IRAQ THE MODEL

Thursday, May 08, 2008

Iraq Quietly Confronts Iran With Evidence of Weapons Trafficking

The Iraqi minister of defense pushed the debate with the Iranians over their provision of weapons to Shia militias one more step on Monday. Minister Abdul Qadir Obeidi indirectly confronted the Iranians, without naming them, with new findings that prove their involvement in the arming of Shia militias.
On Monday, state-owned al-Sabah published a statement by the minister in which he spoke of the capture of a certain type of rocket that was never found in militia-held caches until now:

Defense minister Abdul Qadir Mohammed Obeidi revealed that army troops found a 200-mm ground-to-ground rocket manufactured in 2007 during a search operation by the troops north of Basra. Obeidi told al-Sabah in an exclusive interview that, under international laws and norms, this kind of rocket can be traded only with the approval of parliaments and is used only at times of extreme necessity during wars … and wondered how this rocket entered the country. Obeidi added that this rocket can be launched only from a special platform and by specialized crews.

From what I read in Iraq’s two biggest newspapers, it seems that the government is trying to step up the rhetoric against Iranian interference in Iraq and to induce uproar among the Iraqi public. Azzaman had the following information about the found rocket, provided by “intelligence officials“:

The rocket was manufactured in 2007 in Iran and is called Falaq-1. Falaq-1 is a strategic missile of immense destruction power and was used by Hezbollah against Israel in the July 2006 war. …The sources mentioned that launching this type of rockets requires a crew of several people with advanced technological expertise…The sources, that preferred to remain unnamed, said that if this rocket was launched at a target, it could obliterate an entire city and kill all of its inhabitants even if those numbered by the tens of thousands…the same sources added that increasing the range of the rocket is not a complex process and can be done inside Iraq and clarified that the discovery of this strategic rocket in Basra poses a threat to security in Iraq and the Middle East. The sources expressed fear that large numbers of this rocket might have entered Iraq with crews to launch them. If that happens then we'd be on the brink of a domestic and regional security crisis"

The exclusivity of the first statement and the anonymity of the "intelligence sources" that provided the second indicate that the message is selective in choosing the target audience; that is primarily the Iranian government and, as an inevitable byproduct, the Iraqi public. Iraqi government officials seem to have exaggerated the material significance of the finding on purpose. They also realize that western journalists and readers very unlikely to buy these exaggerated statement-that's irrelevant anyway since this is a conversation meant to be between only Baghdad and Tehran.

The minister of defense is of course no idiot when it comes to weapons and their uses and specifications and he knows that bigger rockets have occasionally been found or destroyed. He served in the former and new army and his old colleagues including the ITM father testify to his professionalism and knowledge. It's timing and attitude in Baghdad that decided the sudden intensification of the tone, not the caliber of rockets.
I think the government in Baghdad is trying to say the following to the Iranian counterpart:
1-the provision of small arms is one thing but the provision of heavy weapons that can cause panic and relatively much more destruction is another.
2-if we can accept that machineguns, RPGs and mortars can be smuggled into Iraq without the Iranian government's knowledge; we can't accept the same claim when it comes to weapons of this magnitude.
3-we know and you know that you're providing these weapons and we can't remain silent anymore. At the same time neither of us is going anywhere anytime soon, so we must learn to coexist. You don't wan us to be your enemies and we can't afford to make you ours at the moment, so knock it off and let's not show the world the dirty laundry.

The message is quite clear and simple. Baghdad sent a delegation last week to ask Iran to stop the flow of weapons and support to Shia militias. When the delegation returned empty handed the government immediately announced through spokesman Ali Dabbagh that it will work to collect and display evidence of this support-A day later the conversation escalates with the above statements. The question is; is Iran going to respond reasonably or is it going to keep denying its involvement in the crime? And if it does, I wonder what the next escalation in the conversation is going to look like.

Posted by Omar @ 13:39

Sunday, May 04, 2008

Do Iraqis Want an Arab Nuclear Bomb?

The change that took place in Iraq was not only a political one but also, and more importantly, a change in awareness; something that isn't easy to detect.
This is what I see clear in the nature of Iraqi dialogue among the public, and I'm always pleased by the degree of awareness and open-mindedness that emerged in the years that followed the change. I believe it is an important indication about the future.

Recently I've been reading through one of the BBC forums whose topic is basically "do Arabs have the right to possess nuclear weapons?". I didn't hesitate to read all the contributions, which numbered over 600 from various Arab countries. I wasn't surprised by the nature of Iraqi contributions to the discussion. I had always called these "singing outside the Arab flock".
This "singing" is almost always faced by attacks from the rest of Arabs who often generously use the word "traitors" when addressing their Iraqi counterparts just because they have different views about one issue or another.

What made me tackle this issue was not only the difference between the Iraqi and mainstream Arab views but the characteristic understanding exhibited through these Iraqi contributions of the nature of the challenge posed Arab possession of nuclear weapons to the region and especially to Arabs and Muslims themselves.
42 out of 47 Iraqi commentators voiced absolute rejection to the idea of nuclear weapons in Arab hands. More important is the consensus among those commentators that stable democracy is prerequisite to the acquisition of immense tools of power such as WMDs. Not only that, in fact some of the commentators even emphasized that only Israel has the right the possess nuclear weapons in the region because of the hostility and fanaticism of the regimes it's surrounded by.

There's no doubt how dangerous it is to allow dictatorships and WMDs to exist in the same place, and it seems that the change in Iraq has strengthened this conviction among the people. I am not surprised that Iraqis, whose country's been the field of war are more vocal and serious about rejecting proliferation and violence that peoples in countries where change hasn't happened yet. in my opinion this is the answer to present to those who claim that war has led to more extremism. In fact war did lead to more extremism, but only among those opposed to the change and who see in it a threat to their extreme ways which they try to impose on the others.
Now I leave you with some Iraqi comments. I will avoid translating comments from other Arabs since I'm sure you already know what those sound like…

"Besides the fact that nuclear programs place a heavy burden on the weak economies of Arab countries, harming the poor day in and day out…I indeed do not feel safe when I know that an Arab regime possesses such weapons because these weapons would be commanded by the desires and impulses of rulers who have been proven incompetent in anything except for repressing and impoverishing their peoples.
Mo'ammar Qaddafi has been sitting on the chest of his people for 40 years, so can you imagine figure what it's going to be like when he acquires nuclear bombs? Not to mention our horrible experience with Saddam Hussein who used WMDs against his own people."
Lateef Baghdadi. Baghdad/Iraq

"I wish from all my heart that Arabs get to build nuclear weapons because they will use them against one another and against their peoples-what Saddam did is the best example. Consequently this would lead to the extinction of Arabs and by that Arabs would be giving a free service to the civilized western world by ridding the world of themselves and their terror. The world will become safer."
Ammar Rahmatallah. Baghdad

