Iraq OKs six more companies for 4th energy bid

Reuters:

Iraq has approved six more energy companies to participate in its 4th energy auction, raising the number of pre-qualified bidders to 46, a senior oil ministry official said on Wednesday.

The auction for 12 new exploration blocs, scheduled for late January, is expected to add 29 trillion cubic feet of gas and 10 billion barrels of oil to Iraqi reserves.

"We have six companies that were not qualified first, but after reviewing their information, we asked them to submit further documents to support their position. We have decided to qualify them after they offered the required documents," Abdul-Mahdy al-Ameedi, director of the oil ministry's contracts and licensing directorate, told Reuters.

It is quite fascinating to me that no matter how deep political deadlocks in Baghdad are, and regardless of whether security is improving or facing setbacks, the oil industry keeps going forward!

Sadr applauds Hizbollah Brigades, seeks merger

Al-Sumaria News (Arabic) quoted Moqtada Sadr as saying that he blesses the work of the Hizbollah Brigades--one of the notorious IRGC backed special groups--and that he offered a merger between the group and his militias; "The strength of the Trend [Sadr's movement], so to speak, is yours."

Sadr also acknowledges that that the Brigades' mission is regional, and extends well beyond Iraq's borders, and implies that his offer was kinda declined; "I had wished for efforts to unite and that your work be dedicated to Iraq alone, but your [the Brigades'] senior commanders rejected that."

Panetta says 3,000 is enough

New York Times reports:

Defense Secretary Leon E. Panetta is supporting a plan that would keep 3,000 to 4,000 American troops in Iraq after a deadline for their withdrawal at year’s end, but only to continue training security forces there, a senior military official said on Tuesday.

Now one of the big questions is force protection. Sadrists and other Iran-backed militias said if any US military personnel are going to stay beyond 2011 then "there will be war." It seems there are 3 logical options:
1)You can keep a force that can defend against such threats, or
2)Demand that the Iraqi government makes a commitment to take decisive action to neutralize that threat, or
3)Find a way to assist Iraq without exposing your people to danger.

Al-Qaeda offshoot acquires, well, something!

Al-Qaeda offshoot acquires Libyan air missiles: EU

Due to the turmoil in Libya, members of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) have "gained access to weapons, either small arms or machine-guns, or certain surface-to-air missiles which are extremely dangerous because they pose a risk to flights over the territory," said Gilles de Kerchove.

So what exactly did they acquire again?

Tehran looking beyond Al-Assad

Asharq Al-Awsat:

...The senior ISCI member also told Asharq Al-Awsat that “Tehran is very concerned about the fate of the Syrian regime, and it wants to move the area of conflict to Iraq and the Arab Gulf region” adding that “in the event of the collapse of the Bashar al-Assad regime, Tehran will concentrate on Baghdad as an alternative to Damascus.” The ISCI source, who spoke to Asharq Al-Awsat on the condition of anonymity, also revealed that “instructions have been issued – in the form of advice from the al-Quds Force that is responsible for the Iraqi file in Iran – for a media campaign to be launched against the Gulf States, particularly Saudi Arabia, in order to raise the issue of Bahrain once again, as well as for a media campaign to be launched against Kuwait against the backdrop of its construction of the Mubarak Port.“

Now that explains what the fuss is about.

Iraq bars Hess from auction over Kurdish deals

Iraq's Oil Ministry has excluded U.S oil firm Hess Corp from competing in its 4th energy auction because the company signed deals with Iraq's northern Kurdish region, a senior Iraqi oil official said on Monday....A laughable attempt to fool the system and avoid blacklisting. You'd expect a company of this size to know better!

U.S. Eyes Covert Plan to Counter Iran in Iraq

Military commanders and intelligence officers are pushing for greater authority to conduct covert operations to thwart Iranian influence in neighboring Iraq, according to U.S. officials....Those in Iraq with shady ties to Iran will freak out. They will put more pressure on Maliki not to request an extension for US presence. Could the envisioned operations be covert enough to bypass that?

