involvement in violence and Maliki didn't forget to give a stern warning against corruption calling corruption a crime just as serious as terrorism.
Back in Baghdad the most significant raid conducted yesterday was the one on Buratha mosque, one of the most important Shia mosques in Baghdad which is also considered a SCIRI territory.
The raid ended without blood but the preacher of the mosque, a lawmaker from the SCIRI, expressed his dismay about the raid "because it was American soldiers who searched the mosque" and this seems to be one of the changes in rules of engagement. I recall that there was some kind of a rule that said only Iraqi soldiers or police were allowed to walk into places of worship while American troops would have to stay outside.
This raid too is of political significance as it can be used to prove to that the operation is impartial and not directed against one sect without the other.
On the streets, checkpoints and roadblocks are becoming increasingly serious and strict in doing their job; soldiers and policemen are sparing no vehicles or convoys from searching and I personally saw a case yesterday where an ambulance driver tried to rush his vehicle through a checkpoint but the soldiers ordered him to stop and let him pass only after they checked the inside of the vehicle finding only a civilian medical emergency.
Strict checkpoints always mean slow traffic and inconvenient delays for Baghdadis but this downside is welcome when these security measures make the streets safer.
Despite the traffic jams and though this is the largest deployment for troops in the capital, daily life and civilian activity-contrary to what was expected-still continues at a rather normal level, unlike previous crackdowns where life came to near paralysis.
Meanwhile a new bird appeared in the sky; not exactly new but one that's been absent for a long time; since the end of major operations in 2003.
In fact this is the first time ever that I see the B-1 flying over Baghdad. Since Tuesday, the long-range huge bomber appeared several times over the city spending as long as 75 minutes in some cases. Unfortunately with only 3x zoom this is the closest I could get.
Al-Maliki who's been on a tour in the mid-southern region announced the beginning of the operation from Kerbala. This choice I think delivers two messages; first it looks that Maliki was trying to show that the plan is solid enough and could go on without his immediate supervision and presence in Baghdad and that the military commanders are operating without interference from politicians. And second I think he wanted to say that even though the focus has been in Baghdad for months, the situation elsewhere was not ignored; and this part could be seen in the tough-worded warnings he made to local officials and militants alike.
First he gave militants in Kerbala 48 hours to disarm or face the consequences and then turned to the local officials and told them if they couldn't do their job right they'd better step down and let someone better take their place.
The Kerbala provincial administration's reputation isn't quite impressive when it comes to corruption and involvement in violence and Maliki didn't forget to give a stern warning against corruption calling corruption a crime just as serious as terrorism.
Back in Baghdad the most significant raid conducted yesterday was the one on Buratha mosque, one of the most important Shia mosques in Baghdad which is also considered a SCIRI territory.
The raid ended without blood but the preacher of the mosque, a lawmaker from the SCIRI, expressed his dismay about the raid "because it was American soldiers who searched the mosque" and this seems to be one of the changes in rules of engagement. I recall that there was some kind of a rule that said only Iraqi soldiers or police were allowed to walk into places of worship while American troops would have to stay outside.
This raid too is of political significance as it can be used to prove to that the operation is impartial and not directed against one sect without the other.
On the streets, checkpoints and roadblocks are becoming increasingly serious and strict in doing their job; soldiers and policemen are sparing no vehicles or convoys from searching and I personally saw a case yesterday where an ambulance driver tried to rush his vehicle through a checkpoint but the soldiers ordered him to stop and let him pass only after they checked the inside of the vehicle finding only a civilian medical emergency.
Strict checkpoints always mean slow traffic and inconvenient delays for Baghdadis but this downside is welcome when these security measures make the streets safer.
Despite the traffic jams and though this is the largest deployment for troops in the capital, daily life and civilian activity-contrary to what was expected-still continues at a rather normal level, unlike previous crackdowns where life came to near paralysis.
Meanwhile a new bird appeared in the sky; not exactly new but one that's been absent for a long time; since the end of major operations in 2003.
In fact this is the first time ever that I see the B-1 flying over Baghdad. Since Tuesday, the long-range huge bomber appeared several times over the city spending as long as 75 minutes in some cases. Unfortunately with only 3x zoom this is the closest I could get.
Thursday, July 24, 2008
Talabani Rejects the Provincial Election Law
Disagreement erupted between the parliament and presidency council over the provincial elections law. After the parliament passed the law with 127 votes out of 140 that attended the session, president Talabani and VP Adbul Mahdi rejected the law and returned it to the parliament for revision.
The key point of disagreement is an article that provides guidelines for the future of Kirkuk. Spokesman of parliament Mahmoud Mashhadani ordered a secret vote for this particular article, the thing that outraged Kurdish MPs and some Shiite MPs who then decided to boycott the vote.
No wonder Kurds reject the article. I’ve translated the important parts of the article, which was posted on Azzaman, that are the most likely source of disagreement:
Anyone familiar with Kurdish ambitions in Kirkuk and their current weight in the province can agree that the above points are not even close to anything the Kurds are willing to accept. Particularly (3) and (5-b) are in my estimation out of question for the Kurds. These points if approved would mean that Kurds would have to end the presence of the Peshmerga in all of Kirkuk province and reverse the influx of thousands of Kurdish people settled in the province since 2003. The latter is one of the most controversial issues when it comes to Kirkuk. Kurds claim that those people were simply reclaiming homes and farms from which they were displaced by Saddam in earlier times, while Arabs and Turkmen claim that Kurds are working to change the demographics of the province to ensure winning in elections.
Objectively, the document represents over the top demands of powers opposed to Kurdish domination in Kirkuk.
A source in the UIA speaking on condition of anonymity to Azzaman described what happened as a “tactical rift in the UIA…prominent members walked out and didn’t vote on the legislation while other major factions remained and voted including Badr organization, independent MPs and part of the SIIC and Da’awa Party” and added that “friction between the UIA and Kurdistan Alliance has reached a dangerous zone that may well change the future of this coalition”.
Another source, this time from the Kurdistan Alliance said “we had signed an agreement with the UIA prior to the vote. We signed an agreement with Ali Adeeb and representatives from the SIIC, the independent group, Badr and Da’aw not to pass the law, but we were surprised [by the result]”
What became evident from both the wording of the document and the results of the vote is that the capacity of the Kurdish-UIA coalition, that dominated Iraq’s decision-making process for several years, to pass legislation is being seriously challenged; especially with the disintegration of the UIA.
I think this experience represents a milestone in the redistribution of political power amid constantly changing conditions on the ground. On the one hand there is the rise of Sunni Arab tribes as an influential legitimate player with the expanding power of Awakening councils and the return of the Accord Front to the cabinet, and on the other hand there’s the fact that the Kurds’ main ally-the UIA-now controls dozens of seats less than it did in the past.
One serious limitation that will face attempts to resolve the issue is time. The parliament is due to have its month-long summer recess on August 1st. According to Al-Sabah, political leaders want the parliament to rework the draft law and agree on a version more acceptable to all blocs so that a second vote can be made in seven days. Otherwise holding provincial elections on time will be unlikely.
However, the document offers a lot of leeway for the parties that endorsed it to make acceptable concessions in future negotiations, which offers a good ‘emergency exit’ to avoid a deadlock. If this is combined with a Kurdish respect for peaceful ways and acceptance of the changes in political balance of power, then a compromise may ultimately be possible.
The key point of disagreement is an article that provides guidelines for the future of Kirkuk. Spokesman of parliament Mahmoud Mashhadani ordered a secret vote for this particular article, the thing that outraged Kurdish MPs and some Shiite MPs who then decided to boycott the vote.
No wonder Kurds reject the article. I’ve translated the important parts of the article, which was posted on Azzaman, that are the most likely source of disagreement:
2-Authority shall be divided among the three main constituencies by giving them (Arabs, Kurds, and Turkmen) 32% each and 4% to Christians. Authority means [posts in] all military and civilian institutions as well as the top three posts (The chairman of the province council, the governor, and the deputy governor).
3-During the mission of the committee mentioned in (4) below, security responsibility in Kirkuk province shall be assigned to military units deployed from central and southern Iraq, that will replace existing units. This is to ensure the professionalism and freedom of the committee and to end the presence of security forces affiliated with political parties.
4-A committee shall be formed to oversee the implementation of (2) above and (5) below. Each major constituency will have 4 representatives in the committee. Christians will have 1 representative. The committee makes decision by a majority vote. The prime minister nominates officials from the trade, planning and interior (citizenship department) ministries for membership in the committee. This is to be done under supervision by the UN and Arab League who will provide support, advice and inspection. The committee should be formed and embark on its mission by October 1, 2008.