"My name is Haider Mousawi from Arabic Basra. I absolutely refuse that Arabs acquire nuclear weapons, at least for the time being, for several reasons. First, it's dangerous for them before others, as Arab rulers are not wise and might use them against one another or against themselves (just like the former rulers of my country did to their people and the region's peoples). Second, nuclear weapons could not save super powers like the USSR from collapse. Third, they are very expensive, so it's better to [spend money] fighting poverty and unemployment. Fourth, those weapons are going to be a burden on their producers in the future and fifth, a peaceful program makes more sense."
Haider Mousawi. Basra

"Arabs' or Iranians' possession of nuclear weapons is like putting a live grenade in the hand of a six year old. That's what I consider it a huge crime against themselves and their countrymen first, and against the world second. I had worked at the Iraqi Atomic Energy Agency for several years. And although I completely believe that the Iraqi nuclear program was over by 1991 and although I refuse America's justifications for invading Iraq, I still thank God day and night that that program had been destroyed. That's because otherwise Iraq's situation would have been worse than it is right now.
No to any Arab nuclear program."
Dr. Imad Abdulwahab. Canada

"The world shall not permit Arab countries ruled by dictatorships to possess nuclear weapons or any other type of WMDs because these countries are often ruled by the impulses of one man such as the dictator Bashar Asad. This technically means that the weapons would belong to an individual, not a state and this individual might decide to sue them in a moment of anger or recklessness leading to disasters. We witnessed what Saddam did with his chemical weapons and how he decided to murder Iraqis with these weapons without a reasonable justification for their use. That's why no tyrannical regime should be allowed to possess these weapons."
Ahmed. Baghdad

"Even thinking about this subject should be forbidden to Arabs, Iranians and Muslims because of the factor of religious and sectarian extremism. The world would be living in the dark ages had these dangerous weapons fell into their hands."
Saad al-Iraqi. Baghdad

"Arabs do not have the right to possess nuclear weapons. The Arab mentality cannot handle uranium; they're good for no more than rifles. Had Saddam had nuclear weapons, he would have bombed all Arabs; Egypt, Kuwait, Lebanon, even Saudi Arabia and the Ka'aba."
Fadhil Bayati. Mosul

"No, no Arab country has the right to possess nuclear weapons. The reasons are as clear as the sun at noontime…All Arab leaders are not qualified for leadership; first they're stupid and second they're criminals. Imagine what someone who commits crimes against his own people do if he had nuclear weapons? Nuclear weapons should be in the hands of only civilized democratic regimes, not backward criminal regimes.
If Arab rulers get to acquire these weapons then, well, so much for planet earth!!!"
Abbas Husseini. Thi-Qar/Iraq

"Imagine that Arabs were in Israel's position and had these weapons, would they stand idle? Certainly they would bomb Gaza and destroy it altogether. Imagine that Hezbollah had these weapons, would it sit back and watch or use them? You have a big example in Saddam."
Tariq Sajid. Baghdad

"I think that only mature democracies have the right to have nuclear weapons…"
Ali al-Ali. An Iraqi in Jordan

"Only democracies like Israel or India can have these weapons while Arab countries would threaten world peace and the future of life on the planet. Even if Arabs don’t get to have strategic missiles to strike the west, they'd detonate [the weapons] in their homes and against their peoples in any case of revolt.
When Arabs acquired conventional explosives they strapped them to their cars and their own bodies and enhanced them with nails and ball bearings to attack civilian crowds at weddings and hospitals. This is what happened and keep happening in Iraq, Jordan, Israel and Egypt and all other places infested with terrorism."
Mohammed al-Iraqi. Baghdad/Iraq

"By no means can Syria, the member of the axis of evil and their followers be compared with Israel. If Israel wanted to strike Muslims with WMDs it would have done it long time ago. While if an organization like Hezbollah acquired these dangerous weapons-God forbid-they would murder the innocent and the guilty alike and then regret would be useless…peace be with those who want good for others the way they want it for themselves."
Ahmed. Kufa

Posted by Mohammed @ 22:04

Monday, April 28, 2008

Are Sadr and Al-Qaeda Teaming Up in Iraq?

A few days ago, there were two suspiciously coordinated statements emerging from Iraq. Muqtada al-Sadr made open-war threats followed immediately by a similar threat from al-Qaeda.
As they say, there is usually no smoke without fire.

Respected Iraqi writer and lawyer Suleiman Hakim (a prominent writer regularly published on the leading Iraqi politics and culture website Kitabat ) reported on April 11th -more than a week before Sadr and Abu Ayyub made their threats- about serious negotiations taking place between Sadr’s movement and a leader of the Islamic army group.
The meetings, Hakim believes, are taking place in Syria and Lebanon and are sponsored by a special Syrian security apparatus specialized in Iraqi affairs.

“Sheik Zergani [Sadr’s representative in Lebanon] and Sadr’s representative in Syria met in the Lebanese capital last March with Mr. Khalil Jumeily [a leader of the Islamic army] and after preliminary discussions in which they exchanged their views about the situation in Iraq and their plans for overthrowing the existing order and reviewing the positions of domestic and regional allies, they decided to resume the discussions in Damascus so that once they reach specific agreements, one certain Syrian security apparatus in charge of Iraqi issues would witness and sponsor those agreements. the relationships between Sadr movement and the Islamic army are not outside the frame of the Iran-Syria alliance. And so these relationships are being restored after being severed in the aftermath of the holy shrines bombings in 2006 and the massacres committed by Mahdi army indiscriminately against Sunni Iraqis. The main requirement of the new agreement is that the Islamic army launch wide operations against American and government targets and to take control of cities and towns near the army’s strongholds, in addition to the provision of assistance and backup to the Mahdi army once Muqtada unfreezes the army and gives the green light for starting the battle against the authority of the Shia coalition. … [The objective is] to create a new situation on the ground that forces the American forces to negotiate a new formula for power and authority in Iraq."

The fact that this story was written almost days before both al-Qaeda leaders sent in a wave of audio recordings and Muqtada threatened open war gives them increased credibility.
True, the idea of the Islamic army cooperating with Mahdi army sounds as peculiar as it always has. Not because of the sectarian difference, because the two groups did cooperate and sent reinforcements to each other back in 2004 during the battles of Fallujah and Najaf.
It’s because by considering a new joint venture with Sadr the Islamic army is making two huge mistakes. It’s true that the leaders of the group are likely not politically savvy and driven by emotion, but it still should be easy for them to understand that this would be a blunder.

Why?
First, by siding with Sadr they’d be obviously choosing a losing partner in the long run, and the bet on quick gains through a nationwide shock offensive is too much of a longshot stretch, with highly unpredictable outcome.
Second, and most important, is that former Sunni insurgent groups (the Islamic army being one of the most prominent), by turning against al-Qaeda, have already created for themselves better bargaining positions when it comes to negotiating the future distribution of power in the country with the government or the U.S.

It is close to impossible to truly gauge what the leaders of these groups are thinking because we still don’t have enough knowledge about the subtleties that underlie the relationships between the different factions within the Sunni insurgency in general, and the Islamic army in particular.
But we Iraqis need to stay alert, for something nasty might be brewing for us in Damascus.