Iranian Police Arrest Water-Pistol 'Rebels'

Iranian police have started cracking down on water fights springing up across the country, arresting several young men and women who took part in the latest organized water-pistol battles....Seriously Iran!?

Al-Sadr calls for Iraqis to rise up against gov't

Al-Sadr calls for Iraqis to rise up against gov't...He wants yet another fight.

US military marks first month with no troop deaths in

US military marks first month with no troop deaths in Iraq war.

EU bans Syrian oil as crackdown kills 13

EU bans Syrian oil as crackdown kills 13...will China do the same?

Syrian Protesters Burn Iranian, Russian, and Hezbollah Flags

For decades we watched protesters in the Middle East burn the flags of America, the UK and Israel, as these countries were believed to represent the “enemies of the people.” For the first time, we see protesters burn the flags of Iran, Russia and Hezbollah for a change! Are we witnessing a moment of redefining the “enemies of the people” in the Middle East?

The first video shows protesters in Syria burning the Iranian and Russian flags. The second video shows a protester holding a handwritten sign written in Russian and Arabic addressed to the Russian leadership saying that the Syrian people want their freedom. In the third one, Hezbollah flags are set ablaze in Syria as protesters chanted No to Iran, No to Hezbollah!

Middle East Transformation Will Not Favor Extremists

The ambiguity surrounding some Islamist powers involved in Middle East revolts raise questions in the West about the trajectory in which ongoing turmoil is taking the region. Skepticism is exacerbated by the fact that some Al-Qaeda affiliates are enthusiastically talking about the opportunities that change in the Middle East holds for them. Lessons learned from Iraq’s transformation suggest two things; that the emergence of even a stumbling democracy makes extremists more vulnerable to change themselves, and that the potential for evolution towards democracy is greater than that for relapse towards theocracy. The international community should therefore remain engaged until that outcome is achieved.

Change is happening. And with change comes opportunity for the powers that oppose the status quo. The average Tahrir Square-type protesters use this opportunity to seek greater freedoms, a more representative government, better jobs and other legitimate aspirations. There are, however, unsavory actors who see in this change and the ensuing chaos an opportunity to do harm.

Al-Qaeda propagandist and extremist cleric Anwar Al-Awlaki, for instance, recently said that change will allow terrorist organizations to make a “major leap forward,” regardless of the end-state of the new political system that will replace outgoing dictators.

Awlaki’s generalization is fundamentally flawed, and the opportunity for his envisioned “leap” will end when stability and pluralistic political processes begin to take hold. The nature of the new political system does indeed matter. Protracted ethic and sectarian conflicts, civil wars and failing states tend to provide a favorable environment for extremists and terrorists. Democracies do not.

A democracy should allow previously repressed Islamists to take part in politics. These Islamists will strive to influence this democracy to further their views. But the system also changes the Islamists. Under the previous regimes, Islamist groups appealed to people simply by merit of their opposition to a dictator. In a democratic system the competition is different. Islamists will have to get elected to have influence, and since there will be no more resistance-against-dictatorship to boast, they need to present a revamped platform to be electable.

Gradually the Islamists will have to assume a more civil and less confrontational posture. The campaigns and results of the 2005 and 2010 general elections in Iraq show what the trajectory is; voters gradually base their decisions more on the policies of the contenders rather than their piety.

Even seemingly irreconcilable cases like Moqtada Al-Sadr had to pay lip service to what the people want; reform, freedoms and better services. And above all, they have to eventually distance themselves from violence. Although Sadr continues to threaten with violence and tries to bend democracy to serve his purposes, the rules of the democratic game forced him to suspend most armed operations in 2008--in part--in exchange for a role in politics.

Change in the Middle East will break the vicious cycle the dictators had created and which enabled them to thrive and justify their staying in power. First, they kept the West under the impression that their regimes are necessary to protecting the security and interests of the West from Islamist extremists. Second, they simultaneously kept their people under the illusion that the West is bent on destroying Islam and resurrecting Western imperialism. Such arguments do not seem to resonate well today.