5-The duties of the committee include:
a)Setting a mechanism for power-sharing.
b)Identifying violations of public and private property that took place in Kirkuk province after April 9, 2008.
c)The committee submits recommendations to the electoral commission to update voter records based on the finding.
d)Provincial elections in Kirkuk will be held after the committee submits all findings and recommendations.
e)The federal government provide necessary security and resources for the committee to conduct its duties.
f)In case of obstruction or incompletion of the committee’s mission, provincial elections will be held on basis of [a fixed quota of] 10 seats to each of the major constituencies and 2 to the minorities no later than December 31, 2008.
Anyone familiar with Kurdish ambitions in Kirkuk and their current weight in the province can agree that the above points are not even close to anything the Kurds are willing to accept. Particularly (3) and (5-b) are in my estimation out of question for the Kurds. These points if approved would mean that Kurds would have to end the presence of the Peshmerga in all of Kirkuk province and reverse the influx of thousands of Kurdish people settled in the province since 2003. The latter is one of the most controversial issues when it comes to Kirkuk. Kurds claim that those people were simply reclaiming homes and farms from which they were displaced by Saddam in earlier times, while Arabs and Turkmen claim that Kurds are working to change the demographics of the province to ensure winning in elections.
Objectively, the document represents over the top demands of powers opposed to Kurdish domination in Kirkuk.
A source in the UIA speaking on condition of anonymity to Azzaman described what happened as a “tactical rift in the UIA…prominent members walked out and didn’t vote on the legislation while other major factions remained and voted including Badr organization, independent MPs and part of the SIIC and Da’awa Party” and added that “friction between the UIA and Kurdistan Alliance has reached a dangerous zone that may well change the future of this coalition”.
Another source, this time from the Kurdistan Alliance said “we had signed an agreement with the UIA prior to the vote. We signed an agreement with Ali Adeeb and representatives from the SIIC, the independent group, Badr and Da’aw not to pass the law, but we were surprised [by the result]”
What became evident from both the wording of the document and the results of the vote is that the capacity of the Kurdish-UIA coalition, that dominated Iraq’s decision-making process for several years, to pass legislation is being seriously challenged; especially with the disintegration of the UIA.
I think this experience represents a milestone in the redistribution of political power amid constantly changing conditions on the ground. On the one hand there is the rise of Sunni Arab tribes as an influential legitimate player with the expanding power of Awakening councils and the return of the Accord Front to the cabinet, and on the other hand there’s the fact that the Kurds’ main ally-the UIA-now controls dozens of seats less than it did in the past.
One serious limitation that will face attempts to resolve the issue is time. The parliament is due to have its month-long summer recess on August 1st. According to Al-Sabah, political leaders want the parliament to rework the draft law and agree on a version more acceptable to all blocs so that a second vote can be made in seven days. Otherwise holding provincial elections on time will be unlikely.
However, the document offers a lot of leeway for the parties that endorsed it to make acceptable concessions in future negotiations, which offers a good ‘emergency exit’ to avoid a deadlock. If this is combined with a Kurdish respect for peaceful ways and acceptance of the changes in political balance of power, then a compromise may ultimately be possible.
Saturday, August 26, 2006
Sticking to the essence of the plan…
I've been reading and hearing a lot about options "other than democracy" for Iraq being considered by Washington.
I couldn't find the time to search for the original report but I found this recent article that mentions the report and comments on it:
Most interpretations for the anonymous statement expect those alternatives to be in the form of a coup replacing the current government in Iraq with a puppet government loyal to America and lead by a new dictator.
Since the whole story is built around a statement from an anonymous expert and since no clear scenario has been provided, I'm going to offer the Iraqi version of the story that also comes from anonymous experts but with a scenario that looks reasonably formulated from a structural point of view. The report was published on the Iraqi website of Sot al-Iraq, a website run by Iraqi intellectual mostly in exile.
The scenario or "plan" predicted by the author of the story says that the US is going to offer Iraqi military and government one last chance to control the situation and prevent the sectarian violence from turning into open civil war and suggests that America's decision to end in more troops to Baghdad was made to give PM Maliki's government a real chance to curb sectarian violence.
This "last chance" doesn't lack a deadline and according to the report the deadline is supposed to be somewhere between September and October, so if the military effort succeeds, plan B will be ruled out and the policy in Iraq will remain unchanged, probably even allowing the US to revive its plans of troop-level reduction by end of 06.
However upon failure of military efforts and if civil war breaks out the report says the following steps will be taken:
1-Declaring Iraq a zone of genocide and referring the Iraqi file back to the UN Security Council under resolutions 1483 and 1546.
2-After getting appropriate new resolution from the UNSC, the US and allies return to assume all security responsibilities in Iraq.
3-Dismising the current Iraqi government and parliament.
4- Appointing a US military leader for Iraq.
5-The constitution of Iraq remains active but with articles concerning governance suspended.
6-Appointing an Iraqi civil administration consisting exclusively of technocrats with no religious, sectarian or ethnic leanings to assist the US lead military administration in running the affairs of the country.
7-Holding general elections in the country under international supervision at least 2-4 years from the beginning of the implementation of the plan.
In a cruel environment like this and in the shadows of many shortcomings I can feel that many observers, and especially more among Iraqis tired of violence and incompetent leaders, find plan "B" attractive and I don't deny that I too was enthusiastic about it the first time I heard of it at a moment when the war reached its toughest stages with some radical powers doing everything to impose their plans on the rest and silence voices of any sort of opposition, but now that I took some time to think it over I found that this plan or any similar one will represent several steps backward and may even take us back to the time before the 9th of April.
On the domestic level in general, the doubts among the masses that America came only to replace one dictator with another and not to spread democracy will become a fact and will send a message that America hasn't changed its policies yet.
On the regional level that would be exactly what authoritarian regimes in the region want and would give them a chance to declare the war ended with a victory for dictatorships. The failure to prove wrong the theory that the middle east isn't yet ready for democracy will significantly add to the power and reputation of religious extremism which will become the only power antagonizing the dictatorships. However those dictatorships still feel they are capable of repressing, exporting or redirecting this extremism against mutual enemies like religious minorities or liberal groups…
So what can be done to make progress?
In my opinion we should continue along the basic objectives of Operation Iraqi Freedom in establishing democracy and the rule of law and offering enough protection for this democracy until it can sustain itself, i.e. what we need is an enhanced plan "A" based on determination to finish the mission.
I think the main duty of American troops who probably find themselves with little meaningful duties to do is presence itself. The mere presence of these troops is so important to stop the extremists and anti-democracy powers from disrupting the mission or halting it so as long as these troops are in Iraq those enemies will not have the capacity to alter the course to their benefit.
Still, those enemies will keep conducting their limited operations in order to deplete the resources and frustrate the Iraqi government and the coalition troops in the hope that this would lead a withdrawal of the coalition.
My assumptions come from reading and hearing what extremists of either sect say and from even direct personal conversations with followers of those extremists; on one hand there are the remnants of the Baath and former army and radical Sunnis who count on their ability to regain control like they did back in 1991 when they repressed the uprising with relatively little effort and those still have hope that they are able to exterminate or herd the untrained, not-accustomed-to-handling-power masses.
On the other hand the plans of radical Shia leaders seem to be more realistic given what they accomplished on the ground and given their ability to overcome the mistakes of 1991 by building political and military foundations in the provinces capable of directing action.
The point is that, for either group, the ambition to do something big to change the face of the country (that can be sparked by escalating a simple incident at any time) will face the wall of the coalition presence in Iraq and this can be seen clearly in the claims of these groups when they say that the American presence is hindering Iraq's effort to restore security while the fact is that the American presence is the obstacle stopping them from taking over the country and marginalizing if not eliminating their rivals.
In this manner, the mere physical existence of US troops in Iraq is doing a crucial service in protecting the newborn democracy.
What can be added here is some enhancements/corrections to the original plan "A"…
We the Iraqis should tolerate the results of our choices and this is a key point in the process of learning and practicing that seems to be our only means to make progress, so the next four years are going to be an important lesson for us on the importance of careful choice making and the American troops can help us finish this lesson by assisting the people and the government (its moderate reasonable powers) in reducing the influence of armed militias and disarming the community. This process will be no doubt long and tiresome but it's necessary since we have gone this far.
There's also another act, other than military force, that can support and empower democracy and pluralism, this is the free world's mission to support patriotic liberal powers in Iraq. These are the powers that radical and fascist powers want to deter and neutralize through assassinations, intimidation, Takfir or accusations with treason, all backed by effective propaganda machines funded by outside parties.
To make it simple, in addition to the presence of military forces we also need to garner all kinds of support to the liberal, secular, truly pro-democracy powers. It is no secret that Iran, Saudi Arabia and Syria support extremists of both sects so why not America and other friends of democratic Iraq offer grater, or at least equal, support for the liberals/moderates?