Posted by Omar @ 09:24

Monday, April 21, 2008

Al-Qaeda in Iraq: Determined but Desperate

The latest three messages from al-Qaeda addressing the Sunni community uncover the depth of the crisis that al-Qaeda is facing in its former host community.
The threatening tone of the missives from the alleged Abu Omar Baghdadi and Aby Ayyub, and the insulting tone of the second by Zawahiri, reflect mistrust, anxiety and a dire need to retrieve what was lost.

Death threats do not represent a serious call for cooperation on an achievable objective. This “work-for-me-or-I-kill-you” tone is completely different from the usual recruiting slogans that have focused on the ideology of fighting for absolute truth against absolute evil.
Those slogans have failed, which is why they have been discarded and replaced by threats and an effort to seek out third parties to render verdicts on disagreements, which is what Baghdadi alluded to when he proposed that some (not all!) Sunni clerics come forward to mediate between al-Qaeda and the public.

This call for mediation indicates first, that al-Qaeda has lost direct contact with the public and second, that there are still some clerics involved with al-Qaeda.
This is the main reason why people have abandoned the Association of Muslim scholars and it’s also the reason that moderate Sunni clerics declare war on the organization.
This is also a reason for the conflict between some tribes with some members of the Islamic party. One suspects that a group of the party’s members are essentially stuck with al-Qaeda: they can’t walk away because of the incriminating evidence al-Qaeda has against them and could threaten to expose.

Of course the threatening messages had to be backed with action in order to be taken seriously; the bombings in Mosul, Anbar and Diyala served as the actual bloody part of the message.

Here we can note, however, that the act didn’t match the threat. Instead of killing security forces and “awakening” fighters only (whom al-Qaeda calls collaborators) the murderous crimes reached civilians who had nothing to do with the whole conflict. Although one attack targeted a funeral of two “awakening” members, the actual victims were noncombatant mourners.
These crimes demonstrate that the principles and values that al-Qaeda touted are false and that the old ways have failed. Otherwise al-Qaeda wouldn’t have switched to terrorizing fellow Sunnis instead of promising mansions in heaven and dozens of virgins.

It is worth noting a difference in style: while Baghdadi used threats, al-Zawahiri has instead resorted to insults. By asking “Are these Awakening Councils in need of someone to defend them and protect them?” al-Zawahiri is playing on the sensitivity of the issue of pride.
In Arabic, there are instances in which questions could serve as assertive statements, in this case an insulting one. Basically what he’s saying is “By seeking protection and cooperation from the US military you are behaving like helpless women and children”.

Such an insult directed against tribal warriors hardened by endless wars since 1980 to date could easily infuriate the target audience more than Baghdadi’s threats did.
It is likely the response of the people will be of the scale of al-Qaeda’s crimes and that blood will only bring blood. This is what we saw from the first reaction from sheik Ali Suleiman of the Duleim tribe (the most prominent tribe in Anbar) who said “we’re not going to let them walk out of our land alive” and called Baghdadi’s message “words of a mad man”. This last notion of madness technically indicates that what al-Qaeda is proposing is absolutely nonnegotiable; the sheik didn’t use words like unacceptable, inappropriate, too harsh, too arrogant; he simply called the proposal crazy.

Attacks on civilians are only going to make the “Awakening” warriors more determined to stand their ground and al-Qaeda is only going to get more solid resistance and more enmity from the people in return for keeping this course of action.
The bad news is that the timing of the newest message from Abu Ayyub suggests that Iraq is heading for tough times in the short term.
It appears that Abu Ayyub wants to synchronize his own campaign with that promised by Sadr.

They know that Iraqi army units have been pulled from Anbar and elsewhere to support the fight against Shia militias, meaning that escalation on a second front would make the job of the Iraqi and US military harder.
The messages in words and bombs indicate that al-Qaeda remains determined to fight on the Iraqi front, which Zawahiri once again called “the fortress” of al-Qaeda’s terror campaign and will keep directing resources towards this purpose.
But at the same time, the vocal anger and frustration reveal that al-Qaeda continues to lose allies and ground and that time on the long run is not on its side. Above all it means that those of us determined to fight terrorism must not lose resolve in this critical battle.

Al-Qaeda has made the Iraqi front its physical center of gravity, and so it’s exactly the place where we must fight, and win.

Posted by Omar @ 08:26

Tuesday, April 15, 2008

Iraq's Moment of Truth in Baghdad and Basra

The battle between criminal gangs and the state continues, yet the war is far from being over. Public statements keep coming from both sides and they don’t seem to promise a diplomatic resolution for the crisis.
The latest exchange included a pledge for a “final battle” by Sadr’s spokesman Bahaa Aaraji and an assertion by Maliki that the government will not stop pursuing gangs militarily and politically. Telling Sadr that his movement cannot take part in elections unless he disbands his militias and surrenders weapons is a turning point in Iraqi politics, especially because a broad political front including leading Sunni, Shia, and Kurdish powers emerged to back this new trend in dealing with this issue.

I think what encouraged Maliki to push the limits of the conflict to this unprecedented level was the first-of-a-kind success of the Political Council for National Security — an entity that includes the president, PM, and leaders of major parliamentary blocs — to reach consensus on a decision. This entity managed for the first time a week ago to overcome the impotence that had halted its mission since its inception. Evidence of the newfound potency of this entity is that Ayad Allawi, who had refused being part of it for a long time, is now sending delegates to negotiate terms for his membership.

The ongoing confrontation highlights a dramatic change in the inclination of the Iraqi leadership, which decided to face the challenge with unwavering resolve instead of shrinking away. We have learned from the experience of the last five years that unresolved fights tend to be very costly in the long run, as we will have to deal with recurrent fights over and over again. It can be understood from Maliki’s words that he came to realize that the decision to disband or exterminate illegal military entities should have been made a long time ago.

At this point neither side is happy with the results and I think that both have made up their minds to go to war because each one thinks his side is closer to winning and has greater backing from the public than his rival. However, I believe that Sadr is making the mistake of thinking that what worked for previous battles would be equally effective in future ones. I strongly think that if a final battle is to take place, it will unfold with a bitter defeat for Sadr militarily and politically; the balance of power by far favors the state in spite of the difficulty of the situation.

The Iraqi leadership represented by Maliki is standing before a historic opportunity to strengthen the foundations of the rule of law. This opportunity has been made available by the decision of the Shia to renounce and expel the extremists amongst them, a decision that was long avoided because of sectarian considerations that were proven wrong later.
Everyone has come to realize that allegiance to the country provides more security in the long run than sectarian entrenchment does, and in my opinion the awakening of the Iraqi west and the uprising against the perverted violent practices of co-religionists have provided an example for a similar awakening among the Shia — of course, with the main difference we outlined in an earlier post; that is, while in the west we had a tribal uprising against extremist religious powers, in the south the uprising is religious-on-religious, with the target highly identified with one particular group.