Change will alter the threat calculus for Islamists, from an international, intercultural or global realm, to one that is confined to individual states or communities. Instead of preparing Jihad against America and the West who—in the extremists view—support oppressive regimes and seek to destroy Islam, their efforts will shift towards the more urgent struggle for power within their own countries.

Rallying cries such as Palestine, Iraq or Afghanistan will become less and less relevant as people and factions in the Middle East regardless of their ideology start to compete with one another for power and influence and pay more attention to their problems at home.

Contrary to what Awlaki likes to think, change in the Middle East and North Africa will provide a great opportunity to significantly weaken radical Islamist groups. There will soon be a long and tough turf battle between radicals and moderates within the Muslim communities undergoing change. And as we saw in Iraq a few years ago, Sunni extremists, which saw in the fall of the dictator an opportunity to declare an Islamist state, were defeated at the hands of other Muslims. As long as the international community remains invested in consolidating democracy in the Middle East, the extremists’ fortunes in Libya or Egypt or Bahrain will not be any brighter than they were in Iraq.



By Omar and Mohammed

Power-Sharing Deal Falling Apart?

This is disturbing:

BAGHDAD (AFP) – Iyad Allawi, leader of the bloc that won the most seats in Iraq's 2010 elections, said on Wednesday that he will not chair a supervisory body that he was to have headed as part of a power-sharing deal.

The National Council on Strategic Policies was to be created as a sop to Allawi when rival Nuri al-Maliki was nominated to a second term as prime minister in November, and was intended to constrain Maliki's powers by providing a body for other politicians to make decisions on major issues.


It has yet to be established, though, as a law required to bring it into existence has not been passed.


"I will not participate in the national council," the former premier said in an interview with the Al-Rasheed satellite television channel to be broadcast later on Wednesday. Key quotes were provided beforehand to AFP.


"This is a final decision, and Iraqiya can choose another person instead of me," he said, referring to his Iraqiya bloc which won 91 seats in the 325-member parliament, two more than Maliki's State of Law coalition. Allawi attributed his decision to "the lack of implementation of the national partnership agreement."

And not even a day later...



Now Allawi is not naive. He knows very well that a) the Kurds will stick with Maliki with whom they have a strategic deal. He has so far given them what they wanted, including the right to resume oil exports, and b) the Sadrists and ISCI--even if they ally with him--will not allow him to become Prime Minister, as we saw during 9 months of negotiations. So whay is he doing this?

Ayad Allawi traveled to Najaf on Thursday for talks with Moqtada Al-Sadr. At a joint press conference with Sadr, Allawi announced that Iraqiya seeks to build better ties with the Sadrist movement, ISCI and the Kurdistan Alliance. “Iraqiya wants to build positive relations with all blocs and political movements in the country, particularly with the Sadrist movement.”

Note that yesterday, the Sadrists alluded to the possibility of forging a new majority coalition with Allawi, ISCI and the Kurds. In my opinion, this call is simply another example of Sadr's disruptive attitude.

The National Council for Strategic Policies

The most recent draft of the legislation to govern the proposed National Council for Strategic Policies (NCSP) leaked to an Iraqi news website yesterday. This is the body which Ayad Allawi is supposed to chair under the deal between him, Barzani and Maliki. Allawi has set this as the condition for his bloc's participation in Maliki's government. The parliment is supposed to vote on this next week.

Here's my rather quick, not so fancy translation:

The National Council for Strategic Policies

The structure of the Council

A. The presidency of the council: Consists of the president of the council and the secretary general.

B. The members of the council: Include the president of the republic and his deputies, the presidency of the parliament, the presidency of the federation council, the PM, his deputies, the presidents of federal regions, and the president of the supreme judicial council.

C. Participants in the council meetings: concerned ministers, by invitation from the presidency of the council. Those ministers do not have the right to vote.

D. Advisors and experts.

E. Administrative staff.

F. Independent budget.

G. The council is part of the executive branch and its president has a rank equivalent to the Prime Minister.

H. The ministers are required to attend meetings concerning their specialties, without affecting their work at the council of ministers.