In the brutal war the world is fighting against terror and extremism, many of the rules of engagement whether political or military need to be reconsidered and maybe changed from what had been known for decades and as long as the enemy is striking below the belt and fears or respects no referee, a new and improved policy should be adopted when it comes to offering support to allies.
This way the process can be lengthy, boring and difficult but success will be certain.
Of course there are no guarantees that results will change much for the best within only four years from now but definitely extremism will have the shorter end of the stick then and positive outcomes can be even further accelerated if the world took stricter measures to neutralize the hotbeds of extremism in Iran, Syria and Saudi Arabia.
I couldn't find the time to search for the original report but I found this recent article that mentions the report and comments on it:
But last week came the new nugget: an anonymous "military affairs expert" attended a White House briefing and reported: "Senior administration officials have acknowledged to me that they are considering alternatives other than democracy. Everybody in the administration is being quite circumspect, but you can sense their own concern that this is drifting away from democracy."
Most interpretations for the anonymous statement expect those alternatives to be in the form of a coup replacing the current government in Iraq with a puppet government loyal to America and lead by a new dictator.
Since the whole story is built around a statement from an anonymous expert and since no clear scenario has been provided, I'm going to offer the Iraqi version of the story that also comes from anonymous experts but with a scenario that looks reasonably formulated from a structural point of view. The report was published on the Iraqi website of Sot al-Iraq, a website run by Iraqi intellectual mostly in exile.
The scenario or "plan" predicted by the author of the story says that the US is going to offer Iraqi military and government one last chance to control the situation and prevent the sectarian violence from turning into open civil war and suggests that America's decision to end in more troops to Baghdad was made to give PM Maliki's government a real chance to curb sectarian violence.
This "last chance" doesn't lack a deadline and according to the report the deadline is supposed to be somewhere between September and October, so if the military effort succeeds, plan B will be ruled out and the policy in Iraq will remain unchanged, probably even allowing the US to revive its plans of troop-level reduction by end of 06.
However upon failure of military efforts and if civil war breaks out the report says the following steps will be taken:
1-Declaring Iraq a zone of genocide and referring the Iraqi file back to the UN Security Council under resolutions 1483 and 1546.
2-After getting appropriate new resolution from the UNSC, the US and allies return to assume all security responsibilities in Iraq.
3-Dismising the current Iraqi government and parliament.
4- Appointing a US military leader for Iraq.
5-The constitution of Iraq remains active but with articles concerning governance suspended.
6-Appointing an Iraqi civil administration consisting exclusively of technocrats with no religious, sectarian or ethnic leanings to assist the US lead military administration in running the affairs of the country.
7-Holding general elections in the country under international supervision at least 2-4 years from the beginning of the implementation of the plan.
In a cruel environment like this and in the shadows of many shortcomings I can feel that many observers, and especially more among Iraqis tired of violence and incompetent leaders, find plan "B" attractive and I don't deny that I too was enthusiastic about it the first time I heard of it at a moment when the war reached its toughest stages with some radical powers doing everything to impose their plans on the rest and silence voices of any sort of opposition, but now that I took some time to think it over I found that this plan or any similar one will represent several steps backward and may even take us back to the time before the 9th of April.
On the domestic level in general, the doubts among the masses that America came only to replace one dictator with another and not to spread democracy will become a fact and will send a message that America hasn't changed its policies yet.
On the regional level that would be exactly what authoritarian regimes in the region want and would give them a chance to declare the war ended with a victory for dictatorships. The failure to prove wrong the theory that the middle east isn't yet ready for democracy will significantly add to the power and reputation of religious extremism which will become the only power antagonizing the dictatorships. However those dictatorships still feel they are capable of repressing, exporting or redirecting this extremism against mutual enemies like religious minorities or liberal groups…
So what can be done to make progress?
In my opinion we should continue along the basic objectives of Operation Iraqi Freedom in establishing democracy and the rule of law and offering enough protection for this democracy until it can sustain itself, i.e. what we need is an enhanced plan "A" based on determination to finish the mission.
I think the main duty of American troops who probably find themselves with little meaningful duties to do is presence itself. The mere presence of these troops is so important to stop the extremists and anti-democracy powers from disrupting the mission or halting it so as long as these troops are in Iraq those enemies will not have the capacity to alter the course to their benefit.
Still, those enemies will keep conducting their limited operations in order to deplete the resources and frustrate the Iraqi government and the coalition troops in the hope that this would lead a withdrawal of the coalition.
My assumptions come from reading and hearing what extremists of either sect say and from even direct personal conversations with followers of those extremists; on one hand there are the remnants of the Baath and former army and radical Sunnis who count on their ability to regain control like they did back in 1991 when they repressed the uprising with relatively little effort and those still have hope that they are able to exterminate or herd the untrained, not-accustomed-to-handling-power masses.
On the other hand the plans of radical Shia leaders seem to be more realistic given what they accomplished on the ground and given their ability to overcome the mistakes of 1991 by building political and military foundations in the provinces capable of directing action.
The point is that, for either group, the ambition to do something big to change the face of the country (that can be sparked by escalating a simple incident at any time) will face the wall of the coalition presence in Iraq and this can be seen clearly in the claims of these groups when they say that the American presence is hindering Iraq's effort to restore security while the fact is that the American presence is the obstacle stopping them from taking over the country and marginalizing if not eliminating their rivals.
In this manner, the mere physical existence of US troops in Iraq is doing a crucial service in protecting the newborn democracy.
What can be added here is some enhancements/corrections to the original plan "A"…
We the Iraqis should tolerate the results of our choices and this is a key point in the process of learning and practicing that seems to be our only means to make progress, so the next four years are going to be an important lesson for us on the importance of careful choice making and the American troops can help us finish this lesson by assisting the people and the government (its moderate reasonable powers) in reducing the influence of armed militias and disarming the community. This process will be no doubt long and tiresome but it's necessary since we have gone this far.
There's also another act, other than military force, that can support and empower democracy and pluralism, this is the free world's mission to support patriotic liberal powers in Iraq. These are the powers that radical and fascist powers want to deter and neutralize through assassinations, intimidation, Takfir or accusations with treason, all backed by effective propaganda machines funded by outside parties.
To make it simple, in addition to the presence of military forces we also need to garner all kinds of support to the liberal, secular, truly pro-democracy powers. It is no secret that Iran, Saudi Arabia and Syria support extremists of both sects so why not America and other friends of democratic Iraq offer grater, or at least equal, support for the liberals/moderates?
In the brutal war the world is fighting against terror and extremism, many of the rules of engagement whether political or military need to be reconsidered and maybe changed from what had been known for decades and as long as the enemy is striking below the belt and fears or respects no referee, a new and improved policy should be adopted when it comes to offering support to allies.
This way the process can be lengthy, boring and difficult but success will be certain.
Of course there are no guarantees that results will change much for the best within only four years from now but definitely extremism will have the shorter end of the stick then and positive outcomes can be even further accelerated if the world took stricter measures to neutralize the hotbeds of extremism in Iran, Syria and Saudi Arabia.
Sunday, October 30, 2005
A new liberal lobby emerges in Baghdad...
Today, Mohammed and I had the privilege to be invited to attend a conference organized by a group of civil society organizations to announce the launch of a new community under the name “Ahd Al-Iraq” or (the oath of Iraq).
The basic theme of the community is to take a promise from politicians, civil society activists and MPs (current or running for office) to preserve and protect the rights and freedoms every Iraqi citizen is supposed to enjoy under the new constitution and under the internationally recognized conventions and laws and to work to introduce amendments in the constitution whenever believed necessary for the protection of these rights and freedoms.
The founders of the community named five main points in the constitution that require urgent reconsideration:
1-Several articles in the constitution mention “public order and ethics” as limits to freedoms granted to the population.
The suggestion: These concepts must be defined by the judiciary and must not be left loose for whomever (clerics, executive authority, etc) to interpret as they like.
2-The personal affairs law:
The suggestion: to return back to the civil law legislated back in 1959 and to prevent Shareat laws from replacing that law.
3-The supreme/higher federal court in the constitution has to be formed from law experts and Shareat experts, number and nominations are to be decided by 2 thirds of the parliament members.
The suggestions:
a)All court members have to carry high degrees in law and first line judges.
b)Shareat experts must not outnumber law experts.
c)Women must be represented inside the court with no less than 25%.
4 & 5- Both related to the role of the higher human rights committee:
Suggestions:
Several but the most important one is to allow the committee to a) review legislations and laws to ensure they do not violate the universal declaration of human rights b)verify the constitutionality of legislations.
This committee is founded by a group of well known Iraqi women activists including some who occupy important positions in the government namely, Dr. Azhar Al-Sheikhly the minister of women affairs, Iraq’s ambassador to Egypt Saiyah Al-Suhail Dr. Pascal Eisho, the minister of immigrants and displaced, Dr. Narmeen Othman the minister of environment and social affairs and Dr. Rand Raheem Iraq’s envoy to the US and founder of the ‘Iraqi Institute’ and others. However, these women didn’t participate as ministers but rather as individual Iraqi women working together to gather support for the cause of the community.