I believe that another promising sign further emphasizes, to the government and people alike, that putting sect and tribe above country is a bad idea. Today 1,300 police and soldiers who disobeyed orders or, worse, sided with the enemy in Basra will get to taste the consequences of that, the same way that the commanders who were in charge of recruiting them did.
This housecleaning is not limited to security forces; Maliki also issued an order to fire Habib Sadr, the director general of the Iraqi Media Network, obviously over the disgraceful coverage of the battle. I didn’t follow the coverage of Iraqiya TV, but there was a lot of misplaced sympathy for Sadr on the government-owned al-Sabah, and the reader could indeed feel that the network was apologizing for, if not defending, the militias.

Back to the awakening theme. In both cases, extremists did not look after their brethren and tried to impose their radical views and practices upon everyone else around them. That’s why although the sect was perceived as a source of security in the first place, people got to realize with time that those extremists who held the banner of the sect had a different agenda from the provision of security for their people.

No Iraqi leader since 2003 has had the same broad support for a policy that Maliki has right now. For the first time a leader has the support of a majority of Shia, along with the approval of the Sunni and Kurds in addition to the sympathy of the public, which has grown tired of the recklessness and violence of Sadr’s movement. For the first time the leader appears more like a leader of Iraq than a leader of a particular sect, party, or ethnic group. Moreover, he has won the support of the coalition to further build an unprecedented consensus among all concerned parties.
I see that Maliki and the government are standing before a chance that will not come again to move the country forward. I’m optimistic about Maliki’s promises and determination more than ever and I totally agree with him that the solution is in disbanding the Mahdi Army (or al-hal hoa al-hal; literally, “the solution is in the [dis]solution,” in a play on words of which Iraqis understand the implicit meaning).

Again, the main element in a resolution for the battle should not be exclusively military through disarming the Mahdi Army, nor exclusively political by excluding the movement from the political process. It has to be also judiciary.
The rule of law must be established and emphasized through prosecuting the heads of the movement who are involved in major atrocities. Evidence is abundant and damning; the movement repeatedly took up arms against the state and caused the deaths of many thousands of civilians and security personnel.
In fact the movement itself keeps offering free confessions every time they boast of their militiamen’s performance in battle. If we actually succeed in putting the leaders of the militia on trial, then I believe that all others who illegally carry arms will be facing a serious challenge. As the Arabic proverb says, “Hit the big and the little will be frightened.” Right now the Mahdi Army is the biggest among insurgents, so defeating it will make others think more than twice before they take up arms against the legitimate institutions of the state.

I hope the Iraqi leadership benefits from this moment of unity, not only to quell violence but also to promote political reconciliation. I agree with observers in Baghdad who say that we’re witnessing a political spring. The most important event so far has been Maliki’s meeting with VP Hashimi to discuss the revival of the national unity government. Actually, a political breakthrough is now more likely to take place than ever, especially since all rivals have acknowledged Maliki’s role as a leader of a central government that has the exclusive right, and the obligation, to restore the prestige of the state and establish the rule of law.
Again, it’s a great opportunity for making substantial progress in the process of building the state and we must not waste it.

Posted by Omar @ 17:42

Saturday, March 29, 2008

Iraq: Whither Sadr and the Mahdi Army?

As fighting rages between government forces and Sadr’s militia in several cities, senior clerics from the hawza (senior Grand Ayatollahs) made a debut in the conflict.

Ayatollah Fadhil Al-Maliki issued a fatwa in which he openly called on police and army to abandon their duty, adding that operation Knights’ Charge is not targeting criminals but an aggression against “the majority of the Iraqi people.” Although there is news about a handful of soldiers and policemen abandoning their posts and joining the militia, this fatwa is not going to have a significant effect on operations. However it’s a reminder that there are still people who bet on fatwas as long as some are willing to offer allegiance to the sect instead of the country.

This fatwa revives the old conflict over legitimacy between the ethnic Arab and foreign clerics of the hawza. The former, like Ayatollah Al-Maliki or Sadr himself, accuse non-Arab clerics like Sistani of leading a “Hawza Samita” or a silent hawza in the face of what Sadr considers injustice and tyranny.
Iran, on the other hand and as we predicted yesterday, chose not to endorse Sadr’s position and did nothing more than issue a call through Ahmed Jannati, chief of the Guardians Council, for negotiations between Sadr and the government to resolve the crisis.

On the field, as fighting spread to include Karbala province, Sadrists rejected Maliki’s call to lay down their weapons and said they’d do that only surrender their weapons to a government that “fights the occupation”. Putting such an unrealistic condition is synonymous to “we will never lay down our weapons”. This defiance is logical from their perspective that is based on force and in order to justify the use of force they need to find a pretext—and what’s better than claiming to be fighting for the cause of national liberation!?

The clashes were not limited to the streets of Basra, the halls of the parliament saw some fighting as well, but in the form of fist-fights between Sadrist MPs and their counterparts from the other parties in the UIA. The UIA and Kurdish bloc walked out of last evening’s emergency session after an intense verbal exchange among some MPs developed into a fist fight, the chief of the UIA bloc Jalal al-Din Saghier told Radio Sawa.
The parliament as usual decided to form a committee to deal with the situation—a move to save face, no more; in Iraq we have a joke that says “if you want to not solve an issue, let a committee take care of it”.
Again, as predicted in an earlier post, Sadrists have approached tribal leaders and clerics and asked them to mediate between them and the government. The prince of the giant Rabi’a tribe will lead a delegation to negotiate a solution with the government.

Last but not least, it’s good to finally hear Maliki acknowledge the danger that Sadr’s militia pose to the country. Saying that Shia militias are “worse than al-Qaeda” signifies the ferocity of the battle and the enormous pressure it applies on the government. It makes me optimistic that the leadership has realized the extent and nature of the threat. In fact I hope that my expectation of a truce that spares the heads of evil proves wrong. Avoiding taking a battle to the end could cost us several times the price in recurrent outbreaks of violence.

While most influential parties seem to be in favor of the crackdown on Mahdi army (including Kurds who view Sadr as an obstacle to establishing the federal system that would grant them control over Kirkuk. Also recall that Masoud Barazani was so vocal in expressing his hostility to Sadr back in late 2003 when he was temporary president of the GC) Sadr’s old ally Ibrahim Jaafari stepped forward to call for an end to the fighting and to accept the Sadrists back in the political process. The statement was described by Maliki’s advisor Sami Askari as “inappropriate and meaningless“.

But ironically a similar call came from Adnan Duleimi of the Sunni Accord Front. In my opinion this came out of Duleimi’s concern about maintaining the balance of power among Shia parties—a Da’wa and SIIC with near absolute power in the center and south would put more power at the disposal of these parties in Baghdad with federalism again being the central issue.