I. The Council has the right to appoint advisors in various fields of expertise as needed.

J. The Council is the place where the three branches of government work in cohesion in an integrated manner to build the state. The Council is not a replacement for either branch.


The functions of the council:

1. Domestic policies:

Achieving national reconciliation and supervising its implementation. Repatriation of refugees and internally displaced people, and compensating them in a manner commensurate with damages and suffering. Expediting the processing of detainees and the release of the innocent. Dealing with the decisions of the Justice and Accountability Committee within the judicial framework and recommending that the Parliament close this file. Building a common vision for constitutional amendments to overcome previous loopholes and improve the efficiency of the political system.


2. Foreign policy:

Preparing the prerequisites for:

a. regaining Iraq’s status within the Arab and Islamic community.

b. creating constructive relations with the regional and international surroundings.

c. removing Iraq from under Chapter VII of the UN charter.

3. Monetary and economic policy:

Planning national strategies for various economic activities to secure prosperity and decent living standards for the people. Adopting specific guidelines and standards for achieving sound economic growth and harmony between federal budget allocations and the priorities of the strategic goals and the investment and development plans and programs.


4. Security and military policies:

Planning the high strategic policies for Iraq’s internal and external security. To secure Iraq’s stability and the nation’s ability to deter and defend against any aggression. These policies include the following areas:

a. Defense policy

b. Armed forces buildup

c. Military doctrine

d. Procurement policy

e. Training doctrines

f. Military service policy

g. Unit deployment

h. Force employment

i. Internal security policy (nationwide)

j. Command structure, and defining powers and responsibilities (supreme commander, commander in chief, defense minister, interior minister, chairman of the join chiefs)

k. Intelligence strategy, and coordinating the functions of the different intelligence agencies

5. Oil, Gas and Electricity policy:

Establish a special commission, attached to the Council, to be comprised of experts, as well as the ministries of oil, electricity and water resources. The commission’s function is to review the principles and foundations of contracts and agreements, to make amendments to traties, and to expedite the drafting of the oil and gas law, and any other legislations, prior to sending them to the parliament.

6. Administrative policy:

Amending the CPA-issued Inspector General law. The Council also plays a role in planning and overseeing the execution of high policies for the preservation of national culture, heritage, and education.


7. Policies concerning the sovereignty and integrity of the judiciary:

Preparing a list of priorities to enact the necessary legislations, in coordination with the council of ministers. Evaluating the framework of active laws and legislations to identify and address weaknesses. Abolishing legislations, rules and regulations that were made by the former regime.


8. Constitutional amendments:

Building a common vision for constitutional amendments to overcome previous loopholes and improve the efficiency of the political system and support the nation’s stability (examples include the dispute over the definition of the “largest bloc”, fluid timetables for transfer of power, etc).


9. National priorities:

Since the Council deals with the highest policies of the nation, the matter requires adopting the following pattern:

1. Defining the concept of national reconciliation

2. Defining the objectives that must be met to achieve national reconciliation

3. Designing the grand strategy (the policies required to achieve the objectives), by defining the tasks, assigning duties, timeframes, alternatives, etc.

10. General considerations:

a. This Council does not act against the constitution

b. Technical meetings shall be held with concerned ministers and advisers.

c. The political meetings of the Council are convened by the presence of the members as explained above above.

d. The duties, specialties and decision-making mechanism are to be decided, and shall become part of the Council’s internal charter.

e. This Council is established by law for one electoral cycle, and may be extended for more than one cycle according to future agreements among the members of the council of representatives.

f. The decisions and recommendations of the Council are binding to all concerned entities.

g. The Council reserves the right to establish permanent or temporary commissions or workgroups to address specific issues.

Maliki's rivals are not giving up yet

Unnamed politicians say that former PM Ibrahim Jaafari, Finance Minister Bayan Jabr, and the sketchy Ahmed Chalabi will be working separately to foil Maliki's efforts to assemble a cabinet. The key, according to the report, is in the following lines from the constitution.