The event was attended by more than a few female Assembly members as well as several tribal sheiks and representatives of other political entities and organizations…one can fairly say that a wide range of social and political the spectrum of Iraq population was well represented in the event.
The general sense was that the constitution had to be supported to be passed but now, hard work and serious steps have to be taken to introduce the needed amendments to build the civil society where each and every citizen can enjoy his rights and his freedom like anyone else in the civilized free world.
The entire crowd welcomed the notes of one tribal Sheik from Sadr city who raised an objection to one clause in the punishment law which states that teachers and husbands should not be persecuted if they use disciplinary beating against their students or wives respectively. in his unexpected note, the sheik asked the committee to include correcting this clause in its agenda.
I learned that next week there will be a bigger conference with press coverage in the convention center and then participating politicians, activists and organizations will be asked to give their signatures and declare commitment to supporting the community’s efforts.
Through the window I could see one of Saddam’s ways of wasting Iraq’s money; work in this needless gigantic mosque started in 1990s during the sanctions but Saddam didn’t last long enough to finish it. (Any ideas for investment?)
The interesting thing about this meeting and similar ones is that civil society organizations began to modify their methods of applying pressure on the government and politicians, so instead of waiting for politicians and parties to present their platforms, now we have emerging organizations that decided to jump a couple of steps ahead and start telling politicians and parties what the people want to see in electoral platforms and what kind of a government people are willing support.
I wish them success in this campaign.
The basic theme of the community is to take a promise from politicians, civil society activists and MPs (current or running for office) to preserve and protect the rights and freedoms every Iraqi citizen is supposed to enjoy under the new constitution and under the internationally recognized conventions and laws and to work to introduce amendments in the constitution whenever believed necessary for the protection of these rights and freedoms.
The founders of the community named five main points in the constitution that require urgent reconsideration:
1-Several articles in the constitution mention “public order and ethics” as limits to freedoms granted to the population.
The suggestion: These concepts must be defined by the judiciary and must not be left loose for whomever (clerics, executive authority, etc) to interpret as they like.
2-The personal affairs law:
The suggestion: to return back to the civil law legislated back in 1959 and to prevent Shareat laws from replacing that law.
3-The supreme/higher federal court in the constitution has to be formed from law experts and Shareat experts, number and nominations are to be decided by 2 thirds of the parliament members.
The suggestions:
a)All court members have to carry high degrees in law and first line judges.
b)Shareat experts must not outnumber law experts.
c)Women must be represented inside the court with no less than 25%.
4 & 5- Both related to the role of the higher human rights committee:
Suggestions:
Several but the most important one is to allow the committee to a) review legislations and laws to ensure they do not violate the universal declaration of human rights b)verify the constitutionality of legislations.
This committee is founded by a group of well known Iraqi women activists including some who occupy important positions in the government namely, Dr. Azhar Al-Sheikhly the minister of women affairs, Iraq’s ambassador to Egypt Saiyah Al-Suhail Dr. Pascal Eisho, the minister of immigrants and displaced, Dr. Narmeen Othman the minister of environment and social affairs and Dr. Rand Raheem Iraq’s envoy to the US and founder of the ‘Iraqi Institute’ and others. However, these women didn’t participate as ministers but rather as individual Iraqi women working together to gather support for the cause of the community.
The event was attended by more than a few female Assembly members as well as several tribal sheiks and representatives of other political entities and organizations…one can fairly say that a wide range of social and political the spectrum of Iraq population was well represented in the event.
The general sense was that the constitution had to be supported to be passed but now, hard work and serious steps have to be taken to introduce the needed amendments to build the civil society where each and every citizen can enjoy his rights and his freedom like anyone else in the civilized free world.
The entire crowd welcomed the notes of one tribal Sheik from Sadr city who raised an objection to one clause in the punishment law which states that teachers and husbands should not be persecuted if they use disciplinary beating against their students or wives respectively. in his unexpected note, the sheik asked the committee to include correcting this clause in its agenda.
I learned that next week there will be a bigger conference with press coverage in the convention center and then participating politicians, activists and organizations will be asked to give their signatures and declare commitment to supporting the community’s efforts.
Through the window I could see one of Saddam’s ways of wasting Iraq’s money; work in this needless gigantic mosque started in 1990s during the sanctions but Saddam didn’t last long enough to finish it. (Any ideas for investment?)
The interesting thing about this meeting and similar ones is that civil society organizations began to modify their methods of applying pressure on the government and politicians, so instead of waiting for politicians and parties to present their platforms, now we have emerging organizations that decided to jump a couple of steps ahead and start telling politicians and parties what the people want to see in electoral platforms and what kind of a government people are willing support.
I wish them success in this campaign.
Saturday, January 17, 2004
Sharia, dreams, and nightmares.
When I first heard about the announcement 137, I felt extremely upset and worried.
My upset was further increased when I followed some of the reactions by western media and reading some comments on posts on various blogs including Iraqis such as “get the troops out of Iraq now”, “if the sheia want theocracy let them go to Iran”, “that’s why we opposed the war” or “we should’ve left SH there, it seems that those people can only be governed by dictators” and so on.
Honestly, I was furious when I started writing this post, I wanted to curse everyone; the GC, Islamic parties, religions, Iran, Iraqi bloggers …etc.
But that only lasted for a moment; this is not how I truly feel, and it is not the time to be angry as emotional judgments often miss the point.
I gathered my shattered thoughts together and tried to examine this as calm as I can and found that through all this mess there are some facts that can be concluded before reacting to this, who was behind it? Who objected? And to what degree extreme reactions were true and justified?
So here we come to some facts:
1-The announcement comes from an unauthorized council, and therefore Iraqi courts and Iraqi people are not committed to follow it.
2-according to Jalal Talbani; the announcement didn’t get the necessary majority (2/3 of the votes) therefore it’s illegal.
3-we don’t have a constitutional council yet, thus it’s out of question to put such issues into discussion.
4-the announcement is not signed by the CPA head, who has the veto, so it’s still just a proposition.
5-the public coverage was so scarce which gives rise to suspicions, was it made to please the Mullahs and gain their support, by trying to pass this agreement without public announcements fearing objections?
6-sharia is a relative term, which one the proposition was referring to: Sunni, Sheia, Wahabi? With their sub-divisions? Islamic Sharia in Iraq refers to classical Sunni and Sheia sharia, and not to the more radical Wahabi (Taliban or Saudi Arabia) nor Islamic brotherhood version (Hamas or Jihad).
7-the Sharia law has been practiced in Iraq for centuries (even when secular governments were in charge, as it didn’t interfere with politics), so this would better described as preservation of an already existing system rather than creation of a new one.
8-there was strong opposition against the proposition inside the GC and on the streets, and that was obvious as Iraqi women (not fearing the fanatics) held demonstrations against the proposition.
9-the people who agreed on this proposition said that it’s not supposed to replace the secular family law, and that it’s just an optional one for committed Muslims, while other Iraqis who do not want to submit to this one will still have the secular one.
Using these facts in an attempt to answer the above questions, one can come with some simple conclusions:
1-this is the wrong decision, made by the wrong people at the wrong time, resulting in wrong reactions.
2-this is either a real demand by the Islamic parties, or just a political bluff.
a-If it’s a real demand, then it’s either:
- Signaled by fear on the part of Islamic parties and groups that a secular government (which seems to be inevitable and almost everyone agrees with as it’s supported by the USA) would restrain the religious activities and their effect on the community, such as what happened in Turkey.
-Or it was made to get more political ground, taking advantage of what seems to be the support of the majority of Iraqis turning this advantage into solid achievements on the ground.
b-could it be a bluff? It seems that it makes sense, when one puts in mind that the USA would never allow a theocracy in Iraq, then such suggestion made by Islamic groups (probably supported by some neighboring countries, to damage the relation between Iraqis and Americans) would really embarrass the American administration, and the immediate response to the American veto will be “ see, didn’t we tell you that the Americans are here to fight Islam?”
Giving the facts and assumptions, how should we react to this?
-If it’s a real demand, then just forget it, because even if the CPA didn’t use the veto, I’m sure that the majority of Iraqis will not approve of it. And when elections will be held, and a constitution is written (if it holds to that time), this particular point will not achieve the desired majority. And I know what I’m talking about.
They look stronger and out numbering only on the streets and only in this unstable period, where emotions play a considerable role in men’s decisions. But if a free plebiscite made in stable conditions, it will be much different.
-If it’s a trap? Ok, let’s play it their way.
“Give us the type of Sharia you want, and we will give you our immediate approval. Write your Sharia down, and we will accept it”
These people; committed Sunni and Sheia, hate each other more than you imagine, they can only unite for a few weeks against what they consider a common enemy.