I was going to stop here but now I see that Sadr finally decided to break his silence and make the first public appearance in several months. While the location of the interview remains undisclosed, the fact that he was interviewed by Ghassan Bin Jidou suggests that he’s either in Iran or is enjoying the generous hospitality of his Lebanese twin Nesrallah (can anyone check the recent stamps on Bin Jidou’s passport?).

I want to end this by saying that if we put together Sadr’s words that he’s in control of the Mahdi army and Maliki’s words that Shia militias are worse than al-Qaeda then the logical conclusion should be that Sadr must be dealt with in the same manner in which we deal with terrorist chiefs when we spot them.

Posted by Omar @ 22:25

Friday, March 28, 2008

Behind the Bloodshed in Basra

One of the most notable things about the fierce and bloody confrontation taking place the government and Sadr’s militia is the spin on the operation by the commanders and the government; that it is a crackdown on outlaws with emphasis that the operation targets no particular movement or political line.
This generic label, includes the so-called rogue Sadrists. Sadr announced only weeks ago that whoever doesn’t uphold the ceasefire would no longer be considered a member of the movement.

Now, Sadr is watching those rogue elements being hit hard by the government forces. Instead of disavowing those who blatantly disobeyed his ceasefire orders we see him call for negotiations and condemning the government, thus once more revealing his real face as a defender of his own version of terrorism.
Another important dimension in this confrontation, largely ignored, regards Sadr’s rhetoric about security situation in Basra. The anti-Multinational Force powers always blamed British troops for insecurity in the province prior to their withdrawal.

Now it must be asked in a loud clear voice - who’s responsible for insecurity now that British troops are gone?
Another important aspect of this operation is the excessive enthusiasm of the UIA-led government in striking the Sadrists, who are supposed to be part of the UIA and are also Shiites.

This is the first sign of the rising election fever in the south. Word on the street is that Sadrists want to hijack the provincial elections. Everybody knows that their criminal methods can severely reduce the chances for holding fair elections and may grant Sadr’s people huge gains at the expense of other Shiite factions such as the SIIC, Da’wa and Fadheela. The stakes are high for the SIIC in particular whose federal dream in the south, which Sadr is opposed to, hinges on the results of provincial elections.
If Sadr is to be cut down to size before the provincial election law can be passed, presumably his rivals would be able to compete in a relatively more civil way.
The outcome of this operation in my opinion will not involve the extermination of Sadr’s militia but rather the reduction of its power.
A truce would then be put in place with mediation by senior clerics, tribal leaders and third-party politicians.

But this would be a mistake - similar to former interim prime minister Allawi’s when he didn’t finish the job back in Najaf four years ago, except that the situation is more complicated this time as both belligerents are from the UIA.
Why? Because leaders like Saddam, Nasrallah and Sadr always manage to turn defeat into symbolic victory for domestic consumption. If Sadr and a decent part of the movement’s command survive this round, he will portray his movement as an innocent victim of the “occupation and its agents” and will use this for an even louder propaganda campaign after the battle.
Those killed in the fighting are poor unfortunate followers, but the real outlaws, the heads of the movement, will likely escape punishment.

Just like Desert Storm or the summer 2006 Lebanon war, the survival of the leader can easily become synonymous to victory in their twisted dictionary.
And let’s not forget Iran. Its role in this chapter of the struggle for power in the south is still unclear to observers. Both sides of the conflict are friends of Iran, yet I think Iran will support the SIIC and prime minister Maliki this time.
It appears, for now, that Iran has begun to abandon this undisciplined movement. Iran has learned over time that Sadr’s militia, although powerful in some regions, is reckless and unpredictable - unlike the rest of the UIA which is consistent and organized in utilizing the power granted to them as the biggest party in the government to their advantage.

It is true that the grand strategies of Tehran and Sadr are quite the same when it comes to their ambitions in spreading their version of totalitarian Shia Islamism in the region. However, Sadr’s ambitious aspirations are not in harmony with Tehran’s tactical plans. He rejects a federal system in Iraq because he wants to control the whole country, while Iran at this stage is only looking forward to having an ally in a stable Iraqi south.

This is why supporting the SIIC makes more sense for Iran as the most reliable party that may be able to make the autonomous region in the south a reality—a reality in which Iran has a strategic interest, as it can turn the south into a friendly buffer zone instead of a thorn in its side.

Posted by Omar @ 13:46

Thursday, March 27, 2008

Iraqis and US Presidential Elections

While common sense suggests that Iraq would be very interested in the U.S. presidential race — given the immense influence of U.S. decision-making on the situation in the country — we see that the local media in Iraq have largely been ignoring the developments of the Democratic and Republican primaries. Moreover, we have hardly heard any comments from the political class, and the average person on the street is not as interested about the American election as they were in 2004.

What could be the reasons for this?

The first, I believe, is that the clock in Baghdad ticks slower than the clock in Washington. It’s very likely that the media and politicians are not yet interested in the American election simply because there’s still plenty of time left until Americans get to make their final decision. Meanwhile, everyone in Iraq is busy living with immediate domestic challenges and issues of daily life.

There are, however, other likely reasons for the country’s lack of interest. The political class, for example, is perhaps reluctant to endorse or oppose any of the three candidates. This is a natural defense mechanism. They don’t want to throw in their lot with one candidate and then have to deal with a winner they opposed. That would be a great political risk to take for any Iraqi politician or party, especially since the Iraqi election is only 12 months after the American one. The media, being largely reflective of the viewpoints of the government or political parties outside the government, are expected then to exhibit the same kind of behavior in order not to undermine their political sponsors or affiliates.

While I expect the silence of the media and politicians to last through the coming months, the average Iraqi will begin to get more and more interested in the subject. From previous experience, I believe this will become visible once there are only two candidates competing for the presidency. That’s when the clock will — finally — start ticking in Baghdad.

No opinion polls have been conducted to see which of the three candidates (McCain, Clinton, Obama) is viewed most favorably by Iraqis. If I were to try to predict their feelings, I’d start by restating the fact that most Iraqis are concerned first and foremost about their living conditions — economy, security, water, electricity — and they care primarily about coming up with solutions to these problems. Iraqis have also come to realize that their problems are essentially domestic, arising from the struggle among political powers. These in turn are complicated by regional interference, which is most of the time permitted by those very same political powers.
Therefore, the solution has to come from within, and from within only. Yet we cannot ignore that this requires a foreign factor represented by the American presence. This presence is the only hope for creating the environment under which the solution from within can be reached. This is exactly the rationale for the surge, of which McCain has been one of the strongest proponents, if not its main architect.

While many Iraqis may be oblivious to that last fact, I believe there’s wide agreement that Iraq still needs America’s commitment to the democratic project in the country. Perhaps this belief is more prevalent among ordinary people than it is among politicians, particularly those who aren’t sincerely interested in the idea of a unified state. Those politicians, while still more or less silent, view the American presence as a restraint to their ambitions in the long run. They feel they have mustered the tools of power that would enable them to survive and prevail against their rivals — including the not-yet-strong central government in Baghdad — if they enter a struggle to realize their ambitions of walking away with a big enough chunk of the country; the SIIC of Hakim embodies this trend. There are also the Kurdish leaders who are growing more dissatisfied with the current administration’s “complicity” in Turkey’s operations in Kurdistan and are receiving American criticism for the undemocratic way in which they’ve been running their political parties and the Kurdish region so far.