Article 76:

First: The President of the Republic shall charge the nominee of the largest Council of Representatives bloc with the formation of the Council of Ministers within fifteen days from the date of the election of the President of the Republic.

Second: The Prime Minister-designate shall undertake the naming of the members of his Council of Ministers within a period not to exceed thirty days from the date of his designation.

Third: If the Prime Minister-designate fails to form the Council of Ministers during the period specified in clause “Second,” the President of the Republic shall charge a new nominee for the post of Prime Minister within fifteen days.

Fourth: The Prime Minister-designate shall present the names of his members of the Council of Ministers and the ministerial program to the Council of Representatives. He is deemed to have gained its confidence upon the approval, by an absolute majority of the Council of Representatives, of the individual Ministers and the ministerial program.

Fifth: The President of the Republic shall charge another nominee to form the Council of Ministers within fifteen days in case the Council of Ministers did not win the vote of confidence.

Several observations arise here.
First, all three alleged plots are led by politicians who are very close to Iran. My assumption here is that since the premiership is going to stay within the Shiite house in general (since Iraqiya and the Kurds already got their share of the three top posts) Maliki drastically depreciated from Iran's perspective. After all, Tehran was at odds with Maliki since after he turned on Sadr 2008. The support Iran gave Maliki in the past few months was an exception to the rule. Now that the Shiite parties are more or less on the same side again, it makes sense for Iran to back a less nationalistic figure.

Second, as usual, any such scheme would require Kurdish cooperation. From the Kurds perspective, a good PM should be: 1)reasonably weak, 2)not a Sunni Arab nationalist. At least two of the three men named in the report fit the bill. However, the Kurds seem quite happy with the deal with Maliki, so it's not easy to tell what their response is going to be should the alleged schemes materialize.

Third, the constitutional article isn't specific enough. The third clause does not specify whether the "new nominee for the post of Prime Minister" must come from the largest bloc in parliament, or any other bloc.

The government formation journey could be far from over.

Government formation update

The government formation process seems to have reached critical mass and I suspect we’re going to see some interesting developments within the next couple weeks. Here’s where the different groups stand as of now:


The Sadrists (40 seats) made a 180 degree turn earlier this week by supporting Maliki’s bid for a second term. Apparently a fatwa from Ayatollah Ha’iri (Moqtada’s mentor) forced him to change his mind, even though he had been consistently and adamantly opposed to letting Maliki stay for a second term. But Sadr isn't particularly famous for being consistent! His followers are confused to say the least, because Sadr has more than once referred to Maliki as a liar and a hypocrite. Now Sadr is telling his followers that his decision to support the same hypocrite is “in their best interest.”

This change in Sadr’s position has brought the Iraqi National Alliance (INA: Sadrists, ISCI, and Fadheela) to the brink of collapse. While Sadr and Fadheela endorse Maliki, ISCI, led by Ammar Hakim remains opposed to Maliki staying power and is still trying to promote its own candidate Aadil Abdul Mahdi. In fact, ISCI is in a tough position because it’s suffering from internal divisions as well. Badr organization (aka Badr Brigade, led by Hadi Al-Aamiri, who is very close to Iran) which represents roughly half of ISCI is moving in the same direction as Sadr. Hakim and Abdul Mahdi believe this is their last chance to remain a relevant player. They see they have been losing ground and clout to their rivals/partners over time. Five years ago ISCI (back then SCIRI) was the largest, most powerful Shiite party, but now they have only 17 seats out of 325. ISCI leaders think that a deal with Allawi could give them some of that power back.

The Kurds (57 seats) are generally closer to Allawi these days, but also have some disagreements. Masoud Barzani seems comfortable supporting Allawi, but Jalal Talabani sounds like he’s been under a lot of pressure from Iran to go in the opposite direction. This is potentially dangerous.

The two smaller blocs; Tawafok (6 seats) and Iraq Unity (4 seats) can be counted as Allawis upporters.