Let’s step aside and deprive them of this (common enemy) and you will see that their old quarrels will float to the surface, and they will never reach a consensus even after a hundred years, and each side will hurry back to the CPA to get support.
Such trivial events (yes, trivial, because, as dangerous as they seem to you, they’re not more than futile attempts, by a bunch of idiots trying to reverse history and combat the natural course of events) will not alter the eventual outcome of this struggle.
All is needed (which seems the CPA is doing) is to reassure average people about their religious freedom, provide them good jobs that keep them busy and education that open their eyes.
Our battle is not with them; it’s with those who act behind the curtains, using sensitive issues such as religious beliefs and traditions. The worse thing that we can do today is over reacting in our opposition and using offensive tone. The right tactic, in my opinion, lies in firm determined refusal conveyed through calm diplomatic maneuvering.
I was saddened by some Americans’ and westerners’ reaction to this silly event, I received some e-mails urging me to leave Iraq, and offering me help to find a new life and career in the US or Europe. I heard about similar invitations to other Iraqi bloggers.
Grateful as I am to these generous gestures, I cannot but wonder, whether you were supporting Iraqi freedom or Iraqi bloggers. If you feel the whole thing was a mistake, and Iraqis didn’t/don’t deserve all the trouble and the sacrifices made, then I don’t blame you. That’s certainly how it looks on TV, newspapers and most web sites.
We (Iraqi bloggers) are just phenomena that will soon fade away.
Iraqi freedom is a noble task that will benefit not only the 25 million Iraqis, but also the whole world. And no one said it was going to be easy.
I will not migrate to your heaven and leave people, who desperately need help, to the flames.
I will stay here with all those who believe in this just cause, and fight until the dream come true.
Then and only then, I will come to visit your land, as a friend, grateful for the support you’ve given so far, and will invite you (10 or 20 years from now) to come and see what you’ve bravely and generously participated in creating (a free prosperous and democratic Iraq). Silly as it may seem, I still believe in this dream.
By Ali.
My upset was further increased when I followed some of the reactions by western media and reading some comments on posts on various blogs including Iraqis such as “get the troops out of Iraq now”, “if the sheia want theocracy let them go to Iran”, “that’s why we opposed the war” or “we should’ve left SH there, it seems that those people can only be governed by dictators” and so on.
Honestly, I was furious when I started writing this post, I wanted to curse everyone; the GC, Islamic parties, religions, Iran, Iraqi bloggers …etc.
But that only lasted for a moment; this is not how I truly feel, and it is not the time to be angry as emotional judgments often miss the point.
I gathered my shattered thoughts together and tried to examine this as calm as I can and found that through all this mess there are some facts that can be concluded before reacting to this, who was behind it? Who objected? And to what degree extreme reactions were true and justified?
So here we come to some facts:
1-The announcement comes from an unauthorized council, and therefore Iraqi courts and Iraqi people are not committed to follow it.
2-according to Jalal Talbani; the announcement didn’t get the necessary majority (2/3 of the votes) therefore it’s illegal.
3-we don’t have a constitutional council yet, thus it’s out of question to put such issues into discussion.
4-the announcement is not signed by the CPA head, who has the veto, so it’s still just a proposition.
5-the public coverage was so scarce which gives rise to suspicions, was it made to please the Mullahs and gain their support, by trying to pass this agreement without public announcements fearing objections?
6-sharia is a relative term, which one the proposition was referring to: Sunni, Sheia, Wahabi? With their sub-divisions? Islamic Sharia in Iraq refers to classical Sunni and Sheia sharia, and not to the more radical Wahabi (Taliban or Saudi Arabia) nor Islamic brotherhood version (Hamas or Jihad).
7-the Sharia law has been practiced in Iraq for centuries (even when secular governments were in charge, as it didn’t interfere with politics), so this would better described as preservation of an already existing system rather than creation of a new one.
8-there was strong opposition against the proposition inside the GC and on the streets, and that was obvious as Iraqi women (not fearing the fanatics) held demonstrations against the proposition.
9-the people who agreed on this proposition said that it’s not supposed to replace the secular family law, and that it’s just an optional one for committed Muslims, while other Iraqis who do not want to submit to this one will still have the secular one.
Using these facts in an attempt to answer the above questions, one can come with some simple conclusions:
1-this is the wrong decision, made by the wrong people at the wrong time, resulting in wrong reactions.
2-this is either a real demand by the Islamic parties, or just a political bluff.
a-If it’s a real demand, then it’s either:
- Signaled by fear on the part of Islamic parties and groups that a secular government (which seems to be inevitable and almost everyone agrees with as it’s supported by the USA) would restrain the religious activities and their effect on the community, such as what happened in Turkey.
-Or it was made to get more political ground, taking advantage of what seems to be the support of the majority of Iraqis turning this advantage into solid achievements on the ground.
b-could it be a bluff? It seems that it makes sense, when one puts in mind that the USA would never allow a theocracy in Iraq, then such suggestion made by Islamic groups (probably supported by some neighboring countries, to damage the relation between Iraqis and Americans) would really embarrass the American administration, and the immediate response to the American veto will be “ see, didn’t we tell you that the Americans are here to fight Islam?”
Giving the facts and assumptions, how should we react to this?
-If it’s a real demand, then just forget it, because even if the CPA didn’t use the veto, I’m sure that the majority of Iraqis will not approve of it. And when elections will be held, and a constitution is written (if it holds to that time), this particular point will not achieve the desired majority. And I know what I’m talking about.
They look stronger and out numbering only on the streets and only in this unstable period, where emotions play a considerable role in men’s decisions. But if a free plebiscite made in stable conditions, it will be much different.
-If it’s a trap? Ok, let’s play it their way.
“Give us the type of Sharia you want, and we will give you our immediate approval. Write your Sharia down, and we will accept it”
These people; committed Sunni and Sheia, hate each other more than you imagine, they can only unite for a few weeks against what they consider a common enemy.
Let’s step aside and deprive them of this (common enemy) and you will see that their old quarrels will float to the surface, and they will never reach a consensus even after a hundred years, and each side will hurry back to the CPA to get support.
Such trivial events (yes, trivial, because, as dangerous as they seem to you, they’re not more than futile attempts, by a bunch of idiots trying to reverse history and combat the natural course of events) will not alter the eventual outcome of this struggle.
All is needed (which seems the CPA is doing) is to reassure average people about their religious freedom, provide them good jobs that keep them busy and education that open their eyes.
Our battle is not with them; it’s with those who act behind the curtains, using sensitive issues such as religious beliefs and traditions. The worse thing that we can do today is over reacting in our opposition and using offensive tone. The right tactic, in my opinion, lies in firm determined refusal conveyed through calm diplomatic maneuvering.
I was saddened by some Americans’ and westerners’ reaction to this silly event, I received some e-mails urging me to leave Iraq, and offering me help to find a new life and career in the US or Europe. I heard about similar invitations to other Iraqi bloggers.
Grateful as I am to these generous gestures, I cannot but wonder, whether you were supporting Iraqi freedom or Iraqi bloggers. If you feel the whole thing was a mistake, and Iraqis didn’t/don’t deserve all the trouble and the sacrifices made, then I don’t blame you. That’s certainly how it looks on TV, newspapers and most web sites.
We (Iraqi bloggers) are just phenomena that will soon fade away.
Iraqi freedom is a noble task that will benefit not only the 25 million Iraqis, but also the whole world. And no one said it was going to be easy.
I will not migrate to your heaven and leave people, who desperately need help, to the flames.
I will stay here with all those who believe in this just cause, and fight until the dream come true.
Then and only then, I will come to visit your land, as a friend, grateful for the support you’ve given so far, and will invite you (10 or 20 years from now) to come and see what you’ve bravely and generously participated in creating (a free prosperous and democratic Iraq). Silly as it may seem, I still believe in this dream.
By Ali.
Tuesday, November 15, 2005
The December elections: The Equation…
Math wasn’t my favorite class in school but I do remember one thing for sure that is inorder to solve any equation it has to contain a number of variables and constants and the values of the constants will help find those of the variables leading to the final solution.
Elections in Iraq can be considered an equation and the above applies to it more or less. However, here we have much more variables than constants (almost all of which have changed since last January) and this makes the equation harder to solve.
Let’s consider that our main (if not only) constant is the Kurdish bloc that hasn’t undergone any major changes except for the separation of the Islamic Kurdish Party which was a relatively minor component of the bloc. Other than that, the goals, policy and areas of influence are the same and the public base remained hardly changed.
On the other hand we have variables and important ones like the Sheat alliance and Allawi’s list have changed a lot recently with the former shedding some weight and the latter gaining some.