In contrast with ordinary people — or at least with the predicted opinion of ordinary people — these two groups of politicians would rather see an administration that wants to walk away from the problem than one that wants to solve the problem.
This has encouraged Republican leaders, in particular John McCain, to visit Baghdad to negate the state of reluctance that accompanies the waiting for the American election results. This state of reluctance and the delay in passing laws are not good for the democratic process as a whole.

Visits like this, with the absence of similar visits from Democrats, have two dimensions: first, they push the political process in Iraq in order to achieve stability there, which would help the Republicans in the elections. Second, it makes Iraqi politicians and the public understand that a change in the administration does not necessarily mean abandoning Iraq and the immediate withdrawal of troops from the country. The Iraqi government has to work on these basics instead of standing by idly and wasting precious time.

Posted by Omar @ 14:29

Tuesday, January 29, 2008

Al-Qaeda in Iraq's New Sponsor: Libya

After Iran, Syria and others it's now Libya's turn to sponsor terrorism in Iraq.
The news popped up for a second then it vanished; Gaddafi's son is accused by senior awakening officials in Anbar of funding and sending a group of foreign terrorists to Iraq. This particular group, awakening leaders believe, was responsible for the explosives cache that caused the devastating explosion in Mosul last week.

Col. Jubair Rashid Naief, who also is a police official in Anbar province, said those attacks were carried out by the Seifaddin Regiment, made up of about 150 foreign and Iraqi fighters who slipped into the country several months ago from Syria.
Naief said the regiment, which is working with al-Qaida in Iraq, was supported by Seif al-Islam Gadhafi, 36, the eldest son of the Libyan leader.
"I am sure of what I am talking about, and it is documented," Naief said, adding that he was "100 percent sure" of the younger Gadhafi's role with the terror group.

Does this not deserve thorough investigation?

We shouldn't be surprised to see young Gaddafi being accused of sponsoring terrorism in Iraq, not should we be surprised if he turns out to be actually involved in sponsoring that "battalion" of terrorists. The dictators of the Middle East have a long-established trend of sponsoring terrorism and provoking chaos in any relevant, or irrelevant, part of the world they have access to. The 2nd half of the 20th century was full of examples of this sort; Saddam funding insurgents in Chad, Egypt becoming part of a civil war in Yemen, Tunisia hosting the PLO, Saddam providing shelter for Dzhokhar Dudayev in 1993, and the list goes long.

However, I am very surprised that this news is being bizarrely ignored by the media.
Did the world get so used to the idea of terror-sponsoring regimes interfering sending death and murderers to Iraq, or did the world get so used to hearing about terrorist attacks in Iraq that an incident like this one is "just another bombing"?

I think this is a case that deserves a lot of attention and some serious investigation; maybe just as much attention as political assassinations in Lebanon have been getting.

On the one hand the accusation should be taken seriously simply because the accused-and his father- have the motive, the tools and a fairly long record of employing terrorism.
Gaddafi's regime is hardcore anti-American so there's every reason to think the regime would try to strike America's interest and efforts in Iraq. Although the tone changed since 2003 but I strongly doubt he did deep down. Gaddafi has also long treated Iraq as an enemy and he, along with Syria, were the only Arab regimes that were Iran's allies during the eight year war.
Moreover, there's a good reason to think that Gaddafi's son, Saif al-Islam want to take revenge upon America, and what's a better place than Iraq to do this!
Remember that his sister was killed in the US air strike on their home in the mid 1980s when he was still a teenager and I don’t think he forgot about it.

On the other hand, the awakening councils should be taken seriously when it comes to the intelligence they gather and offer. First and foremost the reason behind their success in Anbar was mostly their ability to gather and utilize reliable intelligence. The awakening fighters don't have the firepower, technology, training or discipline of organized armies yet they made huge success against al-Qaeda. The only asset I can think of that enabled them to do so is intelligence.
Let's not forget that those fighters were until recently close to, if not part of the network that includes al-Qaeda so it's not unlikely that some of them had access to information about operations and movements that are taking place just now. It's logical to think that terrorists would abort missions whose details have been compromised but the different times at which former insurgents split from al-Qaeda to join the awakening and the quick pace of changes on the ground provides room for confusion and mistakes.

One more important finding makes my suspicion stronger. Could it be a coincidence that the percentage that Libyan nationals make up of total foreign terrorists has spiked during 2007? According to recently captured documents that US military captured in Sinjar, a town west of Mosul, one fifth of foreign fighters who came to Iraq between in the year leading to August 2007 were Libyan nationals. Or could be another coincidence that Libya covertly sponsored a satellite TV channel in Iraq that was going to launch in late 2006, the same time the Libyan "surge" started? This is a new and surprising figure that suggests that there's an organized effort to recruit and send fighters from Libya to Iraq; an effort not easy to undertake in a repressive police state unless someone above the law is involved.

I think the least thing to do is to make sure that as operations in Mosul proceed and suspects and enemy fighters are captured that interrogators dig for information about Gaddafi's son involvement. Another thing that we can do would be to go back and interrogate all militants and suspects that were captured in and around Mosul since the estimated time of arrival of the "battalion" the awakening official mentioned.

The truth must be discovered and the criminals, whoever they are, must be exposed and made an example so that others think twice before trying to do the same.

Posted by Omar @ 19:51

Friday, January 25, 2008

Hello my friends! We feel terrible about not writing anything all this time.
Mohammed and I are both doing fine, I'm doing fine at school as well, my grades from the first semester weren't exactly impressive but I'm quite satisfied given it was the first semester and I had to adjust to a completely new system.

First of all we want to thank all the friends who sent emails checking on us; thank you guys! That was really sweet of you.
We can't make promises about writing more regularly except that we will try. You know, we both live far away from Iraq now and far away from each other as well while in the first four years of blogging we used to work as a team from the same spot; watching the same news, touring the same streets and witnessing the same events firsthand, so it's a big challenge to operate effectively when all of those things are no longer possible, but we'll see…

Now I just want to make a quick comment on a resurfacing story, which is the Lancet study.
Our friends at Iraqi bloggers central emailed me saying that the study has recently been proven wrong and wondered if the Iraqi bloggers who attacked us over our criticism of the study would apologize now since we were right in our criticism.

Frankly I neither need nor expect an apology. The people who deserve a sincere apology are Iraqis as a whole, especially those who are still inside. They deserve an apology from this group of bloggers who so much wanted to believe that an additional half a million of them were dead just to support their view of the war.

Ok, that's all I have to say for now. At least you can have a new fresh thread to post your comments because the number in the last one is getting ridiculous!