The INA is having a meeting today with Maliki’s bloc, but ISCI is not going to take part. The meeting will most certainly result in declaring Maliki as the official candidate of the so called National Coalition (INA+Maliki’s State of Law coalition). This would give Maliki 140 votes—and potentially half a dozen more if Badr breaks away from ISCI.

The only option for the other blocs to counter this outcome would be to form their own coalition, and there are signals (particularly from Allawi) that this is already in the works. If the Kurds, ISCI and the two smaller parties join Allawi (assuming Talabani doesn’t go astray) they will have a total of 168-175 votes, depending on whether Badr stays or goes with Maliki. Either number is of course greater than 163, which is what they need to present their own candidate; that would be Allawi, or Abdul Mahdi.

UPDATE:

Maliki is now officially nominated for the premiership with Sadr's support. ISCI boycotted the meeting.

On the radio

Will be on the Brian Lehrer-WNYC show tomorrow starting 10:06 Am EST to talk about the withdrawal of combat troops and Obama's speech.

New Op-Ed

Check out the opinion page at the WSJ tomorrow. Austin Bay and I will have a piece on government formation.

Realities, rules, relationships won't help surge succeed

Debating the surge in Afghanistan, on The Hill. Here are my two cents.

When the Bush administration unveiled the Iraq surge and new war strategy, then Senator Barak Obama opposed the plan, arguing it was bound to fail and increase the violence. He was proven wrong. A few years later, President Obama, faced with a dismal situation in Afghanistan, is trying to copy the same approach, minus the right strategy and necessary catalysts. Although it may take many months before a reliable assessment of success or failure can be made, there is little reason to expect Obama’s plan to meet with the same success of the Iraq surge.

Let’s look at some of the enablers of success in Iraq and compare those with the situation in Afghanistan.

First, differences in the capability, resolve and reliability of local partners matter. In Iraq's case, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki acted as a resolute, if sometimes reckless, partner. He did not shy away from cracking down on terrorists or confronting insurgents — Shiite or Sunni — head-on. The parallel rapid growth in the size and proficiency of Iraqi security forces — which some keen observers called “the real surge” — was also instrumental in turning the tide.

In Afghanistan, the situation is not even remotely similar. President Hamid Karzai not only has been reluctant to support military operations but went as far as threatening to join the Taliban. Moreover, U.S. forces cannot expect from Afghan forces the same level of active participation the Iraqis were able to contribute. Despite having a larger population, Afghanistan’s security forces are a third the size of Iraq’s. Tough terrain and more scattered population centers further complicate counterinsurgency operations by the smaller combined U.S.-Afghan force.

Second, different operational strategies and stricter rules of engagement represent another challenge to troops in Afghanistan. While both surge plans emphasized protecting the civilian population, the strategy in Iraq also emphasized taking the fight to the enemy. An important part of the strategy was sending troops out of large bases to fight their way into neighborhoods where they established combat outposts from which they could protect civilians and proactively tackle the enemy at the same time, which they did. Troops in Afghanistan do not have the same freedom of action. The rules in Iraq offered troops more flexibility in force employment, allowing them to take timely decisive action against the enemy. In Afghanistan it is common to hear troops complain how the new rules of engagement can allow enemy fighters to escape, and occasionally put the troops in danger. This was not the case in Iraq.

Third, the relationships between the population, terrorists and government were different in Iraq than in Afghanistan. Afghans, while not necessarily fond of the Taliban actions, do not seem to see huge differences between Taliban and government control. In fact sometimes they prefer the former as the Taliban can be better at governance and creating working relations with the population, largely because the government is so incompetent and corrupt.

In Iraq the situation was different. Terrorists alienated the population with their brutality, while the government and U.S. forces offered brighter and more viable alternatives. By the time the surge started, Awakening tribes were already chasing down al-Qaeda.

The Iraq surge had the right enablers, but also clear and suitable political and military goals—to protect the population, defeat the irreconcilable, and offer the reconcilable a chance to find political solutions. Obama sent the additional troops, and the generals wrote great counterinsurgency manuals, but a comprehensive strategy based on the needs and assets on the ground does not seem to exist yet.