We have also seen a new variable entering the equation; that is the Sunni Arabs who are definitely going to take a significant chunk of votes for their new lists.
So one can easily predict from this that the results are going to differ greatly from last time, but how? Is the question.
From what I hear and see on the ground I can say that the new government will see at least one major bloc bring replaced by one (or an alliance) from the current opposition. And here I’m speaking about the Sheat alliance in particular. We have noted more than once that this bloc has lost many of its previous components like Ahmed Chalabi and two other moderate/secular trends. Add to this a) the declining popularity of the SCIRI and Dawa parties and the rising complaints from the people (especially in the south and Baghdad) because of the weak performance of the government and b) there is no support from the Ayatollahs to this list so far and none is expected at all this time.
Well, I guess I can add a (c) here which is that the biggest two groups in the alliance; the SCIRI and the Sadrists already have a very fragile bond between them and they technically fought each other and burned each other’s offices not long time ago!
Meanwhile, Allawi (whose list won about 40 seats in January) have added more strength to his list by including the communists, ex-president Yawir and a few other smaller lists that collectively won about 10 seats in January. However, this list has the potential of winning up to 80-90 seats if more Sunnis voted for him and Yawir and if some Sheats choose to leave the SCIRI and Dawa and instead vote for Allawi who proved to be a strong leader in his 6-month term last year.
The Kurds on the other hand have neither renewed their alliance with the Sheat alliance, nor declared one with Allawi but they have made clear signs that they want to ally with the winners to form a government and they would not accept anything less than a president or prime minister post for one of their politicians.
Since the Kurds weren’t getting along very well with Jafari in the past few months and the tensions between Jafari and Talbani went to the degree of armed clashes between their guards and calls for resignations and because of their (the Kurds’) known inclination to ally with secular trends, I can see the new government consisting of Allawi and the Kurds and probably a secular Arab Sunni party.
This will inevitably push the parties of the Sheat alliance to change their strategy from dominating the parliament and forming the government to forming the opposition and that’s why I expect then to limit their ambitions to winning the essential number of seats (1/3 of the 275 i.e. 92 seats) that grants them the veto right in the parliament so that the ruling bloc would not be able to pass any law without an agreement with the Sheat alliance bloc.
There remains one variable that can not be estimated in magnitude or direction at the moment due to its complexity and because it’s a new addition to the equation, so I will leave this part to another post that will hopefully come soon.
I have said before that what made me vote for the constitution was the last-minute-deal that allowed for making amendments immediately after the formation of the new parliament, unfortunately we discovered later that the procedure would require the suggested amendments to be put for voting in the parliament in one package of suggestions which if approved would later find their way to a general referendum.
This way a veto from 1/3 of the parliament (that could be due to an objection on one suggested amendment) will halt the whole bill and this of course is not in the interest of the secular trends (and I was personally disappointed too) since they are the ones who have many ideas for amendments in mind unlike the religious trends that have written most of the constitution and put almost everything they wanted in it.
Anyway, there’s still hope and actually there’s a good chance that if Allawi and the Kurds win the majority then the new parliament can amend the constitution in a way that meets the standards of modern constitutions that protect the rights and freedom of all citizens away from the restrictions of religion and backward thinking.
Elections in Iraq can be considered an equation and the above applies to it more or less. However, here we have much more variables than constants (almost all of which have changed since last January) and this makes the equation harder to solve.
Let’s consider that our main (if not only) constant is the Kurdish bloc that hasn’t undergone any major changes except for the separation of the Islamic Kurdish Party which was a relatively minor component of the bloc. Other than that, the goals, policy and areas of influence are the same and the public base remained hardly changed.
On the other hand we have variables and important ones like the Sheat alliance and Allawi’s list have changed a lot recently with the former shedding some weight and the latter gaining some.
We have also seen a new variable entering the equation; that is the Sunni Arabs who are definitely going to take a significant chunk of votes for their new lists.
So one can easily predict from this that the results are going to differ greatly from last time, but how? Is the question.
From what I hear and see on the ground I can say that the new government will see at least one major bloc bring replaced by one (or an alliance) from the current opposition. And here I’m speaking about the Sheat alliance in particular. We have noted more than once that this bloc has lost many of its previous components like Ahmed Chalabi and two other moderate/secular trends. Add to this a) the declining popularity of the SCIRI and Dawa parties and the rising complaints from the people (especially in the south and Baghdad) because of the weak performance of the government and b) there is no support from the Ayatollahs to this list so far and none is expected at all this time.
Well, I guess I can add a (c) here which is that the biggest two groups in the alliance; the SCIRI and the Sadrists already have a very fragile bond between them and they technically fought each other and burned each other’s offices not long time ago!
Meanwhile, Allawi (whose list won about 40 seats in January) have added more strength to his list by including the communists, ex-president Yawir and a few other smaller lists that collectively won about 10 seats in January. However, this list has the potential of winning up to 80-90 seats if more Sunnis voted for him and Yawir and if some Sheats choose to leave the SCIRI and Dawa and instead vote for Allawi who proved to be a strong leader in his 6-month term last year.
The Kurds on the other hand have neither renewed their alliance with the Sheat alliance, nor declared one with Allawi but they have made clear signs that they want to ally with the winners to form a government and they would not accept anything less than a president or prime minister post for one of their politicians.
Since the Kurds weren’t getting along very well with Jafari in the past few months and the tensions between Jafari and Talbani went to the degree of armed clashes between their guards and calls for resignations and because of their (the Kurds’) known inclination to ally with secular trends, I can see the new government consisting of Allawi and the Kurds and probably a secular Arab Sunni party.
This will inevitably push the parties of the Sheat alliance to change their strategy from dominating the parliament and forming the government to forming the opposition and that’s why I expect then to limit their ambitions to winning the essential number of seats (1/3 of the 275 i.e. 92 seats) that grants them the veto right in the parliament so that the ruling bloc would not be able to pass any law without an agreement with the Sheat alliance bloc.
There remains one variable that can not be estimated in magnitude or direction at the moment due to its complexity and because it’s a new addition to the equation, so I will leave this part to another post that will hopefully come soon.
I have said before that what made me vote for the constitution was the last-minute-deal that allowed for making amendments immediately after the formation of the new parliament, unfortunately we discovered later that the procedure would require the suggested amendments to be put for voting in the parliament in one package of suggestions which if approved would later find their way to a general referendum.
This way a veto from 1/3 of the parliament (that could be due to an objection on one suggested amendment) will halt the whole bill and this of course is not in the interest of the secular trends (and I was personally disappointed too) since they are the ones who have many ideas for amendments in mind unlike the religious trends that have written most of the constitution and put almost everything they wanted in it.
Anyway, there’s still hope and actually there’s a good chance that if Allawi and the Kurds win the majority then the new parliament can amend the constitution in a way that meets the standards of modern constitutions that protect the rights and freedom of all citizens away from the restrictions of religion and backward thinking.
Saturday, September 09, 2006
Federalism in Iraq; SCIRI's project.
The way some of our politicians here insist on implementing federalism annoys me and to some extent also confuses me, although federalism is stated in the constitution it is certainly not the time to activate the form of federalism that is being marketed by some Shia blocks in the parliament when the country is facing a lot of serious challenges and problems and has more critical steps to take than to form autonomous or semiautonomous regions to please a group of politicians or clerics.
And I also doubt that federalism of the type proposed recently can make the politicians who call for it achieve what they are looking for in it be that declared or hidden goals.
It's no secret that, leaving the Kurdistan part aside, the strongest supporter for federalism is al-Hakeem and his SCIRI. Al-Hakeem and his staff, most importantly his ambitious young son Ammar who lived most of his life in Iran and is the hottest candidate for leading the southern region in case it's formed, had been running an extensive PR campaign so to speak to persuade Iraqis in the 9 provinces south of Baghdad to endorse his project in establishing 'the federation of the center and south', this campaign had been focusing on the security issue and the SCIRI had been telling the people that if they wanted to be safe from Takfiri and Baathist insurgents and terrorists then the only way is through federalism.
This former argument does not seem to have solid basis on the ground since the Sunni insurgency in its various forms has had relatively little influence in the south and in fact the developments in the past few months show that instability in the south comes mostly from violence created by Shia factions rival to the SCIRI; in Basra there is the Fadheela Party militias, agents of Iran and outlaw tribes, in Kerbala there are the followers of cleric Mahmoud al-Hasani and in Diwaniya most recently the Sadr militias have been demonstrating their ability to create unrest as we saw in the deadly clashes that occurred only a week or more ago.
Anyway, I was told that this campaign isn't meeting substantial success in the centers of cities which made the Hakeems turn to the simple-minded people of rural suburbs using a tone that's much like "stop whining about lack of services! The decision is in your hands now, vote for federalism and you'll get the water, electricity and gas you need".