Posted by Omar @ 16:47

Wednesday, December 05, 2007

How to eat an elephant

Most people would say it’s impossible. No one could eat an elephant. Others would argue that one actually could eat an elephant—with patience, one bite at a time.
The government cracked down on the Association of Muslim Scholars, an organization of Sunni clerics sympathetic to al-Qaeda and believed to have even been involved in leading, funding and hosting insurgent groups that have been responsible for countless attacks against Iraqis and Americans alike.

Unlike previous operations, this one is different in that the troops were sent following a request submitted to the government by the department of Sunni endowment, an entity in charge of overseeing Sunni mosques and other religious activities. The chief of the Sunni endowment, Sheikh Ahmed Abdul Ghafour Samarraie, is a moderate Sunni cleric who has renounced the insurgency and explicitly accused the association of assisting al-Qaeda by justifying their murderous attacks against Iraqis.

For four years now we’ve been waiting for this to happen. This al-Qaeda apologist, so-called association of Muslim scholars had to be dealt with and honestly it was frustrating to see them operate freely when the damage they caused was widely known, in nature if not in extent.

This incident, I believe, is not to be seen as abstract and it’s no coincidence that the raid on their office came amid efforts to prosecute corrupt officials from Sadr’s movement and the Fadheela Party. The list includes the former deputy minister of health, a Sadr follower who’s been accused of running sectarian death squads and the chief of the integrity committee in the parliament; a member of the Fadheela Party which is believed to be involved in massive oil smuggling operations in the south. He is now about to lose parliamentary immunity over corruption charges.

The interesting thing indeed is that the officials who are leading this campaign and rose to challenge the Sadrists and the association are from their respective sects and regions.

In Karbala, as a most recent example, the police chief finally declared the Mahdi Army an outlaw group. He accused them of murdering over 700 Iraqi civilians, 70 police officers, kidnapping over 130 civilians as well as conducting some 50 attacks with roadside bombs over the last three years in Karbala province alone.

In my opinion, what we’re seeing right now is an exploitation of the achievements of the surge strategy in the direction to establish rule of law-step by step.

I think, and it would be a practical approach if that was the case, that the campaign will involve multiple steps and will deal with targets one at a time according to a certain pattern; that is from the most aggressive, least reconcilable and less politically powerful to the less aggressive, more reconcilable and more politically powerful.

Yes, I consider Sadr now to fit in the less powerful politically category because a) PM Maliki became less dependent on him after withdrew his followers from the cabinet and from the UIA as well and b) his political weight comes from his ability to create chaos and fear; this ability is not as great as it used to be.

Of course such a pattern would require different means and tactics to deal with each target. For example with al-Qaeda it is simply a great military and intelligence effort to exterminate them. With Sunni insurgents it was a combination of coercion and persuasion. Those who agree to cooperate are welcome in the new Iraq-those contributed to the effort against al-Qaeda — while those who don’t suffer the consequences.

Now it’s Sadr’s and Dhari’s (the head of the association of Muslim scholars) turn. The two have been more or less defanged in many parts of the country as Dhari can’t find reliable bargaining power in al-Qaeda anymore and as Sadr is being squeezed with pressure from his former allies in the UIA and determined Iraqi military commanders in the south.

In my assessment of the situation, I think this phase of the campaign will focus on these two threats while momentarily purposely overlooking the smaller ones (small in the ability to create chaos, greater in political weight though). This can make a lot of sense. What stopped the US military from taking decisive action against Dhari or Sadr and his followers were the concerns that doing so might cause more harm than good. Now it seems that those two have lost the capacity to cause enough chaos. In other words they no longer can deter a decisive action by the US troops and Iraqi government. This is truer since the decisive action is coming in the form of legal processes and charges pushed by Iraqi officials supported by evidence, meaning the defendants are denied the use of the occupation /sectarian partiality cliché.

When this phase is completed, and it might take a while, the judicial and security institutions of the state will have gained confidence, popular support and will be galvanized by the experience. That would prepare the atmosphere for the launch of the next phase—cleaning the “house of moderates”. Those moderates (represented by parties such as the SIIC, Islamic Party, Kurdish parties, etc) have enjoyed a fairly long “grace period” since they have been indispensable in establishing the political process after the fall of the former regime. But when state institutions become stronger, terror and other threats and manipulation by extremists would be neutralized to a great extent; those parties will become more vulnerable to scrutiny and to the rule of law.

Our moderate politicians-I prefer to call them “less radical” politicians — might not like this in the future but I doubt they would be able to stop the moving wheel of evolution. The beautiful nature of democracy and power-sharing is that concessions will always be made in order to preserve both; the system for the state and the best possible position for the groups within.

Posted by Omar @ 08:36

Wednesday, November 14, 2007

Troops and locals stop twenty car bombs from reaching the streets of Baghdad.

Yesterday a joint US-Iraqi force with help from local anti-al-Qaeda awakening fighters in the Adhamiyah district in northeastern Baghdad found and disarmed more than 20 vehicles rigged as VBIEDs in a parking lot.

This is a great find by any standards but the timing makes it all the more significant.
The significance comes not only from the quantity of bombs, cars and other resources that al-Qaeda has been denied the ability to use. It comes from the amount of frustration they have to deal with right now that all these preparations and resources are lost.

What makes me think that this will indeed frustrate them is that al-Qaeda chose to mass this great number of VBIEDs instead of deploying them to the streets one, or a few, at a time fresh from the factory. Two possibilities arise here; they either couldn't find the means and safe routes to deploy the bombs and so they had to wait for more favorable circumstances, which is good news since it means their ability to conduct missions has really been reduced to a great extent.
Or it could mean that they were planning for something big, and I'm more inclined to think that this was the case.

Apparently their cells in Adhamiyah (in my estimation the strongest remaining in the eastern side of Baghdad proper) were planning a spectacular comeback during which a wave of car bombings would have sought to undermine the improvement in security.
A week of several car bombings a day would have been seen as a huge setback following several weeks of great decline in violence.
Fortunately this has been prevented and whatever their plan was, it's vapor now and they will have to start all over again… That's if they don't get caught, killed or kicked out of the neighborhood, which seems to be happening quite often these days!

Posted by Omar @ 22:44

Four Years!

On a day like this four years ago this blog was created...Time indeed goes by so fast, damn!
Anyway, just wanted to congratulate myself and my big brother (allow me to pat myself on the back!) and to say thanks to all the good people who have been with us in this long journey from the beginning...

Posted by Omar @ 22:08

Tuesday, November 13, 2007

Baath Holds The White Flag

The formation of a so called political council for Iraqi resistance was met by different reactions from the public and the politicians who are now divided into proponents and opponents. Whereas the Accord Front called for mediation between the council and the government some parties in the UIA see that the council cannot be negotiated with and declared it a continuation of the former regime.

What is important in my opinion regarding this development and aside from whether to negotiate with it or not, is the very announcement of forming this new political entity.
It consists of remnants of the former regime and it had led the violent campaign against the change and now its leaders announce the transformation into a political entity seeking negotiations with the government. This represents an admission of the failure of the insurgency. The statement made was dignified with a triumphant tone but this is not the Baath we know. We never saw the Baath triumphant and seeking negotiations at the same time. The former regime never recognized the idea of negotiations and peaceful settlements and this is exactly what led the country to numerous conflicts with the neighbors or with inside adversaries.