This reminds me of a story relayed to me by a friend who lives in the south, his brother was tying to get a certain job in the police department but his attempts failed. He was advised by someone to meet "Sayyed Ammar" and ask him to recommend him to the department. The guy was given an appointment to meet Ammar but on the day of the meeting and after waiting for several hours in the office he was surprised to learn that he and many like him were in fact invited to a speech for the young Hakeem about federalism!
I wonder here what makes al-Hakeem think that he and his party will be able to enjoy his intended Hakeemi Iraqia when almost all other influential Shia factions in that part of Iraq oppose his vision for one reason or another?!
And when I say for example that Sadr doesn't support the federation of the center and south it is not because he wants Mailiki's central government to have full sovereignty throughout the whole country but rather because he wants to control a bigger chunk of the county and does not want to see boundaries limit his ambitions and we have seen evidence for these ambitions in some moves Sadr made like in sending his militiamen to Kirkuk last year to fight the Kurds or in declaring his intentions to send a million armed men to Samarra to "liberate the shrines from the grip of Nawasib".
In this article (Arabic) we can get a clear sense of how Sadr and his followers look at al-Hakeem's version of federalism. The cultural advisor of Sad's office described the proposed federalism of the center and south as a precursor for "A new mass grave for the Shia because of the differences and maybe disputes in visions among the various factions within the community".
Technically the only group that is going to stand by federalism is the Kurds whose current state of relative independence takes its constitutional support from the instatement of federalism in Iraq's constitution but this Kurdish support alone isn't big enough to grant al-Hakeem permission to establish his state and even if it does, al-Hakeem will find himself in a very unpleasant position and this will also mean more unrest in the south that will be very difficult to control.
It's also important to note that Hakeem's policy doesn't have absolute support in the south even in his stronghold in Najaf, recently the advisory board of the city council voted against and blocked the suggestion of forming the "popular committees" which was originally proposed by al-Hakeem.
From a technical point of view and according to article 119 of the constitution either 1/3 of members of city councils or 1/10 of residents (Arabic) in concerned provincescan make the proposal which means a vote can be called for but there's absolutely no guarantee for the project to be approved because that will require a 2/3 majority vote.
I think this gives an idea of the size of obstacles and opposition al-Hakeem might face if a referendum is to b held over federalism in Najaf and other southern provinces.
Bottom line, the kind of federalism that can work for Iraq is one that does not have any connection to ethnic or sectarian roots and in my opinion the best formula to be used in the future is to turn individual provinces, with the exception of Kurdistan, into individual components of the federal state of Iraq and this idea already has decent support from many parliamentarians.
And I also doubt that federalism of the type proposed recently can make the politicians who call for it achieve what they are looking for in it be that declared or hidden goals.
It's no secret that, leaving the Kurdistan part aside, the strongest supporter for federalism is al-Hakeem and his SCIRI. Al-Hakeem and his staff, most importantly his ambitious young son Ammar who lived most of his life in Iran and is the hottest candidate for leading the southern region in case it's formed, had been running an extensive PR campaign so to speak to persuade Iraqis in the 9 provinces south of Baghdad to endorse his project in establishing 'the federation of the center and south', this campaign had been focusing on the security issue and the SCIRI had been telling the people that if they wanted to be safe from Takfiri and Baathist insurgents and terrorists then the only way is through federalism.
This former argument does not seem to have solid basis on the ground since the Sunni insurgency in its various forms has had relatively little influence in the south and in fact the developments in the past few months show that instability in the south comes mostly from violence created by Shia factions rival to the SCIRI; in Basra there is the Fadheela Party militias, agents of Iran and outlaw tribes, in Kerbala there are the followers of cleric Mahmoud al-Hasani and in Diwaniya most recently the Sadr militias have been demonstrating their ability to create unrest as we saw in the deadly clashes that occurred only a week or more ago.
Anyway, I was told that this campaign isn't meeting substantial success in the centers of cities which made the Hakeems turn to the simple-minded people of rural suburbs using a tone that's much like "stop whining about lack of services! The decision is in your hands now, vote for federalism and you'll get the water, electricity and gas you need".
This reminds me of a story relayed to me by a friend who lives in the south, his brother was tying to get a certain job in the police department but his attempts failed. He was advised by someone to meet "Sayyed Ammar" and ask him to recommend him to the department. The guy was given an appointment to meet Ammar but on the day of the meeting and after waiting for several hours in the office he was surprised to learn that he and many like him were in fact invited to a speech for the young Hakeem about federalism!
I wonder here what makes al-Hakeem think that he and his party will be able to enjoy his intended Hakeemi Iraqia when almost all other influential Shia factions in that part of Iraq oppose his vision for one reason or another?!
And when I say for example that Sadr doesn't support the federation of the center and south it is not because he wants Mailiki's central government to have full sovereignty throughout the whole country but rather because he wants to control a bigger chunk of the county and does not want to see boundaries limit his ambitions and we have seen evidence for these ambitions in some moves Sadr made like in sending his militiamen to Kirkuk last year to fight the Kurds or in declaring his intentions to send a million armed men to Samarra to "liberate the shrines from the grip of Nawasib".
In this article (Arabic) we can get a clear sense of how Sadr and his followers look at al-Hakeem's version of federalism. The cultural advisor of Sad's office described the proposed federalism of the center and south as a precursor for "A new mass grave for the Shia because of the differences and maybe disputes in visions among the various factions within the community".
Technically the only group that is going to stand by federalism is the Kurds whose current state of relative independence takes its constitutional support from the instatement of federalism in Iraq's constitution but this Kurdish support alone isn't big enough to grant al-Hakeem permission to establish his state and even if it does, al-Hakeem will find himself in a very unpleasant position and this will also mean more unrest in the south that will be very difficult to control.
It's also important to note that Hakeem's policy doesn't have absolute support in the south even in his stronghold in Najaf, recently the advisory board of the city council voted against and blocked the suggestion of forming the "popular committees" which was originally proposed by al-Hakeem.
From a technical point of view and according to article 119 of the constitution either 1/3 of members of city councils or 1/10 of residents (Arabic) in concerned provincescan make the proposal which means a vote can be called for but there's absolutely no guarantee for the project to be approved because that will require a 2/3 majority vote.
I think this gives an idea of the size of obstacles and opposition al-Hakeem might face if a referendum is to b held over federalism in Najaf and other southern provinces.
Bottom line, the kind of federalism that can work for Iraq is one that does not have any connection to ethnic or sectarian roots and in my opinion the best formula to be used in the future is to turn individual provinces, with the exception of Kurdistan, into individual components of the federal state of Iraq and this idea already has decent support from many parliamentarians.
Sunday, November 28, 2004
It's been usual for foreigners (diplomats, workers, journalists...etc) in Iraq to take lots of security precautions when they move around in Baghdad or some other Iraqi cities; they try to hide anything that might reveal their identities and I even noticed that they began to choose ordinary cars-from the kinds that many Iraqis own instead of fancy new cars- for use in their rides to avoid attracting attention.
This is of course as a result of the kidnappings and various attacks that targeted foreigners in Iraq regardless of the nature of their presence here. This created the feeling that every foreigner walking on the streets is an easy target for direct gunfire or for kidnapping (for money or to be beheaded later). This even included Arabs and Arab firms and even Iraqis working in Arab firms. In short, anyone who is here to do something that might be good for Iraq.
One group of foreigners really caught my attention by ignoring all the dangers and moving in the streets of Baghdad showing their identity so clearly.
One might think that this group of people did so because they are very bold but actually I don't think this is true for this case. Why? Because simply they were French.
Yesterday, I saw a single car with the words "FRENCH EMBASSY" written in Arabic on the windshield moving in Karrada crowded neighborhood in broad daylight. They didn't seem to be in a hurry and were driving slowly unlike other foreigners who try to drive as fast as possible to avoid being tracked and chased.
It seems that the French are not afraid of the terrorists. Were they excluded from the terrorists' targets list for some reason? Is there a peace truce between them? Did we miss something here? Because the French are moving freely and saying for the terrorists:
"Hey, it's us, so don't mistake us for your enemies, the other foreigners! And we are not just ordinary French. We are the French government! And we are certainly not doing something good for Iraq, so relax!"
This may explain why no one is anymore worried about the two French journalists; they're in friendly hands!
On another subject, it's well known in Iraq that political parties that plan to participate in the upcoming elections are not allowed to start campaigning in the media before the 15th of December 2004.
This rule was breached yesterday and on the hands of one of the well known parties that are part of the current administration.
This party "The National Democratic Party" reserved half a page on Al-Sabah newspaper to advertise for its political program. What is worse is that Al-Sabah is published by the "Iraqi Media Network" which is run by the government in one way or another, and it's more than obvious that the government should not advertise for any political party. I expect Al-Sabah to repeat this with the major parties that form the government, but certainly not for other parties.
This is a bad sign because some parties do not seem to understand that they cannot inherit Iraq. Similar maneuvers belong to Saddam's dark age and do not and must not have a place in the new Iraq we're trying to build and parties like the one I mentioned need to wake up to this fact.
Still in the elections, I've been following the latest demands by some parties to delay the elections, and while it was really distressing to see such demands come from legal parties not from terrorists disguised in the clothes of politicians or clerics, I do understand why they made such demand that goes very well with the ultimate goal of the terrorists.
Some of these parties cannot think beyond their partisan interests and it seems they want things to calm down in the so-called Sunni triangle so that more Sunnis participate in the elections. This seems like a reasonable demand, but the problem is that they do not seek that as much as they seek to strengthen their own individual and partisan positions. I know it's just an assumption and I should not accuse them without a solid proof, but I know these people and they're not too stupid to notice that the terrorists dream is to delay the elections as much as possible if they can't prevent it.
They do understand, this yet they still want to risk the whole future of Iraq just to ensure they get more seats in the parliament. It's true that Iraqis are still not very ready for the elections and no one did a great job in educating the majority about the importance, the rules and laws of the democratic process, and from the beginning I thought we need more time to ensure that most Iraqis not only want democracy but have a minimum accepted knowledge about what it means. However, when the decision was made (due to pressure from inside and outside) I accepted it and was and still on the opinion that it should NOT be delayed no matter what.
It's interesting to see that some of the parties that demanded the delay rushed today to announce that they did not sign any document regarding this appeal! They understand that the majority wants elections as soon as possible, and most people are afraid of any delay, but the truth is that they expect it to come from America, not from Iraqi parties. Thus any party that declares such demands would be probably seen as collaborating with the Americans to prolong "occupation".
This does not necessarily mean that the parties that demand elections to be held at the exact set up date are the true patriots, as among these there are many who want this just because they will definitely gain when a large proportion of Sunni cannot or refuse to vote. They want it to happen now while they can ensure an overwhelming majority rather than wait for some time which might not only result in more Sunnis voting, but worse than that is that Iraqis would have a better chance to learn more about democracy and find their own voice. They might start to think that it's not just choosing between what's available, but making what you chose, available.
Some of those who rush elections still think in the way Arab dictators think. They don't understand that it's not all about the 1st elections. Politics stink, doesn't it!?
Update: Here's the statement of the Iraqi National Congress:
Baghdad, (26 November 2004): The INC supports fully holding the general elections, on 31 January 2005, without any delay.
Delay in holding the elections will be a delay in the restoration of full sovereignty to Iraq. It will also be a delay of withdrawal of foreign troops.
The INC upholds that the legitimacy of the Iraqi government is based on the Transitional Administrative Law (TAL), which clearly states in Art.2.b.2. that elections must be held no later than 31 January 2004. Moreover, Art. 3 of the TAL reconfirms the January election timetable by stipulating that “likewise, no amendment may be made that could abridge in any way the rights of the Iraqi people…; extend the transitional period beyond the timeframe cited in this Law; delay the holding of elections to a new assembly”. The TAL is also reinforced in United Nations Security Resolution 1546 that also refers to date for the elections which must be respected.
The INC welcomes President Bush’s commitment to holding elections on time, which he reconfirmed in his statements today.
The INC believes that a delay in elections will increase the cycle of violence and instability further and undermine the path towards democracy for Iraq.
Contact: Entifadh Qanbar
incbaghdad@yahoo.com
telephone +1-914-360-3875 Here's a link to the statement
This is of course as a result of the kidnappings and various attacks that targeted foreigners in Iraq regardless of the nature of their presence here. This created the feeling that every foreigner walking on the streets is an easy target for direct gunfire or for kidnapping (for money or to be beheaded later). This even included Arabs and Arab firms and even Iraqis working in Arab firms. In short, anyone who is here to do something that might be good for Iraq.
One group of foreigners really caught my attention by ignoring all the dangers and moving in the streets of Baghdad showing their identity so clearly.
One might think that this group of people did so because they are very bold but actually I don't think this is true for this case. Why? Because simply they were French.
Yesterday, I saw a single car with the words "FRENCH EMBASSY" written in Arabic on the windshield moving in Karrada crowded neighborhood in broad daylight. They didn't seem to be in a hurry and were driving slowly unlike other foreigners who try to drive as fast as possible to avoid being tracked and chased.
It seems that the French are not afraid of the terrorists. Were they excluded from the terrorists' targets list for some reason? Is there a peace truce between them? Did we miss something here? Because the French are moving freely and saying for the terrorists:
"Hey, it's us, so don't mistake us for your enemies, the other foreigners! And we are not just ordinary French. We are the French government! And we are certainly not doing something good for Iraq, so relax!"
This may explain why no one is anymore worried about the two French journalists; they're in friendly hands!
On another subject, it's well known in Iraq that political parties that plan to participate in the upcoming elections are not allowed to start campaigning in the media before the 15th of December 2004.
This rule was breached yesterday and on the hands of one of the well known parties that are part of the current administration.
This party "The National Democratic Party" reserved half a page on Al-Sabah newspaper to advertise for its political program. What is worse is that Al-Sabah is published by the "Iraqi Media Network" which is run by the government in one way or another, and it's more than obvious that the government should not advertise for any political party. I expect Al-Sabah to repeat this with the major parties that form the government, but certainly not for other parties.
This is a bad sign because some parties do not seem to understand that they cannot inherit Iraq. Similar maneuvers belong to Saddam's dark age and do not and must not have a place in the new Iraq we're trying to build and parties like the one I mentioned need to wake up to this fact.
Still in the elections, I've been following the latest demands by some parties to delay the elections, and while it was really distressing to see such demands come from legal parties not from terrorists disguised in the clothes of politicians or clerics, I do understand why they made such demand that goes very well with the ultimate goal of the terrorists.
Some of these parties cannot think beyond their partisan interests and it seems they want things to calm down in the so-called Sunni triangle so that more Sunnis participate in the elections. This seems like a reasonable demand, but the problem is that they do not seek that as much as they seek to strengthen their own individual and partisan positions. I know it's just an assumption and I should not accuse them without a solid proof, but I know these people and they're not too stupid to notice that the terrorists dream is to delay the elections as much as possible if they can't prevent it.
They do understand, this yet they still want to risk the whole future of Iraq just to ensure they get more seats in the parliament. It's true that Iraqis are still not very ready for the elections and no one did a great job in educating the majority about the importance, the rules and laws of the democratic process, and from the beginning I thought we need more time to ensure that most Iraqis not only want democracy but have a minimum accepted knowledge about what it means. However, when the decision was made (due to pressure from inside and outside) I accepted it and was and still on the opinion that it should NOT be delayed no matter what.
It's interesting to see that some of the parties that demanded the delay rushed today to announce that they did not sign any document regarding this appeal! They understand that the majority wants elections as soon as possible, and most people are afraid of any delay, but the truth is that they expect it to come from America, not from Iraqi parties. Thus any party that declares such demands would be probably seen as collaborating with the Americans to prolong "occupation".
This does not necessarily mean that the parties that demand elections to be held at the exact set up date are the true patriots, as among these there are many who want this just because they will definitely gain when a large proportion of Sunni cannot or refuse to vote. They want it to happen now while they can ensure an overwhelming majority rather than wait for some time which might not only result in more Sunnis voting, but worse than that is that Iraqis would have a better chance to learn more about democracy and find their own voice. They might start to think that it's not just choosing between what's available, but making what you chose, available.
Some of those who rush elections still think in the way Arab dictators think. They don't understand that it's not all about the 1st elections. Politics stink, doesn't it!?
Update: Here's the statement of the Iraqi National Congress:
Baghdad, (26 November 2004): The INC supports fully holding the general elections, on 31 January 2005, without any delay.
Delay in holding the elections will be a delay in the restoration of full sovereignty to Iraq. It will also be a delay of withdrawal of foreign troops.
The INC upholds that the legitimacy of the Iraqi government is based on the Transitional Administrative Law (TAL), which clearly states in Art.2.b.2. that elections must be held no later than 31 January 2004. Moreover, Art. 3 of the TAL reconfirms the January election timetable by stipulating that “likewise, no amendment may be made that could abridge in any way the rights of the Iraqi people…; extend the transitional period beyond the timeframe cited in this Law; delay the holding of elections to a new assembly”. The TAL is also reinforced in United Nations Security Resolution 1546 that also refers to date for the elections which must be respected.
The INC welcomes President Bush’s commitment to holding elections on time, which he reconfirmed in his statements today.
The INC believes that a delay in elections will increase the cycle of violence and instability further and undermine the path towards democracy for Iraq.
Contact: Entifadh Qanbar
incbaghdad@yahoo.com
telephone +1-914-360-3875 Here's a link to the statement
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