Saddam accepted dialogue and negotiations only after he had met defeat. Power always came first in the ideology of the Baath and the cruelty with which Saddam oppressed his domestic adversaries reminds us that searching for negotiations means that the regime, or those who represent its way of thinking, are incapable of sustaining meaningful resistance.

The call for negotiations reflects the failure of the Baath's military option. This failure can be attributed to a number of reasons, the most significant of which is the determination of the Iraqi people and American administration to continue the march in spite of the pain involved in doing so. It became evident with time for the "resistance" that for the average Iraqis, going back to totalitarian rule is not an option and that an American pullout is not visible in the horizon.

Add to that the growing split between the two main current wings of the Baath; the more Islamist one led by Izzat Dori and the secular nationalist one led by Mahmoud Younis al-Ahmed and the deep conflict of interests between al-Qaeda and several Sunni militant groups. More important are the blows the joint troops dealt al-Qaeda and other extremists. For a long time the figures seemed inconclusive but now it seems obvious that the cumulative effect of their losses has made them hold the white flag.

Some of the other factors we can add are Saddam's execution and the legal proceedings taken against the leaders of the insurgency abroad. These have been choking them, especially those who remained active. Like we said before, the rope around Saddam's neck left scars on many other necks.

On the other hand, the rise of rational political and popular tribal Sunni leaderships, who are seen as heroes in the Iraqi west, caused the old "stars" to fade out. In fact the new leaderships seem to be more capable of leading the populace in the provinces where the insurgency was dominant even more efficiently than the Baath was.

The incremental building of a nation and the simultaneous prelude for the contraction of an insurgency were not easy to see through the smoke of battle, but now things have changed and the results will be clear.

Of course the challenges are still great, yet the defeat of al-Qaeda and the fall of the insurgency tell us clear and loud that determination can and will defeat the rest of the enemies.

Posted by Mohammed @ 00:04

Wednesday, November 07, 2007

Why Southern Iraq Won't "Awaken" Like Anbar

There is growing popular dissatisfaction with the poor performance of local administrations across Iraq’s southern provinces and the growing pressures practiced by clerics who are trying to Islamize the society.

To make matters worse are the atrocities committed by some militias and the bitter fighting among ruling parties in which ordinary citizens pay the highest price.
I think clerics and politicians in Prime Minister Maliki’s United Iraq Alliance realize this dissatisfaction may lead to an awakening movement similar to the one that has taken place in Anbar province in the western part of Iraq.

In order to make a comparison, and try to predict what’s likely to happen in the south, one needs to first understand exactly what happened in Anbar.
The core of the struggle there is an old conflict of interests between clerics and tribal sheiks. The two groups competed for leadership of the society for centuries. Even though the sheik might show loyalty to the cleric he still hides enmity for him; they’re each other’s nemesis.

This conflict of interests was evident in what happened during the revolution of 1920, less than a century before the division between those who supported the clergy’s revolt and those who kept their allegiance to the tribe and preserving its interests.

The difference between clerics and sheiks is huge; the first do not believe in negotiation and speak in terms of “halal” and “haram” claiming to be representative of heaven’s justice. Obviously you can’t negotiate deals with God so as far as the clerics are concerned, society must follow them, without asking questions.

By contrast, the tribal sheik was raised and taught to know how to lead productive negotiations. Tribal leaders have long played the role of judges to settle disputes among individuals within the tribe or between different tribes and when they do so they try to make sure that decisions are reached through consultation with the two sides of the dispute and would acceptable to both as well. In other words a sheik has to be a good negotiator, willing to hear both sides of the story and convince them to make concession in order to contain the problem and restore order—it’s an important part of his job.

Now let’s take a look at the difference between the Iraqi west and south.
First: In the west, the situation was much worse than the south. The suffering of the populace under al-Qaeda was intolerable and this was a factor that made anti-al-Qaeda sentiment grow fast and speeded the emergence of the awakening movement.
Secondly: the Sunni clergy represented by the association of Muslim scholars in a fairly recent organization cannot be compared to the long-established Shia clergy in the south. Therefore there was no strong ideological and spiritual connection between the clergy and populace in the west and the struggle between the two organizations (tribe and mosque) intensified.

In the case of the west, the Islamic Party, which was the only political body representing the Sunnis, was opposed to the association. In turn, the clergy turn did not offer the Islamic party blessings during the elections but instead declared it a renegade infidel body. By contrast the Shia clergy offered invaluable support to Shia parties and made their climb to power much easier.
Third, the Islamic state that al-Qaeda sought to establish followed the Salafi doctrine which still represents a minority faction among Iraq’s Sunni community which largely follows the Hanafi doctrine.
These three points summarize why the west and south have some very distinct differences.

From this, I think that the emergence of a tribal awakening against the dominance of religion in the south would run a serious risk of being smeared as a treacherous revolt against the sect-as a community-itself at a time when the Shia are for the first time enjoying the rise of their sect’s role in Iraq’s politics. The pan-nationalist Arab Salafi hostility toward them could make their “awakening” a double-edged sword - it would weaken their unity in the frame of the sect at a time when they still don’t feel completely secure in a pluralistic country.
What happens then?

Both Shia clerics and politicians feel the growing unrest and they know that awakening is coming. Maybe more slowly, because of the factors I mentioned, but surely. This is why they want to stay ahead of the rising tide.
We are therefore likely see a race take place within the UIA towards taking over the coming awakening - even though the UIA itself is the target. In other words, some parties in the UIA will try to maneuver quickly to tame and lead the awakening instead of standing in its way.
Last week or so the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC) praised the efforts to establish awakening councils from among the tribes of the south “to fight outlaw Shia groups” but on the condition that the government, not the Americans, oversees the process.

Politicians and clerics are trying to avoid a scenario similar to that in the west and also to avoid repetition of what happened in the past when some tribes sided with the British administration and hampered the change called for by the clergy.
What the people in the UIA, particularly the SIIC, are thinking is the following ‘if there’s going to be an awakening that can be diverted from attacking us and exploited to serve our interests at the expense of our rivals then so be it!’
Here I think the SIIC is planning to shape the awakening to be exclusively an effort against Sadr movement which rejects the SIIC’s federal project and its control of local administrations to the extent that bloody skirmishes between the two are not uncommon.

This could be the case if the SIIC succeeds to put the awakening under the supervision of the Iraqi government, not American troops, and consequently under the leadership of Badr brigade.
If this happens the process would end up involving more infighting for partisan gains than awakening against the project to build an Islamic state.
The winner then would be the SIIC and to a lesser extent the Dawa, their grip over the region would become stronger, the position of the clergy preserved and popular dissatisfaction dissipated.

Posted by Mohammed @ 07:40